• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.208-231
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• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제14권1호
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

한국은 과거처럼 국제관계의 예속자가 아니라 명실상부한 중견국으로서, 북한의 핵과 재래전 도발위협을 극복하고 동북아지역의 평화를 유지하는 '균형자' 역할을 할 수 있도록 군사력을 건설해야 한다. 군사력 건설을 통해 다양한 안보위협에 대한 억제력 발휘가 가능하다. 군사적 억제력 발휘를 위해 첫 번째로 '선제적 억제'(deterrence by preemptive)와 '응징적 억제'(deterrence by punishment)는 현재와 미래의 위협에 대비하여 '감시정찰체계와 지휘통제체계'(C41SR)를 공통전력으로 공격무기체계를 결합한 '공격체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 두 번째로 '거부적 억제'(deterrence by denial)는 공통전력과 방어무기체계를 결합한 '방어체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 마지막으로 자주적으로 첨단전력을 개발하기 위해서는 기존의 방위산업과 연구개발 역량을 통합하여 '인프라 축'을 구축해야 한다. 우리는 미래 한국군의 군사력을 건설함에 있어서 정부의 균형자 역할에 대한 국가적 비젼, 이에 대한 국민적 합의를 토대로 본고에서 제시한 군사력 건설 모형에 따른 일관성 있는 정책적인 노력과 신념이 반드시 필요하다.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.43-81
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• 2016

Security environment we face in the Korean Peninsula is unexpectable. Tensions between Seoul and Pyeongyang and its threats are continuously evolving. Kim Jung Un will keep on conducting provocations and DPRK's isolation will result uncertainty to their objective and intention. KPA is centered on ground forces with conventional weapons but they possess modernized missiles and nuclear capabilities. What's more concerning is that North Korea continuously pursue and develop nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Pursuing defense reform is inevitable for the ROK to deal adequately against the security threats posed by the North and to prepare for the environment of future warfare. If we are satisfied with the current capabilities then our military capabilities and security status will retrogress. We have to reorganize our units to make a small but FMC, smart military organization. Organization analysis is an urgent issue for reorganizing units. However, it isn't an easy task to reform an organization. There are vague parts for analysis and strong resistance from the people within the organization. Therefore should not focus on the reduction of people and the organization. Organization reform should be done with the acknowledgement of most of the personnel and should focus on the task and its method. These should be reflected to the organization analysis.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제9권2호
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• pp.227-233
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• 2023

4차산업혁명과 더불어 '무인화' 영향이 전 세계 모든 분야에 미치고 있고, 특히 군사 분야에서 '무인화'는 주된 전투체계의 한 부분을 차지할 정도로 중요성이 부각되고 있다. 최근, 우리 영공을 침범하여 서울까지 내려온 북한 무인기 사태로 우리 군은 위기에 직면한 상태이다. 이에 우리 군은 북한의 무인기를 포착하고 격멸하겠다는 의지표명과 대응방안을 천명했다. 하지만 무인기의 기술발전은 지속되고 있고 활용 방안 또한 확대되고 있어 현 수준에서의 무인기 대응 방안은 무용지물이 될 수 있다. 또한 북한의 위협은 무인기만 있는 것이 아니다. 북한은 사실상 핵 보유국가이자 7차 핵실험을 앞두고 있고 2022년 한 해에만 38차례, 67발의 미사일 시험발사를 하는 등 미사일 기술도 고도화 되고 있다. 또한 우리에게 치명적 위협이 될 수 있는 5대 핵심 전략무기를 개발하고 있고 북한의 강력한 재래식 전력은 북방한계선 일대에 다수 포진되어 있고 장사정포의 포구는 수도권을 향해 있다. 지금 많은 관심을 받고 있는 북한의 무인기 위협을 대응하는 것도 중요하지만 북한의 위협을 종합적으로 분석하고 명확하게 우선순위를 정하여 제한된 예산을 사용해야 무인기 위협 이외의 북한의 전반적인 위협에 대응할 수 있을 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제23권4호
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• pp.141-151
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• 2023

1990년대 냉전의 종식 이후, 평화의 시대가 지속되면서 유럽국가들은 방위비 삭감과 군비축소를 단행했으며 그 결과 서방의 방위산업 기반은 점차 약화되었다. 반면 세계 유일의 분단국인 한국은 북한의 핵·미사일 위협에 직면하여 지속적인 군비 강화를 추진하면서 방위산업의 고도성장을 달성할 수 있었다. 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁의 여파로 재래식 무기체계에 대한 소요가 급증하고 세계 방산시장의 구조변동이 가시화하는 가운데 2022년 폴란드와의 대규모 방산수출 계약이 성사되면서 한국산 무기체계는 큰 주목을 받게 되었다. 2023년 K-방산은 세계 무기수출 9위를 기록했으며, 한국은 2027년까지 세계 4위의 방산수출국 도약을 목표로 하고 있다. 따라서 본 연구는 한-폴란드 방산수출 사례를 분석하여 문제점을 도출하고, 국가 전략산업인 K-방산의 수출 활성화 관련 발전전략을 제시하였다. 방위산업이 한국의 미래 먹거리가 되기 위해서는 방산전담기구 구축, 방위산업 기술보호에 대한 정부차원의 대책 마련, 방산수출과 연계한 우방국들과의 군사 및 안보협력 확대 전략이 필요하다고 판단된다.