Purpose - After the transition, the development of defense industry in Eastern Europe has been regressed. Recently, they have internationally recognized that new products have been exported and contributed to the Innovation-Based Manufacturing of national economy such as unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, water purification technology, and mobile chemical laboratory, etc. The military forces in Eastern Europe are re-armed by the localization of self-produced munitions in their own defense industry, and then emphasize fostering their own defense industry. Thus, if they make a collaboration with other nations as a industrial cluster, it will gain a competitive edge on the defense industry. Research design, data, and methodology - The study was designed with the data of each national defense department. The research of the subject was reviewed before and after the transition. Thousands of workers have worked in defense industries before the transition, however, the defense industry and experts left after the transition. The Hungarian defense spending on GDP also dropped sharply from 1.72% in 2000 to 0.85% in 2013. But, due to the crisis in Ukraine and the crisis of Syrian refugees, the Viségrad Group (V4) member countries have also increased their interest in a defense and industries as well as the confidence in the EU and NATO. Results - On the whole, the joint of military training and purchase of defense materials were found in order to form the EU cooperative combat troops in CEE. There are the implementation of a joint manual plan for strengthening V4 security policy and the joint military exercises for V4 every year, and the others are electronic warfare and innovation of V4 national forces. Through such a performance analysis methodology, we found that the defense industry is developed through the national cluster cooperation among CEEs and spreading global distribution. Conclusions - Eastern Europe and Balkan countries have been looking forward to cooperating with the non-EU countries such as Korea and other defense industries. There are a lot of potential development into a new civilian cooperation defense industry for global-distribution. Thus, Korea should develop electronic commercial applications, not just as a weapon exporting region.
The issue of security on the Korean peninsula is facing the greatest upheaval in 2018 with the inter-Korean summit and the US-North Korea summit. North Korea has pursued the parallel policy developing military and economic at the same time. However, North Korea is changing its route to give up nuclear weapons and focus on the economy through summit talks. Since the change in North Korea is similar to that of Libya in the past, it is necessary to analyze why North Korea is trying to abandon its nuclear program and how the process is flowing compared to the case of Libya. The Libya model was constructed and analyzed in terms of international and domestic perpectives and recognition of the situation by leadership. North Korea's nuclear policy was evaluated based on the Libya model. The nuclear development of Libya and North Korea has caused diplomatic and economic pressures from the international community and ultimately led to instability of the regime. Two countries have tried to abandon nuclear program in order to solve the instability of the regime, also gain the economic reward insead. Libya took economic benefits and secured some of the stability of the regime, but the regime collapsed under the wave of democracy due to the influx of foreign capital and ideas. North Korea will seek diplomatic and economic gains with the example of Libya, but will try to limit as much as possible the culture of democracy and the full opening that can be incidental.
Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
/
v.21
no.9
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pp.1666-1673
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2017
Republic of Korea is divided into South Korea and North Korea, creating military conflicts and social conflicts. North Korea is conducting cyberattacks against South Korea and has hacked South Korea's defense network. In the world of cyberspace, the boundaries of the borders are becoming obscured, and cyberattacks and cyberterrorism for cyberwarfare operate with digital computing connected to points, time and space. Agenda and manual are needed for national cybersecurity. Also, it is necessary to study national cybersecurity laws and policies that can create and implement nationalcyber security policy. This paper investigates cyberterrorism situation in North and South Korean confrontation situation and damage to cyberwarfare in the world. We also study cybersecurity activities and cyberwarfare response agendas, manuals and new technologies at home and abroad. And propose national cybersecurity policy and propose policies so that '(tentative) The National Cybersecurity Law' is established. This study will be used as basic data of national cybersecurity law and policy.
Land Remote Sensing' is defined as the science (and to some extent, art) of acquiring information about the Earth's surface without actually being in contact with it. Narrowly speaking, this is done by sensing and recording reflected or emitted energy and processing, analyzing, and applying that information. Remote sensing technology was initially developed with certain purposes in mind ie. military and environmental observation. However, after 1970s, as these high-technologies were taught to private industries, remote sensing began to be more commercialized. Recently, we are witnessing a 0.61-meter high-resolution satellite image on a free market. While privatization of land remote sensing has enabled one to use this information for disaster prevention, map creation, resource exploration and more, it can also create serious threat to a sensed nation's national security, if such high resolution images fall into a hostile group ie. terrorists. The United States, a leading nation for land remote sensing technology, has been preparing and developing legislative control measures against the remote sensing industry, and has successfully created various policies to do so. Through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's authority under the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, the US can restrict sensing and recording of resolution of 0.5 meter or better, and prohibit distributing/circulating any images for the first 24 hours. In 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 23 ordered a 'Shutter Control' policy that details heightened level of restriction from sensing to commercializing such sensitive data. The Directive 23 was even more strengthened in 2003 when the Congress passed US Commercial Remote Sensing Policy. These policies allow Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to set up guidelines in authorizing land remote sensing, and to limit sensing and distributing satellite images in the name of the national security - US government can use the civilian remote sensing systems when needed for the national security purpose. The fact that the world's leading aerospace technology country acknowledged the magnitude of land remote sensing in the context of national security, and it has made and is making much effort to create necessary legislative measures to control the powerful technology gives much suggestions to our divided Korean peninsula. We, too, must continue working on the Korea National Space Development Act and laws to develop the necessary policies to ensure not only the development of space industry, but also to ensure the national security.
In 2015 the Department of Education announced that it will make downsizing efforts by recommending classified downsizing ratio according to the evaluation of universities for active support toward autonomous efforts of universities with the possibilities of reform and qualitative structural reform for customized human resource cultivation according to the social demands. This is the preemtive structural reform preparing against the rapid decrease of the number of students, and the preparation for changing into competitive universities so that customized human resource that is needed in the society can be trained. Security Science Departments of Korea, first established in 1996, need changes in curriculum in order to prepare for the fourth revolution of the future, and are stagnant on the education goal and employment course. Therefore the adoption of related certificates, curriculum, NCS, and professional curriculum is needed. For example, Hansei University, Chung-Ang University, and Far East University have established the Department of Industrial Security, and Kyonggi University and Sungshin Women's University have established the Department of Convergence Security. Also, Konkuk University has established the Graduate School of Security and Disasters, the Graduate School of Information and Policy, the Graduate School of Criminal Justice, Gachon University the Graduate School of National Security, Sungkyunkwan University the Graduate School of Strategic Studies. This shows that the field of Security Science should not settle for itself. This article analyzes current curriculum and subjects of security, police, industrial security, military related academic departments of key universities. It is necessary to prepare for the future by predicting the change from the merge of academic departments and the demands of the times. As technical colleges are adopting NCS, this is the time to seek for systematic collaboration between universities and technical colleges and between industry, government, and academida.
Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.
The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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v.10
no.3
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pp.19-24
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2024
The future military combat environment is rapidly expanding the role and importance of artificial intelligence (AI) in defense, aligning with the current trends of declining military populations and evolving dynamics. Particularly, in the civilian sector, AI development has surged into new domains based on foundation models, such as OpenAI's Chat-GPT, categorized as Super-Giant AI or Hyperscale AI. The U.S. Department of Defense has organized Task Force Lima under the Chief Digital and AI Office (CDAO) to conduct research on the application of Large Language Models (LLM) and generative AI. Advanced military nations like China and Israel are also actively researching the integration of Super-Giant AI into their military capabilities. Consequently, there is a growing need for research within our military regarding the potential applications and fields of application for Super-Giant AI in weapon systems. In this paper, we compare the characteristics and pros and cons of specialized AI and Super-Giant AI (Foundation Models) and explore new application areas for Super-Giant AI in weapon systems. Anticipating future application areas and potential challenges, this research aims to provide insights into effectively integrating Super-Giant Artificial Intelligence into defense operations. It is expected to contribute to the development of military capabilities, policy formulation, and international security strategies in the era of advanced artificial intelligence.
There have many research papers to see China's evolution of maritime strategy and naval modernization in terms of its naval mind-set. However, this article focuses on assessing how China uses its all sorts of maritime strength to achieve 'a building maritime great power.' The aim of the article is to introduce a new perspective to this debate by analysing China's diversified ma maritime capabilities and a new way of implementation in maritime security strategy. In recent years, China has been developing not only unpredictable maritime military capabilities but also maritime supporting forces - Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. And recently China adopted up-to-date operational concept aimed at gaining military superiority in Asia-Pacific waters. By taking salami slicing strategy, gray zone strategy and cabbage strategy, China has been trying to exercise surpassing influences in regional maritime area, also in western Pacific region. This article provides a stepping stone to comprehend the aspect of China's recent maritime strategic actions, especially in Yellow Sea. In conclusion, this article suggests some policy recommendations for countering China's coercive maritime strategy. First, Korea should make sure a strategic concept of maritime security, instead of land warfare focused strategic concept. Second, it is needed to set up suitable naval forces for actively responding to neighbor nation's offensive actions.
Text mining is a representative method of big data analysis that extracts meaningful information from unstructured and large amounts of text data. Social media such as Twitter generates hundreds of thousands of data per second and acts as a one-person media that instantly and directly expresses public opinions and ideas. The traditional media are delivering informations, criticizing society, and forming public opinions. For this, we compare the responses of SNS with the responses of media on the issue of the termination of the Korea-Japan GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement), one of the domestic issues in the second half of 2019. Data collected from 201,728 tweets and 20,698 newspaper articles were analyzed by sentiment analysis, association keyword analysis, and cluster analysis. As a result, SNS tends to respond positively to this issue, and the media tends to react negatively. In association keyword analysis, SNS shows positive views on domestic issues such as "destruction, decision, we," while the media shows negative views on external issues such as "disappointment, regret, concern". SNS is faster and more powerful than media when studying or creating social trends and opinions, rather than the function of information delivery. This can complement the role of the media that reflects public perception.
North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.
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