• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.175-181
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• 2024

The U.N. Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee estimated that the amount of North Korea's cyberattacks on virtual asset-related companies from 2017 to 2023 was about 4 trillion won. North Korea's cyberattacks have secured funds through cryptocurrency hacking as it has been restricted from securing foreign currency due to economic sanctions by the international community, and it also shows the form of technology theft against defense companies, and illegal assets are being used to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and develop nuclear and missile development. When North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, and declared the completion of its national nuclear armament following the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on November 29 of the same year, the U.N. imposed sanctions on North Korea, which are considered the strongest economic sanctions in history. In these difficult economic situations, North Korea tried to overcome the crisis through cyberattacks, but as a result of analyzing the changes through the North's cyber attack cases, the strategic goal from the first period from 2009 to 2016 was to verify and show off North Korea's cyber capabilities through the neutralization of the national network and the takeover of information, and was seen as an intention to create social chaos in South Korea. When foreign currency earnings were limited due to sanctions against North Korea in 2016, the second stage seized virtual currency and secured funds to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and advance nuclear and missile development. The third stage is a technology hacking of domestic and foreign defense companies, focusing on taking over key technologies to achieve the five strategic weapons tasks proposed by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. At the national level, security measures for private companies as well as state agencies should be established against North Korea's cyberattacks, and measures for legal systems, technical problems, and budgets related to science are urgently needed. It is also necessary to establish a system and manpower to respond to the ever-developing cyberattacks by focusing on cultivating and securing professional manpower such as white hackers.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.227-233
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• 2023

Along with the 4th Industrial Revolution, the impact of "unmanned" is affecting all fields around the world, and in particular, in the military sector, "unmanned" is so important that it occupies a part of the main combat system. Recently, the South Korean military is facing a crisis due to the North Korea's UAV incident that invaded our airspace and descended to Seoul. In response, the South Korea military declared its willingness and countermeasures to capture and destroy North Korea's UAV. However, as the technological development of UAV continues and the utilization plan is expanding, the countermeasures for UAV at the current level can be useless. Also, the threat from North Korea is not just UAV. North Korea has practically a nuclear power and is set to conduct its seventh nuclear test, and its missile technology is also being advanced, with 38 arounds of 67 missile tests conducted in 2022 alone. It is also developing five key strategic weapons that can pose a fatal threat to Korea, and North Korea's strong conventional forces are located around the NLL(Northern Limit Line), and the port of Long Range Artillery is facing the Seoul metropolitan area. It is important to respond to North Korea's UAV threats, which are now receiving much attention, but it will be necessary to comprehensively analyze and clearly prioritize North Korea's threats and use a limited budget to respond to them.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.93-112
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• 2018

The Pyeongchang 2018 Olympic Winter Games is a good example of functionalism in integration theories. President Moon Jae-in is extremely lucky to play host to the Winter Olympics. Moon should be particularly happy to have declared the 23rd Winter Games open, because a handful of North Korean athletes marched into the Pyeongchang Stadium as members of a joint team from "Corea," the result of his strenuous efforts to have the North participate in the world festival of sports on snow and ice. But the president of this divided nation hardly draws envy from other world leaders, as he is faced with the daunting task of accommodating the selfish positions of surrounding powers concerning North Korean nuclear and missile threats. North Korea, a trivial competitor in winter sports, scored big outside the games' sporting arenas by inviting President Moon to summit talks in Pyongyang. As a precondition for a 2018 summit, Pyongyang will first ask for the cessation of the annual joint Korea-US military exercises. President Moon invested a lot in the Olympic delegates from the North. Korea's leader will now have to start a truly difficult game which will require the best of best strategies as well as a great deal of wisdom and tenacity not only to deal with the weapons of mass destruction-toting North Koreans, but also with allies. On the other hand, Moon needs to make the effort to reset domestic politics with tolerance and compromise, so he can better concentrate on the conundrum of North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.43-81
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• 2016

Security environment we face in the Korean Peninsula is unexpectable. Tensions between Seoul and Pyeongyang and its threats are continuously evolving. Kim Jung Un will keep on conducting provocations and DPRK's isolation will result uncertainty to their objective and intention. KPA is centered on ground forces with conventional weapons but they possess modernized missiles and nuclear capabilities. What's more concerning is that North Korea continuously pursue and develop nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Pursuing defense reform is inevitable for the ROK to deal adequately against the security threats posed by the North and to prepare for the environment of future warfare. If we are satisfied with the current capabilities then our military capabilities and security status will retrogress. We have to reorganize our units to make a small but FMC, smart military organization. Organization analysis is an urgent issue for reorganizing units. However, it isn't an easy task to reform an organization. There are vague parts for analysis and strong resistance from the people within the organization. Therefore should not focus on the reduction of people and the organization. Organization reform should be done with the acknowledgement of most of the personnel and should focus on the task and its method. These should be reflected to the organization analysis.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.109-115
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• 2019

The North's short-range projectiles and missiles are the Iskander-class missiles of the S-300 series, with a range of 270-420 kilometers and an altitude of 40-50 kilometers, making it very difficult to respond with South Korea's detection radar or striking weapons. The North's handling of the Seoul sea of fire also makes it very urgent for the South to deploy the weapons to power or introduce them as soon as possible, as it can identify its intention to strike the Seoul metropolitan area by equipping such short-range rockets and missiles with nuclear or chemical weapons. We will be prepared to prep are for reckless provocations by securing our own technology by continuously developing the Korean missile defense system and striking system, Kill Chain, which is designed to defend short-range missiles in the long-term, and securing our own technology.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.325-354
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• 2013

The concept of national security and the fundamental system for crisis management have departed from traditional methods and the importance of a national critical infrastructure crisis management has been emphasized. A national critical infrastructure crisis means a situation where human resource, material and functional system that may have a material effect on the critical functions of the government, the vitality and integrity of society, national economy and the safety of the public becomes disabled due to causes such as terrorism or major disasters. Although North Korea had been subject to numerous rounds of negotiations and sanctions as it continually developed nuclear weapons since the 1960s, it has also showed off its nuclear armaments through successful nuclear testings and missile launches. As the development and threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction becomes more noticeable and the range of its risk expands, this study focuses on the potential for an absence of leadership for national crisis management where the country's leadership, which should serve the critical role and function of handling national crises, becomes completely destroyed by the unexpected initial attacks by North Korea. As a result, the purpose of this study is to propose safety measures for the country's leadership in preparation for North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons by examining the concept and degree of risk of weapons of mass destruction with a focus on nuclear weapons, analyzing the substance of the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and evaluating such threat. In conclusion, first, to ensure the normal functioning of a national crisis management system in the event of a national crisis, we must seek safety measures that conform to the scope and succession order of the leadership of the national crisis management for an Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and the Continuity Of Operations (COOP). Second, in the event of a national ceremony, the gathering of the country's leadership all together in an open place should be avoided. In unavoidable circumstances, the next in rank that will act on behalf of the current leader should be designated and relevant safety measures should be taken. Third, during time of peace, in preparation for national crises, the scope of protection for the country's leadership should be prescribed and specific security and safety measures should be implemented. Fourth, the succession order for acting president in the case of the death of the president pursuant to Articles 71 and 26(1) of the National Government Organization Act should reconsidered to see whether it is a reasonable provision that takes into consideration a national crisis management that corresponds to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Pursuant to the Basic Guidelines for National Crisis Management set out under Presidential Directive No. 229, the Korean government is currently operating a case-by-case "crisis management standard manual" and its sub-manuals and has also prepared the Presidential Security Service's security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president. Therefore, the Korean government should actualize the above points in the case-by-case crisis management standard manual and security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president to implement and legislate them.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.6_1
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• pp.51-58
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• 2016

"History is a mirror" means that we should be prepared for the threats of enemies through learning from repeating history. Currently South Korea is facing various provocations, including North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile s. For the protection of the life and property of its people, South Korea should regard North Korea as a main enemy and be fully prepared for the threats. The Korean War was a war between well-prepared North Korea and ill-prepa red South Korea. After Liberation, North Korean army incorporated the Chinese Communist army, placed battle equi pment with the support of the Soviet army, and finished corps-level training while South Korea at that time did not finish battalion-level training. In wartime and peacetime, an army should improve military security by concealing its own information and find its enemy's information. North Korea carefully prepared for the war, collecting information about the organization, deployment and operation of the South Korean army. South Korean army failed to cope with it and had hard times in its early battles. In this paper, I will emphasize the importance of military security, focusing on the Battle of Gaeseong, the early part of the Korean War.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.142-176
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• 2018

So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.