• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.152-177
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• 2021

Purpose - This study analyses the excepted requirement and burden of proof of the carrier due to unseaworthiness through comparison between the marine transport contract and marine insurance contract. Design/methodology - This study uses the legal analytical normative approach. The juridical approach involves reviewing and examining theories, concepts, legal doctrines and legislation that are related to the problems. In this study a literature analysis using academic literature and internet data is conducted. Findings - The burden of proof in case of seaworthiness should be based on presumed fault, not proved fault. The burden of proving unseaworthiness/seaworthiness should shift to the carrier, and should be exercised before seeking the protections of the law or carriage contract. In other words, the insurer cannot escape coverage for unfitness of a vessel which arises while the vessel is at sea, which the assured could not have prevented in the exercise of due diligence. The insurer bears the burden of proving unseaworthiness. The warranty of seaworthiness is implied in hull, but not protection and indemnity policies. The 2015 Act repeals ss. 33(3) and 34 of MIA 1906. Otherwise the provisions of the MIA 1906 remain in force, including the definition of a promissory warranty and the recognition of implied warranties. There is less clarity about the position when the source of the loss occurs before the breach of warranty but the actual loss is suffered after the breach. Nonetheless, by s.10(2) of the 2015 Act the insurer appears not to be liable for any loss occurring after the breach of warranty and before there has been a remedy. Originality/value - When unseaworthiness is identified after the sailing of the vessel, mere acceptance of the ship does not mean the party waives any claims for damages or the right to terminate the contract, provided that failure to comply with the contractual obligations is of critical importance. The burden of proof with regards to loss of damage to a cargo caused by unseaworthiness is regulated by the applicable law. For instance, under the common law, if the cargo claimant alleges that the loss or damage has been caused by unseaworthiness, then he has the burden of proof to establish the followings: (i) that the vessel was unseaworthy at the beginning of the voyage; and that, (ii) that the loss or damage has been caused by such unseaworthiness. In other words, if the warranty of seaworthiness at the inception of the voyage is breached, the breach voids the policy if the ship owner had prior knowledge of the unseaworthy condition. By contrast, knowingly permitting the vessel to break ground in an unseaworthy condition denies liability only for loss or damage proximately caused by the unseaworthiness. Such a breach does not, therefore, void the entire policy, but only serves to exonerate the insurer for loss or damage proximately caused by the unseaworthy condition.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.142-163
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• 2013

Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.13-21
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• 2010

Since Korea establish diplomatic ties with China in 1992, korea and China have had rapid progress in most of field as politic, economy, society and culture through basing on cultural commonality and geographical adjacency. Especially, China is the biggest trading partner to korea, and also Korea is third-biggest trading country to China. They become strategic cooperating relation in 2008. Currently, in terms of international trade relation, WTO/DDA negotiation is proceeding in difficulty, but FTA has been growing and extending in the world, and the two country, china and korea, have been competitively trying wide and active FTA negotiation promotion. After Financial crisis in 1997, according to the requirement of local economic cooperation, China has shown the interest to several countries since the conclusion of FTA treaty with ASEAN in 2005. China also makes the active afford to conclude FTA with Korea. Last May 28th, this was mentioned in the meeting between president Lee and Premier Wen Jiabao, so it is anticipated that the negotiation for FTA will be started in the near future. There are many political suggestions and concerns in terms of way of negotiation korea would choose. Some economist said that "'Continuous FTA aimed at long-term protocol should be promoted between korea and China and negotiated includingly'" However, this research claims that commodity exchange, service, and investment areas should be included and it has to be comprehensive package settlement style in negotiation. This research has found out the characteristics of China's negotiation and implications through the China's existed FTA negotiation examples. Currently, China has taken Continuous or a phase-negotiation method to ASEAN, Pakistan, Chile and some other developing country and to advanced countries like New Zealand or Singapore, comprehensive package settlement method is used in FTA negotiation. In consider of the FTA negotiation between Korea and China, Korea has some problems in the commodity change area in agriculture maket's opening. While, for china, the issues would happen in service trade area, especially when encountering finance and communication industries are opened, China's economy could be exposed to some risk. In result, Korea should expand its negotiation range from commodity trade to service trade, in order to exchange both issues, then the negotiation will be concluded more easily. In other word, for FTA, korea should follow comprehensive package settlement way that is similar to New zealand and Singapore case. Through this kind of method, Korea can expect effect of creating trade, conversion of it and preoccupancy of service field in china's market against the advanced countries like Usa, Europe and Japan. Also, to have a successful FTA negotiation, korea should find out china's policy for FTA negotiation. With this information, korea will be able to suggest the way to make a profit. Systematic analysis and comparison about previous negotiation cases of china are needed before the negotiation begin.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.45-79
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• 2018

An increase of airplanes and military aircraft operation lead to significant demanding of residential claims by people who live in nearby airports and military bases due to noise, vibration and residential damages caused by aircraft operations. In recent years, a plaintiff has filed a lawsuit against the defendant, claiming the prohibition of using claimant's possessed land as a helicopter landing route, and the Daejeon High Court was in favour of the plaintiff. Although the Supreme Court later dismissed the Appeal Court decision, it is necessary to discuss the case of setting flight prohibited zone. In Japan, the airport noise lawsuits have been filed for a long time, mainly by environmental groups. Unlike the case that admitted residential damages caused by noise, the Yokohama District Court for the first time sentenced a judgment of the prohibition of the flight. This ruling was partially changed in the appellate court and some of the plaintiffs' claims were adopted. However, the Supreme Court of Japan finally rejected such decision from appeal and district courts. Atsugi Base is an army camp jointly used by the United States and Japan, and residents, live nearby, claim that they are suffering from mental damage such as physical abnormal, insomnia, and life disturbance because of the noise from airplane taking off and landing in the base. An administrative lawsuit was therefore preceded in the Yokohama District Court. The plaintiff requested the Japan Self-Defense Forces(hereinafter 'JSDF') and US military aircraft to be prohibited operating. The court firstly held the limitation of the flight operation from 10pm to 6am, except unavoidable circumstance. The case was appealed. The Supreme Court of Japan dismissed the original judgment on the flight claim of the JSDF aircraft, canceled the first judgment, and rejected the claims of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court ruled that the exercise of the authority of the Minister of Defense is reasonable since the JSDF aircraft is operating public flight high zone. The court agreed that noise pollution is such an issue for the residents but there are countermeasures which can be taken by concerned parties. In Korea, the residents can sue against the United States or the Republic of Korea or the Ministry of National Defense for the prohibition of the aircraft operation. However, if they claim against US government regarding to the US military flight operation, the Korean court must issue a dismissal order as its jurisdiction exemption. According to the current case law, the Korean courts do not allow a claimant to appeal for the performance of obligation or an anonymous appeal against the Minister of National Defense for prohibiting flight of military aircraft. However, if the Administrative Appeals Act is amended and obligatory performance litigation is introduced, the claim to the Minister of National Defense can be permitted. In order to judge administrative case of the military aircraft operation, trade-off between interests of the residents and difficulties of the third parties should be measured in the court, if the Act is changed and such claims are granted. In this connection, the Minister of National Defense ought to prove and illuminate the profit from the military aircraft operation and it should be significantly greater than the benefits which neighboring residents will get from the prohibiting flight of military aircraft.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.220-250
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• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

• Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention
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• v.15 no.8
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• pp.3383-3389
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• 2014

Background: Prostate cancer is rapidly increasing in Korea and professional societies have requested adding prostate specific antigen (PSA) testing to the National Cancer Screening Program (NCSP), but this started a controversy in Korea and neutral evidence on this issue is required more than ever. The purpose of this study was to provide economic evidence to the decision makers of the NCSP. Materials and Methods: A cost-utility analysis was performed on the adoption of PSA screening program among men aged 50-74-years in Korea from the healthcare system perspective. Several data sources were used for the cost-utility analysis, including general health screening data, the Korea Central Cancer Registry, national insurance claims data, and cause of mortality from the National Statistical Office. To solicit the utility index of prostate cancer, a face-to-face interview for typical men aged 40 to 69 was conducted using a Time-Trade Off method. Results: As a result, the increase of effectiveness was estimated to be very low, when adopting PSA screening, and the incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) was analyzed as about 94 million KRW. Sensitivity analyses were performed on the incidence rate, screening rate, cancer stage distribution, utility index, and treatment costs but the results were consistent with the base analysis. Conclusions: Under Korean circumstances with a relatively low incidence rate of prostate cancer, PSA screening is not cost-effective. Therefore, we conclude that adopting national prostate cancer screening would not be beneficial until further evidence is provided in the future.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.369-387
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• 2012

Throughout intensive negotiations on the KORUS FTA and even after its ratification on March 15, 2012, ISD (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) has been at the center of many controversies within the FTA. Although the original function of the ISD is intended to be a protectional measure for foreign investors, there have been many foreign investors who tried to use the ISD as a tool to attack a government and nullify the public policy demanding tremendous amount of compensation. Many of the NAFTA ISD cases including Ehtyl v. Canada and UPS v. Canada demonstrate such a behavior by foreign investors. It is the right time for Korean government to conduct in depth studies on NAFTA ISD cases because the precedents provide invaluable insights including the legal reasoning by the decision making authorities including ICSID and UNCITRAL. The lessons we would learn from those cases would prepare Korean government for expected ISD claims by foreign investors and enable the government to maximize its efficiency in policy making process under a new international trade environment, the KORUS FTA.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.151-182
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• 2019

Rise of China has correspondingly seen increased Chinese involvement at global stage and regional levels in different parts of the world. This has attracted claims of strategic competition and rivalry between China and U.S., as China is said to be working towards replacing hitherto U.S. influence. Consequently there have been calls for U.S. to counter increased Chinese involvement to safeguard U.S. influences and interests. This study aims to contribute to this debate by examining the extent to which increased Chinese involvement in Africa has, if any, supplanted U.S. strategic interests in the continent. The study contends that, Chinese involvement in Africa has entailed China creating own niche that does not necessary threaten U.S. interests in the continent as widely portrayed and imagined. This is premised on the fact that, U.S. has historically had relatively minimal strategic interests in Africa as compared to other more strategic parts of the world that China could significantly threaten. Seen in this way, increased Chinese penetration in Africa has not had immediate threats to U.S. core strategic interests, thus explaining U.S. measured response to counter Chinese presence in Africa.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.101-118
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• 1993

Generally there is no law and liability system which applies particulary to commercial space ventures. There are several international treaties and national statutes which deal with space ventures, but their impact on the liability of commercial space ventures has not been significant. Every state law in the United States will impose both tort and contract liability on those responsible for injuries or losses caused by defective products or by services performed negligently. As with the providers of other products and services, those who participate in commercial space ventures have exposure to liability in both tort and contract which is limited to the extent of the resulting damage The manufacturer of a small and cheap component which caused a satellite to fail to reach orbit or to operate nominally has the same exposure to liability as the provider of launch vehicle or the manufacturer of satellite into which the component was incorporaded. Considering the enormity of losses which may result from launch failure or satellite failure, those participated in commercial space ventures will do their best to limit their exposure to liability by contract to the extent permitted by law. In most states of the United States, contracts which limit or disclaim the liability are enforceable with respect to claims for losses or damage to property if they are drafted in compliance with the requirements of the applicable law. In California an attempt to disclaim the liability for one's own negligence will be enforceable only if the contract states explicitly that the parties intend to have the disclaimer apply to negligence claims. Most state laws of the United States will refuse to enforce contracts which attempt to disclaim the liability for gross negligence on public policy grounds. However, the public policy which favoured disclaiming the liability as to gross negligence for providers of launch services was pronounced by the United States Congress in the 1988 Amendments to the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act. To extend the disclaimer of liability to remote purchasers, the contract of resale should state expressly that the disclaimer applies for the benefit of all contractors and subcontractors who participated in producing the product. This situation may occur when the purchaser of a satellite which has failed to reach orbit has not contracted directly with the provider of launch services. Contracts for launch services usually contain cross-waiver of liability clauses by which each participant in the launch agrees to be responsible for it's own loss and to waive any claims which it may have against other participants. The crosswaiver of liability clause may apply to the participants in the launch who are parties to the launch services agreement, but not apply to their subcontractors. The role of insurance in responding to many risks has been critical in assisting commercial space ventures grow. Today traditional property and liability insurance, such as pre-launch, launch and in-orbit insurance and third party liability insurance, have become mandatory parts of most space projects. The manufacture and pre-launch insurance covers direct physical loss or damage to the satellite, its apogee kick moter and including its related launch equipment from commencement of loading operations at the manufacture's plant until lift off. The launch and early orbit insurance covers the satellite for physical loss or damage from attachment of risk through to commissioning and for some period of initial operation between 180 days and 12 months after launch. The in-orbit insurance covers physical loss of or damage to the satellite occuring during or caused by an event during the policy period. The third party liability insurance covers the satellite owner' s liability exposure at the launch site and liability arising out of the launch and operation in orbit. In conclusion, the liability in commercial space ventures extends to any organization which participates in providing products and services used in the venture. Accordingly, it is essential for any organization participating in commercial space ventures to contractually disclaim its liability to the extent permitted by law. To achieve the effective disclaimers, it is necessary to determine the applicable law and to understand the requirements of the law which will govern the terms of the contract. A great deal of funds have been used in R&D for commercial space ventures to increase reliability, safety and success. However, the historical reliability of launches and success for commercial space ventures have proved to be slightly lower than we would have wished for. Space insurance has played an important role in reducing the high risks present in commercial space ventures.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.285-313
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• 2013

By the revision of the Commercial Code of Korea in 1991 and 2007, some provisions for the regulation of Time Charterparty have been introduced into our own maritime law system. But, those provisions are in their nature mainly the reproduction of the provisions prescribed in the standard forms of time charterparty which are widely used, such as BALTIME Charter and NYPE Form, and the subject matters of their regulation are restrictive, so that the applicability of the provisions is not desirable. The cargo is lost or damaged, the cargo owner should seek compensation form, or sue, the carrier as, traditionally, under the COGSA, the cargo carrier is responsible for loss of damage of cargo. However, it is difficult to determine who is the responsible carrier under charters. There is no test to determine the carrier, but the courts in every country generally consider the bill of lading. Although the master has general authority to sign bills of lading on behalf of the shipowner, he can also sign bills of lading for, and on behalf of, the charterer. In this case, the charter is considered the carrier. Furthermore, the charterer is authorized to contract with third parties on behalf of the shipowner and, as such, the responsible carrier is the shipowner. Therefore, when determining the carrier we should examine carefully the all factors and the circumstances surrounding the case. Also, negligence of a captain of a time-chartered ship causing damages to a third party. It will analyze the legal character of a time-charter contract, review judicial precedents on time-charter. The Inter-Club Agreement was drawn up and is intended to be a somewhat easier way of allocating liability for cargo claims between owners and charterers and, although there is still scope for disputes to arise, the Inter-Club Agreement does in fact to some extent make the allocation of liabilities for cargo claims easier. Finally, it will also make legislative suggestions to resolve complex issues involving maritime transportation contracts under the current Commercial Code.