• Journal of Ecology and Environment
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• v.38 no.4
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• pp.493-503
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• 2015

This study analyzed how spatial distribution of Himantormia lugubris is affected by the microenvironment in the Antarctic Specially Protected Area (ASPA) No. 171 located in the Barton Peninsula of King George Island that belongs to the maritime Antarctic. In order to determine the population structure of H. lugubris growing in Baekje Hill within ASPA No. 171, we counted the individuals of different size groups after dividing the population into 5 growth stages according to mean diameter as follows: ≤ 1 cm, 1-3 cm, 3-5 cm, 5-10 cm, and ≥ 10 cm. The count of H. lugubris individuals in each growth stage was converted into its percentage with respect to the entire population, which yielded the finding that stages 1 through 5 accounted for 32.8%, 25.3%, 15.9%, 22.5%, and 3.5%, respectively. This suggests that the population of H. lugubris in ASPA No. 171 has a stable reverse J-shaped population structure, with the younger individuals outnumbering mature ones. The mean density of H. lugubris was 17.6/0.25 m², mean canopy cover 13.3%, and the mean dry weight 37.8 g/0.25 m². It began to produce spore in the sizes over 3 cm, and most individuals measuring 5-10 cm were adults with sexually mature apothecia. The spatial distribution of H. lugubris was highly heterogeneous. The major factors influencing its distribution and performance were found to be the period covered by snow, wind direction, moisture, size of the substrate, and canopy cover of Usnea spp. Based on these factors, we constructed a prediction model for estimating the spatial distribution of H. lugubris. Conclusively, the major factors for the spatial distribution of H. lugubris were snow, wind, substrate and the competition with Usnea spp. These results are important for understanding of the distribution in the maritime Antarctic and evolution of H. lugubris that claims a unique life history and ecological niche.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.71
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• pp.147-170
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• 2016

International maritime law conventions concerned with cargo liabilities have sought to achieve solutions which will be acceptable to a wide range of states. The Rotterdam Rules was approved by the UN Assembly on 11 December 2008. The Rotterdam Rules are intended to replace The Hague and Hamburg Rules. This paper is comparing The Rotterdam Rules with The Hague and Hamburg Rules for the carrier' liabilities and exceptions in order to find carrier' liability System, the burden of proof and exceptions in the International maritime Rules. The purpose of this paper is considering the carrier's principal recourse for defending himself inmost cargo claims. The first area analyze the transfer of carrier's fundamental Liability system in the International Rules. The second is the matter on the appointment of proof in order to establish liability or to be relieve of liability. And the third is the change of the carrier's possible exclusions from liability in the International maritime Rules. From the result of the said analysis, my paper suggests differences of the exclusions in the Rotterdam Rules comparing with the Hague and Hamburg Rules, and features of the Rotterdam Rules appling exceptions on the basis of the Hague and Hamburg Rules with regard to carrier's liability and burden of proof. The former is the inclusion of three exclusions, the deleted natural fault, and The provision making the carrier responsible for the acts of its servants or agents in the 'fire on the ship' of the Rotterdam Rules. The latter is deleting the principle of overriding obligation related to carrier's obligation of seaworthiness in the Rotterdam Rules, the burden of proof being diverted from the carrier to the carrier and the shipper in the cargo damage caused by two factors(one for which the carrier was liable and the other for which it was excusable) in the new rules.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.66-77
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• 2002

Generally hull insurance is undertaken by mean of a contract of hull insurance. A contract of hul1 insurance here is a contract whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured against the loss and damage to the vessel mused by maritime perils. A contract of hull insurance is consists of printed main insurance clauses and a clause includes many sub-clauses. Now the Institute Time Clauses-Hulls (hereunder refer to as "English hull insurance clauses"made by the Institute of London Underwriters is much used as the standard from or basic from by many countries ail over the world Now Korean insurance companies hue not made our their own hull insurance clauses, they have just adopted the made-out English hull insurance clauses and the english law and practice to solve the problem related to marine insurance. On the other hand, the United States of America and Japan have made out their own hull insurance clauses based on English hull insurance clauses and used the clauses for many years. Now American is using American Institute Hull Clauses(hereunder refer to as "American hul1 insurance clauses"as its own clauses which was made out by American Institute of Marine Underwriters in 1977 and Japan is also wing its own clauses named Japanese Hull Standard Clauses(hereunder refer to as "Japanese hull clauses") which was made out by japanese Hull Insurance Association in 1990. Therefore the purpose of this study is not only to make a comparative study on English hull insurance clauses 1995, American hull insurance clauses 1977 and Japanese hull clauses l990, but also to supply on some legal materials necessary for Korea to establish and perform our own hull insurance clauses.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.142-163
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• 2013

Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.287-320
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• 2015

On October 27, 2015, USS Lassen(DDG82), a 9,200 ton class Aegis destroyer of the United States Navy, began its operations within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of the seven artificial islands that China has built and claimed sovereignty over. The maneuver was joined by anti-submarine patrol airplanes such as P-8A and P-3. The White House press secretary mentioned that the President of the United States approved the operation. In response, China announced that it warned the US Navy ship about the 'illegal violation' by sending two destroyers(PLAN Lanzhou and Taizhou). This event represents a close call case where tension between the United States and China in the South China Sea might have been elevated to a conflict between the two navies. Moreover, considering that this happened only one month after Chinese president Xi's state visit to the United States, the event shows that the positions of the two countries have become starkly different to the extent that they are so hard to be reconciled. The United States' position is different from those of Vietnam and the Philippines. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have been directly involved in disputes with regard to sovereignty claims across the waters in the South China sea. As for the United States, being a third party in the disputes, it still cannot be a by-stander watching the whole waters in the region fall under the influence of China. Accordingly, the United States maintains that all countries bear the rights of innocent passage and military operations in the Exclusive Economic Zones(EEZ) as stipulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS). In contrast, China claims that, historically, the South China sea has been part of China's territorial waters, and that foreign countries are not allowed to conduct military operations within the waters. It strongly accuses that such military operations are illegal. Against this background, this paper tracks the different positions of the United States and China on the issues regarding the South China sea. It also carefully looks at the possibility that, in the process of dealing with the issues, the two countries may get into an armed conflict as the phrase 'Thucydides Trap' predicts.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Navigation
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.195-205
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• 2001

It has been over seven years since Maritime Code of the Peoples Republic of China (hereinafter called the Code) came into force on July 1st 1993. During this period it has played a very important roll in governing Chinas ocean shipping. However, owing to the defects of the Code, many problems have arisen in the performance of the Code, among which is the problem related to delay in delivery. Therefore, it is necessary and inevitable to revise the Code. This study is limited to a rough study on the regulations related to delay in delivery in the Code, such as the definition of delay in delivery, the carriers responsibility for delay in delivery, the carriers exemption from responsibility for delay in delivery, the limitation of responsibility, the procedures of claims for delay in delivery and the difference of the Code from the Korea Commercial Law, the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules. Furthermore, some defects in the Code are pointed out and suggestions are provided for the revision of the Code.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.29-55
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• 2018

Arctic sea ice has been retreating as a result of the global warming. Arctic sea ice extent for April 2018 averaged 13.71 million square kilometers. This figure shows far less sea ice compared to the average extent from 1981 to 2010. Meanwhile, 287 times of maritime transits through the Northwest Passage have been made during the 2017 and the first ship traversed the Northern Sea Route without the assistant of ice-breaker in August 2017. Commercialization of the Arctic Passage means significant economic and strategic advantages by shortening the distance. In this article, 'Arctic Passage' means Northern Sea Route along the Arctic coast of Russia and Northwest Passage crossing Canadian Arctic Ocean. As climate changes, the potential feasibility of the Arctic Passage has been drawing international attention. Since navigation in this area remains hazardous in some aspects, IMO adopted Polar Code to promote safe, secure and sustainable shipping through the Arctic Passage. Futhermore, Russia and Canada regulate foreign vessels over the maritime zones with the authority to unilaterally exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the Article 234 of UNCLOS. The dispute over the navigation regime of the arctic passage materialized with Russia proclaimed Dmitrii Laptev and Sannikov Straits as historically belong to U.S.S.R. in the mid 1960s and Canada declared that the waters of the passage are historic internal waters in 1973 for the first time. So as to support their claims, In 1985, Russia and Canada established straight baseline including Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage. The United States has consistently protested that the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage are straits used for international navigation which are subject to the regime of transit passage. Firstly, it seems that Russia and Canada do not meet the basic requirements for acquiring a historic title. Secondly, since the Law of the Sea had adopted before the establishment of straight baseline over the Russian Arctic Archipelago and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, Ships can exercise at least the right of innocent passage. Lastly, Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage have fulfilled the both geographical and functional criteria pertaining to the strait used for international navigation under the international law. Especially, should the arctic passage become commercially viable, it can be expected to accumulate the functional criterion. Russia and Canada regulate the ships navigate in their maritime zones by adopting the higher degree of an environmental standard than generally accepted international rules and standard mainly under the Article 234 of UNCLOS. However, the Article 234 must be interpreted restrictively as this contains constraint on the freedom of navigation. Thus, it is reasonable to consider that the Article 234 is limited only to the EEZ of coastal states. Therefore, ships navigating in the Arctic Passage with the legal status of the territorial sea and the international straits under the law of the sea have the right of innocent passage and transit passage as usual.

• Acta Via Serica
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.105-117
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• 2016

The Silk Road named by Ferdinand von Richthofen was not designated as a specific route. A lot of East-West trade routes had already existed across the continent and the geographical scope and definition of the Silk Road is still expanding. In particular, the claim that the Eastern end of the Silk Road reaches Gyeongju is an example of this expansion. Burial treasures from tombs on the Korean Peninsula have already been identified as products from the Sassanian Dynasty of Persia, and various archaeological and epical evidences support this finding. However, the specific route where these exchanges were made, around the 6th-8th centuries, has yet to be identified. Maritime as well as inland routes can easily be hypothesized. The Silk Road was largely activated by the Yam postal system with the expansion of the Mongol Empire. It not only served as an effective pathway for the Yuan to rule over the Goryeo, but also connected the Eastern end of the Silk Road to Gyeongju. This can explain the situation since the 13th century. Therefore, this paper claims that the Yeokcham system had been operating on the Korean Peninsula since the Unified Silla Kingdom, the previous period of Goryeo, or perhaps even before then. The Yeokcham should thus be regarded as a prototype of the Mongolian Yam, and the Korean peninsula should be recognized as another route which contributed specifically to the development of the Silk Road, not just as a user or a beneficiary.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Navigation
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.15-32
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• 1996

The Internation Maritime Organization (IMO) has required that ships other than cellular-ships which carry cargo units and other entities should be provided with a cargo securing manual. A number of serious accidents has resulted from improper stowage and insufficient securing of heavy cargo. The cargo claims caused by the accidents stated above not only reduce the number of shippers but also reduce their benefits. The following four basic safe items should be considered carefully in the carriage by sea in case of two tiers loading of heavy cargoes packed with wooden case if it is a general cargo ship. a) Safe stowing place b) Safe lashing c) Protecting crushing goods d) Adequate dunnage. All operators of cargoes must be reminded that only the proper stowge and securing of heavy cargos can prevent from the occurrence of such accidents in the future. This paper intends to analyze the unigue damage mechanism for two tiers loading of heavy cargoes on the general cargo ships encountered in the rough sea, and suggest the countermeusere to prevent the identical accidents in the future.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.6
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• pp.119-134
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• 2019

This study focuses on a recent WTO SPS dispute related to Korea Import Bans and Testing and Certification Requirements for Radionuclides (DS495) in order to learn from the case and take proactive measures to prevent potential import restrictions by Japan on Korean seafood. Korean-Radionuclides (Japan) emphasizes the importance of sufficient scientific evidence, especially scientific information from relevant international organizations, in an effort to take preventive measures towards Japan's restrictions on Korean seafood imports. Japan claims that a novel parasite, Kudoa septempuctata, in Korean flatfish causes food poisoning. As food poisoning is a serious concern, there is a low possibility that Japan's enhanced monitoring measures would be more trade restrictive than required as prescribed in Article 5.6 of the WTO SPS Agreement. In addition, Korea is the biggest exporter of olive flounder to Japan. Hence, the possibility that similar conditions could be established is low in relation to non-discriminatory principles under the WTO SPS Agreement. Accordingly, we should collect relevant scientific evidence, improve domestic sanitary management of fishery products, and seek export diversification so that we prepare for potential import restrictions by Japan and minimize implications.