The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the Internet channel introduction on the channel composed of a monopoly manufacturer and an independent physical retailer. This study also examines what would be the best strategy for the Independent physical retailer to respond to the new internet channel entry. The game theoretic model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an internet store. The audition of the internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new internet store is launched by the manufacturer. The results show that an Internet channel entry has the following impacts on the existing channel members. First, the manufacturer's internet channel introduction mitigates the double marginalization problem of the traditional channel. Second, the manufacturer could enhance Its channel power by introducing its own internet channel while it diminishes that of the incumbent independent physical retailer. Third, manufacturer's adding a new internet store leads to a higher demand. Finally, with its own internet direct channel, the manufacturer has an opportunity to practice price discrimination. The manufacture leaves only those with a strong preference for the physical store to be served by the Independent physical store. The results suggest that the independent physical store's best strategy to the entry of the manufacturer's Internet channel is to focus on the consumers who are highly loyal to the physical store while maintaining a high retail price.
The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.
A traffic analysis on the Internet has an advantage for obtaining the characteristics of transferred packets. There were many studies to understand the characteristics of the Internet traffic with mathematical statistical approach. The approach of this study is different from previous studies. We first introduced a virtual network concept to present the Internet as a simplified mathematical model. It also represents each traffic flowing on the Internet as a parallel Gaussian channel on the virtual network. We suggest the optimal capacity of each parallel Gaussian channel using some related studies on the Gaussian channel model.
Internet commerce has been growing at a rapid pace for the last decade. Many firms try to reach wider consumer markets by adding the Internet channel to the existing traditional channels. Despite the various benefits of the Internet channel, a significant number of firms failed in managing the new type of channel. Previous studies could not cleary explain these conflicting results associated with the Internet channel. One of the major reasons is most of the previous studies conducted analyses under a specific market condition and claimed that as the impact of Internet channel introduction. Therefore, their results are strongly influenced by the specific market settings. However, firms face various market conditions in the real worlddensity and disutility of using the Internet. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of various market environments on a firm's optimal channel strategy by employing a flexible game theory model. We capture various market conditions with consumer density and disutility of using the Internet.
In this paper we concentrate design and develop method about Multi-Channel Internet Radio Platform to broadcast music contents in large outlet and between spaces to protect music contents which have drastically widespread demage. we provide application concept and design rule of hardware path for Multi-Channel Connection and Multi Stream.
In Korea, the distribution channel for agricultural products is notorious for its complexity and ineffectiveness. In this sense, the Agricultural Cooperative has tried to clarify the distribution channel and reduce its length. However, there still exist much room for improvements. The Internet shopping mall specific for agricultural product, therefore, is drawing much attention because it can reduce the length of distribution channel drastically and improve effectiveness from the distribution perspective. To test the validity of such Internet-driven shopping mall, we gathered questionnaire data from the Internet based Hannaro Shopping Mall which is run directly by the Agricultural Cooperative. We performed experiments respectively for the two groups of operating personnel and consumers. Experimental results showed that several important factors can be identified which are significant statistically and deemed to have meaningful relationship with performance variables. Our results also showed that the Internet shopping mall has a great potential for improving the effectiveness of the distribution channel of the agricultural products.
The rapid spread of Internet has significant effects on changes in the distribution channel. The direct transaction between manufacturer and consumer could create the threats of dis-intermediation to existing channel members as middlemen. Air-ticket market also has changed in Internet marketing channel era. This study is mainly concerned with understanding the reaction of travel agency to Internet marketing channel. The objectives of this study is to propose and test the model that the perceived threats of dis-intermediation affect the reactions of travel agency: increasing channel competence, decreasing concentration, and deriving diversification. The model basically adopted the arguments of intertype competition, considering the arguments of re- intermediation in order to explain the reaction of using Internet. The result of survey from 158 travel agencies supported most of hypotheses. All the hypotheses are accepted except the relationship between threats of dis-intermediation and increasing channel competence.
Intelligent services have expanded as Internet of Things (IoT) technology has evolved and new requirements emerge to accommodate various services. One new requirement is transmitting data over long distances with low-power. Researchers have developed low power wide area (LPWA) network technology to satisfy the requirement; this can improve IoT network infrastructure and increase the range of services. However, network coverage expansion causes several problems. The traffic load is concentrated at a specific gateway, which causes network congestion and leads to decreased transmission efficiency. Therefore, the approach proposed in this paper attempts to recognize and then avoid congestion through gateway channel hopping. The LPWA network employs multiple channels, so wireless channel hopping is available in a gateway. Devices that are not delay sensitive wait for the gateway to reappear on their wireless channel; delay sensitive devices change the wireless channel along the hopping gateway. Thus, the traffic load and congestion in each wireless channel can be reduced improving transmission efficiency. The proposed approach's performance is evaluated by computer simulation and verified in terms of transmission efficiency.
Due to the recent advances in high-speed communication technologies as well as the easy production of high-quality video contents, IPTV is becoming increasingly popular. Meanwhile, as the number of IPTV channels increases, channel search time to find the desired channel keeps increasing. In this paper, we discuss how to improve the channel search latency in IPTV, and introduce caching and prefetching techniques that are widely used in memory management systems. Specifically, we adopt memory replacement, prefetching, and caching techniques in IPTV channel search interfaces and show the effectiveness of these techniques as the number of channels are varied.
Consumers currently show cross-channel shopping behavior between the Internet and store-based retail types when searching information and purchasing sensory products such as fashion items to reduce risks. As consumers compare both types of stores before making a purchase decision, the Internet retail type and store-based retail type started conflicting/competing each other as the combined retail evolution theory proposed(Kim & Kincade, 2006). The purpose of this study is to examine consumers' cross-channel shopping behavior between the Internet and store-based retail types and their importance and satisfaction with information provided by the Internet retail stores. This study employs a quantitative research method using a survey. Demographics, types of stores used for purchase, satisfaction with the type of stores, Internet shopping behavior, importance and satisfaction with product information in the Internet retail stores were asked. MANOVA and descriptive statistics were used to test hypotheses. The result shows that a majority of participants(36.2%) shows cross-channel shopping behavior between the two retail types. Also, most participants(72.4%) decide on their purchase and are satisfied only after cross-channel shopping between the two retail types. Participants were grouped based on their information search and purchase behavior. Significant differences among the groups were found in importance and satisfaction with product information provided by the Internet stores. In measuring participants' satisfaction, a majority of participants(42.1%) showed satisfaction with their purchase at store-based retail stores after information search via the internet, followed by the satisfaction with the purchase at the internet retail stores after information search at store-based retail stores(30.3%). Fifty one point nine percent of participants search information via the internet(vs.48% at store-based retail stores), and they especially look for fiber contents and design details with pictures(37.4%). The satisfaction with price information provided by the Internet retail stores is the highest (m=3.70 out of 5.0) among fashion product information followed by design information(m=3.48). On the other hand, size information, refund/exchange and fiber content information received low satisfaction scores(m=2.81, 2.71, 2.57 in turn). This research suggests the Internet retail stores should provide more variety of information in detail using technology and improving customer services. This study could provide the Internet retail stores a guideline to establish a satisfactory information delivery system.
shows the channel structures analyzed in this study. Before the Internet channel is introduced, a monopoly manufacturer sells its products through an independent physical store. From this structure, the manufacturer could introduce its own Internet channel (MI). The independent physical store could also introduce its own Internet channel and coordinate it with the existing physical store (RI). An independent Internet retailer such as Amazon could enter this market (II). In this case, two types of independent retailers compete with each other. In this model, consumers are uniformly distributed on the two dimensional space. Consumer heterogeneity is captured by a consumer's geographical location (ci) and his disutility of using the Internet channel ( shows various market conditions captured by the two consumer heterogeneities. (a) illustrates a market with symmetric consumer distributions. The model captures explicitly the asymmetric distributions of consumer disutility in a market as well. In a market like that is represented in (c), the average consumer disutility of using an Internet store is relatively smaller than that of using a physical store. For example, this case represents the market in which 1) the product is suitable for Internet transactions (e.g., books) or 2) the level of E-Commerce readiness is high such as in Denmark or Finland. On the other hand, the average consumer disutility when using an Internet store is relatively greater than that of using a physical store in a market like summarizes the various scenarios of consumer distributions analyzed in this study. The range for disutility of using the Internet (
summarizes the analysis results. As the average travel cost in a market decreases while the average disutility of Internet use remains the same, average retail price, total quantity sold, physical store profit, monopoly manufacturer profit, and thus, total channel profit increase. On the other hand, the quantity sold through the Internet and the profit of the Internet store decrease with a decreasing average travel cost relative to the average disutility of Internet use. We find that a channel that has an advantage over the other kind of channel serves a larger portion of the market. In a market with a high average travel cost, in which the Internet store has a relative advantage over the physical store, for example, the Internet store becomes a mass-retailer serving a larger portion of the market. This result implies that the Internet becomes a more significant distribution channel in those markets characterized by greater geographical dispersion of buyers, or as consumers become more proficient in Internet usage. The results indicate that the degree of price discrimination also varies depending on the distribution of consumer disutility in a market. The manufacturer in a market in which the average travel cost is higher than the average disutility of using the Internet has a stronger incentive for price discrimination than the manufacturer in a market where the average travel cost is relatively lower. We also find that the manufacturer has a stronger incentive to maintain a high price level when the average travel cost in a market is relatively low. Additionally, the retail competition effect due to Internet channel introduction strengthens as average travel cost in a market decreases. This result indicates that a manufacturer's channel power relative to that of the independent physical retailer becomes stronger with a decreasing average travel cost. This implication is counter-intuitive, because it is widely believed that the negative impact of Internet channel introduction on a competing physical retailer is more significant in a market like Russia, where consumers are more geographically dispersed, than in a market like Hong Kong, that has a condensed geographic distribution of consumers.
A Study of Multi-Channel Internet Radio Platform
(Multi-Channel Internet Radio Platform에 대한 연구)
Performance Analysis of the Agricultural Product-Oriented Internet Shopping Mall and Its Effective Operation Strategy
(농산물 전문 인터넷쇼핑몰의 성과분석과 효과적인 운영전략수립을 위한 연구)
Internet Marketing Channel of Airline and Strategies of Travel Agency : Intertype Competition and Re-intermediation
(인터넷 유통경로 형성에 따른 기존 경로구성원의 대응전략: 항공권 유통경로에서 여행사의 관점을 중심으로)
Gateway Channel Hopping to Improve Transmission Efficiency in Long-range IoT Networks
Effect of Caching and Prefetching Techniques to Accelerate Channel Search Latency in IPTVs
Cross-Channel Shopping Behavior between the Internet Retail Type and Store-Based Retail Types - Focus on Information of Fashion Product and Fabrics -
(소비자의 인터넷 상점과 일반 상점간의 크로스 채널 쇼핑행동 분석 - 패션상품 및 소재정보를 중심으로 -)
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