• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.73-81
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• 2017

In April 2009, in the wake of President Obama's Prague speech, the international community held four nuclear sec urity summits from 2010 to 2016 to promote nuclear security and prevent nuclear terrorism. The Nuclear Security S ummit has made significant progress in preventing terrorists from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons or fissile materials, but it still has limitations and problems. To solve this problem, the international community should resume the joint efforts for strengthening bilateral cooperation and multilateral nuclear security regime, and the participating countries should strive to protect their own nuclear materials and fulfill their commitments to secure nuclear facilitie s. Second, the United Nations(UN), the IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency), International Criminal Police Or ganization(INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT), and the Global Partnership(G P) must continue their missions to promote nuclear security in accordance with the five action plans adopted at the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit. Third, the participating countries should begin discussions on the management and protection of military nuclear materials that could not be covered by the Nuclear Security Summit. Fourth, the intern ational community must strive to strengthen the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuc lear Material(CPPNM) Amendment and International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrori sm(ICSANT), prepare for cyber attacks against nuclear facilities, and prevent theft, illegal trading and sabotage invo lving nuclear materials.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.69-96
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• 2019

This paper is written to suggest several recommendations for South Korea to deter and defend North Korean nuclear threat, when North Korea does not seem to give up its nuclear weapons and the US's extended deterrence including the nuclear umbrella could remain uncertain. For this purpose, it explains key options regarding nuclear deterrence and defense by non-nuclear weapon state. It evaluates the current status of South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat and provides some recommendations to improve the preparedness. As a result, this paper concluded that South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat was not that reliable. The preparedness has weakened since the South Korean effort to denuclearize North Korea through negotiations in 2018. In this sense, South Korea could have serious problems in protecting its people from North Korean nuclear threat if the US promise of extended deterrence is not implemented. South Korea should focus on its decapitation operation to North Korean highest leaders in case of North Korean nuclear attack based on a minimal deterrence concept. It should be prepared to conduct preventive strikes instead of preemptive strikes due to North Korea's development of solid fuel ballistic missiles. It should integrate its Ballistic Missile Defense with that of the US forces in Korea. South Korea should make a sincere effort for nuclear civil defense including construction of nuclear shelters.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.129-141
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of preventive attacks through cases of military attacks against nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria that Israel has conducted. It also suggests a desirable approach to preventive attacks against North Korea. The Operation Opera in Iraq in 1981 and the Operation Orchard in Syria in 2007 are examined with an aim to support the opinion "the preventive attack can not be successful in the long run though it may be effective in the short term". It is also possible to denuclearize if the effective preventive attacks on the Korean peninsula are conducted together with removing both nuclear weapons development means and will. In order to guarantee the successful prevent attacks, it is necessary to secure the legitimacy of preventive attacks as well as international pressure. Also, the reliable military attack should be done on facilities, manpower and monitored continuously to prevent developing the nuclear afterwards.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Industry Convergence
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• v.21 no.6
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• pp.395-408
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• 2018

Even after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, the rate of production of electric energy using nuclear energy is increasing, but there is a great danger such as the radioactive waste produced when using nuclear power, the catastrophic accident of nuclear power plant, and connection with nuclear weapons. In particular, Cs present in the ionic form of alkaline elements has a long half-life (30.17 years) because it is readily absorbed by the organism and emits intense gamma rays, thus presenting a serious radiation hazard. Therefore, it must be completely removed before it can be released into the natural ecosystem, because it can adversely affect not only humans but also natural ecosystems. Many adsorbents and ion exchangers which have high Cs removal efficiency have been used in recent years to completely separate and remove by self separation in water. Many adsorbents and ion exchangers which have high Cs removal efficiency have been used in recent years to completely separate and remove by self separation in water. In addition, researches have been doing to synthesize magnetic materials with adsorbents such as HCF and PB, and it shows a great effect in the removal rate of Cs present in wastewater or the maximum Cs adsorption amount. In particular, when a magnetic material was applied, excellent results were obtained in which only Cs was selectively removed from other cations. However, new problems such as applicability in the sea where Cs is directly released, applicability in various pH ranges, and failure to preserve the magnetizing force possessed by the magnetic body have been found. However, researches using ferromagnetic field with stronger magnetic properties than those of magnetic bodies is considered to be insufficient. Therefore, it is considered that if the researches combining the ferromagnetic field with the magnetization ability and functional adsorbents more actively, the radioactive material Cs which adversely affects the natural ecosystem can be effectively removed.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.1156-1163
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• 2020

Fuel temperature coefficient (FTC) of PuO₂+ZrO₂ (ROX) fueled LWR cell is analyzed neutronically with reactor- and weapons-grade plutonium fuels in comparison with a U-free PuO₂+ThO₂ (TOX), and a conventional MOX fuel cells. The FTC value of a ROX fueled LWR is smaller compared to a TOX or a MOX fueled LWRs and becomes extremely positive especially, at EOL. This is because when fuel temperature is increased, thermal neutron spectrum is shifted to harder, which is extreme at EOL in ROX fuel than that in TOX and MOX fuels. Consequently at EOL, ²³⁹Pu and ²⁴¹Pu contributes to positive fuel temperature reactivity (FTR) in ROX fuel, while they have negative contribution in TOX and MOX fuels. The FTC problem of ROX fuel is mitigated by additive ThO₂, UO₂ or Er₂O₃. In ROX-additive fuel, the atomic density of fissile Pu becomes more than additive free ROX fuel especially at EOL, which is the main cause to improve the FTC problem. The density of fissile Pu is more effective to decrease the thermal spectrum shifts with increase the fuel temperature than additive ThO₂, UO₂ or Er₂O₃ in ROX fuel.

• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.97-106
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• 2015

Currently, South Korea is exposed to various attacks of North Korea such as traditional, nuclear, and ABC weapons. Now it is hard to make an accurate estimate the damage may have been occurred to citizens due to those attacks. It is only possible to assume the rough outline. As a countermeasure to such military threats of North Korea, government-aided evacuation facilities services are going along across the board concerning the object, installation range, budget, and drawing standards. Whereas, in case of public evacuation facilities, there is no special regulation or principle in designation. Since various facilities are regarded as applicable, any protection against military threats can't be anticipated. In this study, military threats provoked by North Korea are figured out, thus the problem of plan and design that public evacuation facilities have are pointed out. This study suggest the result and proposal.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.271-309
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• 2010

The main theme of this study is about North Korea's contemporary military strategy which remained a blind spot in the 21st century. Indeed, Pyongyang's contemporary military strategy is evolved from the logic of War. On the basis of this logic, this study examined North Korea's contemporary military strategy with three analytical frameworks. The first is the discovery of Clausewitz's dictums and application of the Trinitarian analysis on the Korean cases. During the course of applying Clausewitzian main dictum--War as continuation of politics, the methodological analysis on war played a important role generalizing the pattern and matrix of North Korea's strategic thinking and military strategy. In particular, Clausewitz's Trinitarian framework on war -Government (reason), Army (chance), People (passion)- was a universal framework to scrutinize the North Korean missile and nuclear strategy. The second is about the matrix of North Korea's military strategy, The study suggested the genealogical feature of Pyongyang's military strategy. In principle, the dictum of 'Military-First Politics' 1S the combination of the political philosophy, Chuch'e (self-reliance) of Kim Il Sung and Kin Jong Il reflected in the military readiness. As a result this analysis was able to equate Clausewitz's dictums to explain Pyongyang's idea of the nature of war in that North Korea's military strategy is the central instrument of delivery to achieve political objectives. The third is about the theoretical encounter of 'Clausewitz's Wonderful Trinity' and 'Remarkable Trinity on North Korea's contemporary strategy'. On the basis, three elements are connected to one of three groups in society; the people, the military, and the government. In order to apply the Clausewitz's Trinitarian analysis into Kim Jong Il's 'Military-First' strategy, two case studies (Missile and Nuclear strategy) were examined. The finding of this study is that Clausewitzian dictum in the 19th century is still valid in the 21st century as it provided plausible theoretical framework to explain the North Korean contemporary military strategy with a reminder that the nature and logic of war are fixed in the socially constructed state.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Systems Engineering
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.29-38
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• 2016

The threats around Korea Peninsula have been dramatically increased because North Korea is developing the Nuclear ballistic missile, Submarine launched ballistic missile(SLBM), and many kinds of weapons for sudden provocations. Therefore, ROK navy needs the cutting-edge warship combat systems in order to defeat the enemy threats effectively in the sea. The paper analyzes current warship combat system acquisition process and studies US navy and other advanced countries acquisition process and their contraction trends. After that, the paper proposes the optimal acquisition process of warship combat system for the ROK navy based on our current situation and other advanced countries acquisition trends. The paper will dedicate the next generation warship combat system acquisition process.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.418-425
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• 2021

Submarines are weapons systems that have been proven to be useful in battle since World War I and have continued to improve the efficiency of propulsion systems in order to be used efficiently on the battlefield. In particular, countries that unable to utilize nuclear propulsion systems make efforts to increase the efficiency of Air Independent Propulsion systems, and typical examples are fuel cells, Stirling engines and MESMA. It is also expected that the development of new propulsion systems such as hydrogen-reformer fuel cells, metal-air fuel cell and direct combustion propulsion systems will continue, so the characteristics of these will be examined and the performance based on the published data be checked in this thesis.