This paper is to analyze the trend and implications of the publication of China's defense and security white papers. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled instruction; publication details and composition of China's defense and security white paper; the gist of the white paper on national defense and security during the Chinese president Xi Jinping era; the implications of Chinese white paper on national defense and security during the Chinese president Xi Jinping era; and conclusion. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense had published seven books every two years since 1998 to 2010. In 1995, the ministry published a white paper titled 'China's arms control and disarmament' for the first time. In 2013, it published a white paper titled 'The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces' and 'China's Military Strategy' in 2015. All have the common characteristic of being a propaganda policy reflecting China's strategic calculations. It seems that China has began to publish defense white papers in a proactive manner, due to the following factors: (1)pressure on China to demand military transparency from neighboring countries such as the United States; (2)the erosion of the 'China threat.' and (3)confidence in the achievement of China's military modernization. The 'active defensive strategy' and the 'strong defense strategy' of Si Jinping are implied in the words "China's dream is a dream of a powerful country and dream of a strong nation is essential to construct a strong nation." His these strategies have raised security concerns for neighboring countries. We need to maintain and reinforce strong ROK-US security cooperation, and hedging strategies to harmoniously promote ROK-China economic cooperation.
Because Korean military promotes employment support policy which give priority to the middle service officer who served more than 5 but less than 10 years and long term service officer who served more than 10 years, the support policy for obligated involuntary officer is relatively deficient. To make matters worse, national youth unemploy ment makes obligated involuntary officers suffer from serious unemployment crisis after discharge. These problems have bad effect on gaining ROTC KAOCS cadets who constitute about 80% of first appointment officers and because they are mostly discharged after just taking a short service, it's time to find a measure to solve the problem. Thus, this study is investigated to improve competitive rate of entry of ROTC KAOCS for securing outstanding manpower by deducing MR about legislation and system which are related to employment support for obligated involuntary officers and suggesting stable job secure plan for employment support, supplement system, and after discharge, model way of career management during military service of an obligated involuntary officers who are suitable for qualificated men who are needed for a company. Also, it will lead to combat power development of the military consequently.
The Future Battlefield includes the main areas of modern warfare, including the ground, sea, and air, as well as cyberspace and space. Cyberspace consists of computers, wired and wireless networks, and spans the ground, sea, air, and space domains. Cyber warfare takes place in cyberspace, so it is not easy for people without expertise in cyber to recognize the cyber situation. Therefore, training personnel with professional knowledge and skills in cyber is paramount in preparation for cyber warfare. In particular, the results of cyber warfare will vary greatly depending on the ability of cyber combatants to carry it out, the performance of cyber systems, and the proficiency of cyber warfare procedures. The South Korean military has power to respond to cyber warfare at various levels, centering on the Cyber Operations Command, but there is a limit to defending all the rapidly expanding cyberspace. In this paper, to overcome these limitations, we looked at the changes in Germany's cyber warfare response policy. Based on them, the organization structure, weapon system, and education and training system of future Korean military cyber forces are presented separately.
The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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v.9
no.2
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pp.171-179
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2023
Due to man-made climate change, global abnormal weather phenomena have occurred, increasing disasters. Major developed countries(military) are preparing for disasters caused by extreme weather appearances. However, currently, disaster prevention plans and facilities have been implemented based on the frequency and intensity method based on statistical data, it is not enough to prepare for disasters caused by frequent extreme weather based on probability basis. The U.S. and British forces have been the fastest to take research and policy approaches related to climate change and the threat of disaster change, and are considering both climate change mitigation and adaptation. The South Korean military regards the perception of disasters to be storm and flood damage, and there is a lack of discussion on extreme weather and disasters due to climate change. In this study, the process of establishing disaster management systems in developed countries(the United States and the United Kingdom) was examined, and the response policies of each country(military) were analyzed using literature analysis techniques. In order to maintain tight security, our military should establish a response policy focusing on sustainability and resilience, and the following three policy approaches are needed. First, it is necessary to analyze the future operational environment of the Korean Peninsula in preparation for the environment that will change due to climate change. Second, it is necessary to discuss climate change 'adaptation policy' for sustainability. Third, it is necessary to prepare for future disasters that may occur due to climate change.
South Korea should not be in subordinate position in international relationships like the past. As the status of middle power. South Korea achieves peaceful unification through overcoming North Korea's nuclear and conventional threats, and builds military power in Northeast Asia as a 'balancer'. This can firstly be achieved by constructing "attack systems triad". 'attack systems triad' can be established through integrating the C41SR as a common strategy for the purposes of preemptive deterrence and retaliatory deterrence against the dangers of the present and the future. Second, denial deterrence can be achieved by establishing "defense system triad" by combining common military power and defensive weapon system. Finally, development of independent advanced technological strategies can be achieved by building defense industry and combination of research and development through constructing "Infra triad". As for constructing and reinforcing the future of the ROK military, a unilateral principle and policy efforts to achieve the aforementioned force construction models are needed. This can only be achieved through the government's national vision to take on the role of mediator and a basis founded upon the consensus of the public.
The regions of Central Asia have each acquired an elevated strategic importance in the new security paradigm of post-September 1lth. Comprised of five states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Central Asia's newly enhanced strategic importance stems from several other factors, ranging from trans-national threats posed by Islamic extremism, drug production and trafficking, to the geopolitical threats inherent in the region's location as a crossroads between Russia, Southwest Asia and China. Although the U.S. military presence in the region began before September 11th, the region became an important platform for the projection of U.S. military power against the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan. The analysis goes on to warn that 'with US troops already in place to varying extents in Central Asian states, it becomes particularly important to understand the faultlines, geography, and other challenges this part of the world presents'. The Kyrgyz military remains an embryonic force with a weak chain of command, the ground force built to Cold War standards, and an almost total lack of air capabilities. Training, discipline and desertion - at over 10 per cent, the highest among the Central Asian republics - continue to present major problems for the creation of combat-effective armed forces. Kyrgyzstan has a declared policy of national defence and independence without the use of non-conventional weapons. Kyrgyzstan participates in the regional security structures, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) but, in security matters at least, it is dependent upon Russian support. The armed forces are poorly trained and ill-equipped to fulfil an effective counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist role. The task of rebuilding is much bigger, and so are the stakes - the integrity and sovereignty of the Kyrgyz state. Only democratization, the fight against corruption, reforms in the military and educational sectors and strategic initiatives promoting internal economic integration and national cohesion hold the key to Kyrgyzstan's lasting future
This paper is designed to make a national strategic concept for the ROK's maritime security and to explore cooperation directions for the ROK Navy and Coast Guard in order to implement the newly-made maritime security strategic concept. As strategy is composed of three main categories(goals, ways, means), the goal of the ROK's maritime security strategy is 'Safe and Affluent Sea' and the way to realize the goal is the principle of cooperative leverage, and the means as tasks to implement the strategic concept are maritime safety, maritime security, and maritime stewardship. The concept of national fleet as used in the US is applied to promoting the cooperation between the ROK Navy and Coast Guard. Thus, under the newly-established maritime security strategic concept along with the national fleet model, followings are suggested as policy proposals for facilitating mutual cooperation between the ROK Navy and Coast Guard in dealing with not only traditional threats but also non-traditional treats at sea and from the sea as well. First, the ROK Navy and Coast Guard has been making efforts to enhance interoperability between the two sea services. However, the mutual cooperations have been focused mainly on areas on operational level rather than policy level. Therefore, the two sea services are recommended to enlarge exchanges and cooperation in policy areas. Second, there are still demands for further cooperation areas between the two sea services in command and communications. The interoperability in C2 between the two needs to be upgraded even to the areas of anti-terrorist activities ar sea, ASUW, ASW, maritime interdiction, etc. Third, mutual comparability between the two needs to be reflected in the maritime forces development to ensure the comparability in UNREP and other logistics areas. Fourth, the standardization of logistical materials and equipments is needed as a way of sustaining operational capability and logistical capacity for the ROK Navy and Coast Guard as well. Fifth, the ROK Navy and Coast Guard are recommended to participate more actively in international maritime cooperation activities such as PASSEX. Sixth, Complementary laws and regulations need further to be revised and to be newly made for collectively managing swiftly maritime accidents and natural disasters at sea.
The 'One Belt One Road (OBOR)' initiative, which was promulgated as part of the enlargement policy along with the advent of Xi Jinping in 2013, is a policy to expand China's political and economic power externally through linkages with neighboring countries. China's overseas port investment plays an important role in the promotion of the 'OBOR' policy from the coast of China through maritime transportation routes from S.E Asia to Mediterranean and Europe. Since China's overseas port investment has been made from several factors such as political, economic, and military motives, it differs in purpose and character from investments made by private companies, such as Global Port Operators(GTO) which consider profitability first. This study aims to address future prospects and implications by analyzing the geopolitics of China's overseas port investment under the 'One Belt One Road' initiative. According to the results, China's overseas port investment is dominated by state-owned enterprises and political and security factors are more important than profitability. China's overseas port investment has been on a large scale in a short period of time, and China has faced with various problems both domestically and internationally. such as debt default, environmental problems, subordination problems from recipient countries and political and military confrontation with great countries such as United States, Japan and India etc.
International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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v.21
no.12
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pp.316-322
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2021
The problem of corruption and the spread of corruption crime today is not only one of the main social problems, but also an obstacle to the implementation of reforms in Ukraine. Given the complexity, scale and diversity of the impact of corruption, it is an undisputed threat to national security. At the state level, corruption threatens, firstly, state security as a result of its spread in public authorities and the combination of political and business spheres; secondly, in the domestic political sphere as a result of non-compliance and violation by officials of public authorities and local governments of the laws of Ukraine; thirdly, in the economic sphere as a result of the dominance of personal interests of civil servants over national ones; fourthly, in other spheres, namely, military, social, ecological, informational, foreign policy, etc. The origins of corruption are diverse and are formed not only in the country but also abroad. The current corruption threat is the result of the country's ineffective domestic and foreign anticorruption policies. Acceleration of the spread and manifestation of external corruption threats is associated with a number of unresolved foreign policy issues against the background of the development of globalization and integration processes, in particular: economic and financial dependence of the country on international financial institutions and organizations; as well as from foreign countries that pose a potential threat due to their ambitious plans to expand our country; unresolved issues regarding the international legal consolidation of borders, etc. It is noted that the current conditions for the development of state security, due to new challenges and threats, need to improve and implement new measures to prevent corruption as a negative impact of the main threats to national economic security. As a result of the study, the main measures to counter the main threats to the economic security of the state were identified.
This study is trying to suggest the continuity and changes that would be made in inter-Korean military negotiations in the future under the Kim Jeong-eun regime by analyzing the recent inter-Korean Working-Level Talks for Gaeseong Industrial Complex based on 'anti-Japanese guerilla style negotiation model, the military negotiation model under Kim Jeong-il era. Especially, through analysis of the inter-Korean Working-Level Talks for Gaeseong Industrial Complex, it is verified that behavior similar to that in the military talks in the past is found even in the economic negotiations. Such analysis leads to an assumption that negotiations under the Kim Jeong-eun regime would be made within the category of the military negotiations under the Kim Jeong-il era. Fundamentally North Korea will change but try to achieve its objectives in the military talks within the existing frame of strategic culture rather than changing it. Such phenomenon will continue for some time. In the future inter-Korean military talks, however, North Korea will try to change its behavior to cope with its financial difficulties. Accordingly, the South Korea's government will have to have paradigm shift toward inter-Korean military negotiations. Especially, Kim Jeong-eun's studying abroad in the past will make him change in the negotiations. At this moment, the South Korean government must make continuous efforts to induce dialogue and negotiation. In order to induce the North Korea to change, the development of economic norm logic with the united front applied in the strategic culture of military negotiation and the formation of a value system in the North Korea's military negotiation policy makers will lead to the creation of a new military negotiation framework.
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