• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제22권2호
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• pp.189-207
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• 1996

In this paper, a market share competition model for two firms with asymmetric conditions is considered with. In the model, the asymmetry between two firms is given by the difference of market shares In the existing market and the change of market share is supposed to be occurred only through pioneering a new market. Since the timing decision of market pioneering is based on the continuous time domain, a super game structure which has infinitely many numbers of subgames is employed for the modeling. In the course of equilibrium finding, we show that there exists no subgame-perfect pure strategy equilibrium In this game. So, we apply a mixed strategy concept and find a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium behavior strategy. As a result of equilibrium analysis, we know that the relative sizes of pioneering Incentives between two firms are varying with parameter conditions. However, the global speed of market pioneering is proven to be independent with the level of asymmetry between two firms.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제3권4호
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• pp.509-513
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• 2008

In this paper, we investigate how generators' ramp-rate constraints may influence their equilibrium strategy formulation. In the market model proposed in this study, the generators' ramp-rate constraints are explicitly represented. In order to fully characterize the inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints, a dynamic game model is presented. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is adopted as the solution of the game and the backward induction procedure for the solution of the game is designed in this paper. The inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints results in the Markov property of the game, and we have found that the Markov property of the game significantly simplifies the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium characterization. Finally, a simple electricity market numerical illustration is presented for the successful application of the approach proposed.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권9호
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• pp.542-549
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• 2003

In this paper, a novel approach to generator maintenance scheduling strategy in competitive electricity markets based on non-cooperative dynamic game theory is presented. The main contribution of this study can be considered to develop a game-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic behaviors of generating companies (Gencos) from the standpoints of the generator maintenance-scheduling problem (GMP) game. To obtain the equilibrium solution for the GMP game, the GMP problem is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game with complete information. In the proposed game, the players correspond to the profit-maximizing individual Gencos, and the payoff of each player is defined as the profits from the energy market. The optimal maintenance schedule is defined by subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Numerical results for two-Genco system by both proposed method and conventional one are used to demonstrate that 1) the proposed framework can be successfully applied in analyzing the strategic behaviors of each Genco in changed markets and 2) both methods show considerably different results in terms of market stability or system reliability. The result indicates that generator maintenance scheduling strategy is one of the crucial strategic decision-makings whereby Gencos can maximize their profits in a competitive market environment.

• 한국컴퓨터정보학회논문지
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• 제14권12호
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• pp.33-40
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• 2009

다중에이전트 시스템의 분석에 중요한 시간, 지식, 그리고 전략에 관한 개념들을 구체화하기 위해 번역시스템(Interpreted Systems)과 ATL및 ATEL을 살펴보고, 특히 ATEL의 문제점, 즉 하나의 에이전트는 그 자신의 상태에 대해 확실한 정보를 갖지 못하더라도 전략을 구성함에 있어서 전체 시스템의 현재 상태에 접근할 수 있으며, 또한 ATEL의 불명확한 행위들에 대한 표현은 일반적인 상황을 모델링하는 것을 어렵게 하는 문제점들을 해결하기 위한 방안으로 게임이론의 서브게임 완전한 나쉬평형 (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium)에 기초한 전략적 제한(strategic constraints)을 그 문제의 해결책으로 제안한다. 또한, 전략적 제한에 기초한 번역시스템을 다중에이전트 시스템에서의 모델체킹 (model checking)을 위한 하나의 방법으로 제안한다.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.775-777
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• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.

• 대한교통학회지
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• 제23권4호
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• pp.37-45
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• 2005

본 연구는 Nash의 협력게임인 협상게임(bargaining game)과 Wardrop의 사용자 균형해와의 관계를 규명하는 데 목적이 있다. Wardrop의 균형은 다수의 운전자들이 교통상황을 정확히 알고 있고(perfect information), 동시에 합리적으로 경로를 선택(rationality)한다는 경직된 가정이 존재하는데, 이는 실제로 존재하는 운전자 상호간의 교류나 타협을 배제하고 있다. 이런 측면에서 운전자간의 교류와 조절과정을 Nash게임의 협상과정(bargaining process)으로 표현할 경우, Wardrop의 경직된 기본가정들을 어느 정도 완화할 수 있을 것으로 보인다. 이를 위하여 본 연구에서는 Nash의 협상게임에 대한 교통망측면의 검토와 Nash의 협상해(bargaining solution)가 Wardrop의 사용자 균형(user equilibrium)과 동일함을 정리(theorem)를 통하여 증명하고 몇 가지 예제로 이를 확인한다. 협상게임은 대표적인 2인 협조게임(two-person cooperative game)으로 본 연구에서도 주로 2인 게임에 대해서 기술하며, 향후 n-인게임(n-person game) 모형에 대해서는 간략히 언급토록 한다.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제22권4호
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• pp.71-80
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• 1997

In this paper, we consider with a market pioneering game among symmetric firms in highly competitive situation. To describe the puzzling situation of timing competition, we construct a dynamic game model and explore the equilibrium solution. As a result, we find a subgame perfect mixed strategy Nash equilibrium conceptually defined by 't$_{0}$ + .elsilon. equilibrium'. Our major finding s include : i) market entry will be occurred in sequential manner even though the condition of each firm is symmetric ii) the optimal timing of market pioneering will be advanced until almost all of the monopolist's profit is dissipated, iii) as the market position of the pioneer is stronger, the timings of the pioneer and the follower are separated, iv) and as the slope of the profit flow is steeper, the entry timing of the two players will be pooled together.

• 한국수학사학회지
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• 제31권3호
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• pp.151-166
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• 2018

The rule of the game of Chomp is simple and the existence of a winning strategy can easily be proved. However, the existence tells us nothing about what strategies are winning in reality. Like in Chess or Baduk, many researchers studied the winning moves using computer programs, but no general patterns for the winning actions have not been found. In the paper, we aim to construct practical winning strategies based on backward induction. To do this we develop how to analyze Chomp and prove and find the winning strategies of the simple games of Chomp.

• 산학경영연구
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• 제21권1호
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• pp.1-17
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• 2008

저공해차량의 최적구매행태를 분석하는 게임이론 모형을 설정하고 이를 분석한다. 현실적으로 적용가능한 게임이론 모형을 설정하기 위해 게임의 결과(outcome)에 대한 의사결정자의 서수적 선호관계를 현실에서 얻을 수 있는 자료를 이용하여 수치로 나타내는 문제를 고찰하고, 각 시나리오별 게임의 분석에는 게임분석도구인 GAMBIT을 이용하는 방법을 살펴본다.

• 유통과학연구
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• 제13권10호
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• pp.15-21
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• 2015

Purpose - This study examines a bundling effect on production and distribution in a patent-protected industry. Despite the heavy use of bundling strategies in the information and technology industry, literature has paid scant attention to bundling of intellectual property rights. This study examines a theoretical exploration of the bundling effect on licensing behavior. Research design, data, and methodology - To address this behavior, we build a simplified model consisting of three stages: 1) bundling decision, 2) licensing agreement, and 3) competition. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is applied to the model. Results - A single-patent holder with superior technology grants its own license to the multiple-patent firm, thereby leaving the market. Anticipating the single right holder's licensing strategy, the multiple-patent firm offers a bundle, making the single-right holder's bargaining position weaker. Conclusions - Bundling is an effective business strategy, resulting in multiple products for a firm as it faces other firms with single-product lines in each market. Taking advantage of the multi-patent or multi-product lines, the firm utilizes the bundling strategy obtaining better technology from the standalone single-patent firms.