• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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• 2006.02a
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• pp.78-102
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• 2006

Networks, services and industries have been converging with the advent of digital convergence by technology advancements of digitalization, broadband and interactivity in the areas of information-communication and broadcasting technologies. Especially, this convergence of technology and market has been blurring the boundary of telecommunication and broadcasting sectors, and the severe competition seems to be inevitable due to the lack of the differentiation in broadcasting media and contents. In this study, we regard the competition phenomenon in the digital convergence between telecommunication and broadcasting as the platform competition in two-sided markets which have been actively studied since 2000, and analyzed it using modified Hotelling's location model. According to the analysis of platform competition on the effects of the differentiation of platform (t) , killer component $(\mu)$ and component compatibility $(\theta)$ , it is shown that two differentiated platforms are simultaneously used in case of the decrease of substitution effects, and the profit of platform with killer contents is increased, but the profit of platforms with higher compatibility is decreased. The policy implication is that it is especially necessary to modify the policy and regulation on media contents considering the growing competition in media. On the other hand, differentiated and reasonable policy is required to make fair competition and active market environment.

• Journal of Digital Contents Society
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.601-608
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• 2012

Platform carriers that were welcomed due to their open policy are now having Vertical-Systematization. As the Vertical-Systematization to strengthen platform's quality intensifies, the qualities of OS, network and manufacturing abilities may be weakened. As the environment changes, consumers move from attractive platform to attractive contents and the killer contents will become the key success factor. Hence, the platform carriers will aim to acquire killer contents to attract more users causing excessive competition for Killer Contents Sourcing. The following paper examines the problems that will stem from fierce competition among platforms, problems regarding the Contents Sourcing and solution for the content-providers.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.19-47
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• 2012

Contemporary smartphone competition is generally described as the battle between Apple's proprietary platform and Google's open platform. However, this competition is not limited within smartphone adoption itself. User's pre-adoption of one mobile platform via smartphone can be connected to the post-adoption of the same mobile platform based on the other smart devices (e.g. smart pad). In this study, we investigate whether user's preference to a certain platform is persistent over mobile ecology, from the pre-adoption of one smart device to the post-adoption of following devices. For this investigation, we adopt the dual-model as the ground theory, where post-adoption of IT product is explained by both dedication and constraint factors. The empirical testing first evidences that dual model works well as our research model for identifying the reasons of post-adoption. Next, we group our data into two parts in order to compare the switching behavior of iPhone users and Android phone users. iPhone users show much lower switching rate to Android based smart pads, while Android phone users show higher churn rate to iPad (49.3% : 96.3%). Especially, satisfaction showed much stronger effect than switching cost on the continuing intention of existing platform, when the analysis is given to the iPhone user's group. From this result, we can conjecture the relatively stronger loyalty of iPhone users. More managerial implications on the mobile platform strategy are driven.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.387-410
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• 2013

The competition aspect of business has been transformed from competition among companies to competition among ecosystem, and has been grown to platform based business, which is defined as ecosystem among business. Coming to the spotlight with the advantages of platform business combined software and hardware like Apple, platform business have been emerging in many fields. In this research, we define platform and platform based business, and then review related researches. After this, we review four representative research methodologies which are Yin(2011)' s case analysis research, Eisenhardt(2007)' s case analysis research, Romano etc' s web based qualitative data analysis method(2003), and Creswll(2010)' s open coding technique. And then, we suggest this research' s natural methodology combined with the advantages of four research methodologies. Based on our research methodology, we choose three high commercialized categories, which are smartphone platform business, social platform business, and search engine platform business. And then, we choose seven companies in three categories with success cases & failure cases, and analysis each case in perspective of our research methodology. And then, we suggest critical success & failure elements. Based on our findings, we suggest three strategic elements for the longevity of platform based business. Finally, we suggest the limitations of our research and further research issues.

• Fashion Information and Technology
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• v.12
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• pp.63-70
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• 2015

• Korean Architects
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• s.581
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• pp.102-107
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• 2017

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.66
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• pp.159-183
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• 2014

This study analyzed the competition among three game platforms, PC, Console and Mobile in aspect of user's gratifications using niche analysis. To do this, four gratification factors, 'transportability and accessibility', 'liveliness and variety', 'availability and economic feasibility', 'relationship', were assessed. To investigate competition level among three game platforms, niche breadth, niche overlap, competitive superiority of four gratification factors were analyzed. The results of niche analysis show that mobile platform appeared as a most competitive platform because it utilized diverse resources for game user gratification and had competitive superiority in 'transportability and accessibility' which appeared as most important factor determining user's gratification. However there was no game platform which had competitive superiority in all four gratification factors.

• 한국IT서비스학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2008.11a
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• pp.175-178
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• 2008

With rapid advancement of IT and Internet technologies, online market is surely becoming a stage of the competition among various forms of platform providers. This study show the significance of the negotiation process in the platform pricing strategy and observe several external/internal factors that might affect the negotiation power of the identities surrounding the platform. Major theories used in this study are the resource-based-view and network theory. Resources resulting in a negotiation power of the content providers and platform providers turn out to be widely scattered in their business areas - from product characteristics to the size of the content provider. End-user (or buyer) group which cannot make a strategic move for the organized development and use of resources is taking advantage of network externalities to support its negotiation power.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.36 no.6B
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• pp.650-662
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• 2011

The competition among companies in converged market of broadcasting and telecommunications has become severe. Companies in this market have vertically integrated critical resources by acquiring or strategically allying with relevant companies. However, the expansion of business territory accompanies financial, organizational, and technological risks. As such, it is important to identify critical success factors that highly affect the company's competency. This study is aimed at delivering strategic implications for firms playing in the converged market of broadcasting and telecommunications by drawing the priorities of competitive resources to acquire. To do this, we selected four teen specific core resources on CPNT (content- platform - network - terminal) value chain. Then, we conducted an Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP) using data from experts in this industry. As a result, the priority for acquisition of competitive resources is presented as follows: broadcasting programs, implementation of TV application store, multi-platform, investment on wireless network, and diffusion of mobile devices. In addition, the result shows that the platform-centric vertical integration is the most promising strategy for competition.