• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.189-207
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• 1996

In this paper, a market share competition model for two firms with asymmetric conditions is considered with. In the model, the asymmetry between two firms is given by the difference of market shares In the existing market and the change of market share is supposed to be occurred only through pioneering a new market. Since the timing decision of market pioneering is based on the continuous time domain, a super game structure which has infinitely many numbers of subgames is employed for the modeling. In the course of equilibrium finding, we show that there exists no subgame-perfect pure strategy equilibrium In this game. So, we apply a mixed strategy concept and find a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium behavior strategy. As a result of equilibrium analysis, we know that the relative sizes of pioneering Incentives between two firms are varying with parameter conditions. However, the global speed of market pioneering is proven to be independent with the level of asymmetry between two firms.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.3 no.4
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• pp.509-513
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• 2008

In this paper, we investigate how generators' ramp-rate constraints may influence their equilibrium strategy formulation. In the market model proposed in this study, the generators' ramp-rate constraints are explicitly represented. In order to fully characterize the inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints, a dynamic game model is presented. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is adopted as the solution of the game and the backward induction procedure for the solution of the game is designed in this paper. The inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints results in the Markov property of the game, and we have found that the Markov property of the game significantly simplifies the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium characterization. Finally, a simple electricity market numerical illustration is presented for the successful application of the approach proposed.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.9
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• pp.542-549
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• 2003

In this paper, a novel approach to generator maintenance scheduling strategy in competitive electricity markets based on non-cooperative dynamic game theory is presented. The main contribution of this study can be considered to develop a game-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic behaviors of generating companies (Gencos) from the standpoints of the generator maintenance-scheduling problem (GMP) game. To obtain the equilibrium solution for the GMP game, the GMP problem is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game with complete information. In the proposed game, the players correspond to the profit-maximizing individual Gencos, and the payoff of each player is defined as the profits from the energy market. The optimal maintenance schedule is defined by subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Numerical results for two-Genco system by both proposed method and conventional one are used to demonstrate that 1) the proposed framework can be successfully applied in analyzing the strategic behaviors of each Genco in changed markets and 2) both methods show considerably different results in terms of market stability or system reliability. The result indicates that generator maintenance scheduling strategy is one of the crucial strategic decision-makings whereby Gencos can maximize their profits in a competitive market environment.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.14 no.12
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• pp.33-40
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• 2009

We study Interpreted Systems, ATL, and ATEL to capture the notion of time, knowledge, and strategy which are important in the analysis of multi-agent systems and propose strategic constraints based on subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of game theory as one of the solutions for the issues of ATEL which an agent can access the current state of the whole system when making up his strategy even when he should be uncertain about the state, and no explicit representation of actions in ATEL models makes some natural situations harder to model. Also, we present strategic constraints-based Interpreted Systems for model checking of multi-agent systems.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.775-777
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• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.23 no.4 s.82
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• pp.37-45
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• 2005

This paper presents a relationship between Nash bargaining game and Wardrop user equilibrium, which has been widely used in transportation modeling for route choice problem. Wardrop user equilibrium assumes that drivers in road network have perfect information on the traffic conditions and they choose their optimal paths without cooperation each other. In this regards, if the bargaining game process is introduced in route choice modeling, we may avoid the strong assumptions to some extent. For such purpose, this paper derives a theorem that Nash bargaining solution is equivalent to Wardrop user equilibrium as the barging process continues and prove it with some numerical examples. The model is formulated based on two-person bargaining game. and n-person game is remained for next work.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.71-80
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• 1997

In this paper, we consider with a market pioneering game among symmetric firms in highly competitive situation. To describe the puzzling situation of timing competition, we construct a dynamic game model and explore the equilibrium solution. As a result, we find a subgame perfect mixed strategy Nash equilibrium conceptually defined by 't$_{0}$ + .elsilon. equilibrium'. Our major finding s include : i) market entry will be occurred in sequential manner even though the condition of each firm is symmetric ii) the optimal timing of market pioneering will be advanced until almost all of the monopolist's profit is dissipated, iii) as the market position of the pioneer is stronger, the timings of the pioneer and the follower are separated, iv) and as the slope of the profit flow is steeper, the entry timing of the two players will be pooled together.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.151-166
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• 2018

The rule of the game of Chomp is simple and the existence of a winning strategy can easily be proved. However, the existence tells us nothing about what strategies are winning in reality. Like in Chess or Baduk, many researchers studied the winning moves using computer programs, but no general patterns for the winning actions have not been found. In the paper, we aim to construct practical winning strategies based on backward induction. To do this we develop how to analyze Chomp and prove and find the winning strategies of the simple games of Chomp.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.1-17
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• 2008

This article examines the establishment of the game theoretic model for the cleaner vehicles and analyzes the established model. We discuss the way to represent the players' preferences over the outcomes to make the model applicable in real practice. In this article we employ the real data to represent the preferences. In the analysis of the model we consider various scenarios and discuss how we can use GAMBIT, which is a game theory analysis software, to find solutions in each proposed scenario.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.13 no.10
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• pp.15-21
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• 2015

Purpose - This study examines a bundling effect on production and distribution in a patent-protected industry. Despite the heavy use of bundling strategies in the information and technology industry, literature has paid scant attention to bundling of intellectual property rights. This study examines a theoretical exploration of the bundling effect on licensing behavior. Research design, data, and methodology - To address this behavior, we build a simplified model consisting of three stages: 1) bundling decision, 2) licensing agreement, and 3) competition. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is applied to the model. Results - A single-patent holder with superior technology grants its own license to the multiple-patent firm, thereby leaving the market. Anticipating the single right holder's licensing strategy, the multiple-patent firm offers a bundle, making the single-right holder's bargaining position weaker. Conclusions - Bundling is an effective business strategy, resulting in multiple products for a firm as it faces other firms with single-product lines in each market. Taking advantage of the multi-patent or multi-product lines, the firm utilizes the bundling strategy obtaining better technology from the standalone single-patent firms.