• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.151-184
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• 2021

Global warming due to climate change is one of the biggest challenges in the 21st century. Global warming is not only a disaster that threatens the global ecosystem but also an opportunity to reduce logistics costs and develop mineral resources by commercializing Arctic routes. The Arctic paradox, in which ecological and environmental threats and new economic opportunities coexist, is expected to have a profound impact on the global environment. As the glaciers disappear, routes through the Arctic Ocean without passing through the Suez and Panama Canals emerged as the 'third route.' This can reduce the distance of existing routes by 30%. Global warming has also brought about changes in the geopolitical paradigm. As Arctic ice begins to melt, the Arctic is no longer a 'constant' but is emerging as the largest geopolitical 'variable' in the 21st century. Accordingly, the Arctic, which was recognized as a 'space of peace and cooperation' in the post-Cold War era, is now facing a new strategic environment in which military and security aspects are emphasized. After the Cold War, the Arctic used to be a place for cooperation centered on environmental protection, but it is once again changing into a stage of competition and confrontation between superpowers, heralding 'Cold War 2.0.' The purpose of this study is to evaluate the strategic value of the Arctic Ocean from geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives and derive strategic implications by analyzing the dynamics of the New Cold War taking place in the Arctic region.

• Journal of Daesoon Thought and the Religions of East Asia
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.13-39
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• 2022

The author examines three new religious movements in South Korea: Jehovah's Witnesses, the Unification Church, and the Daesoon Jinrihoe, and aims to identify the factors that are conducive to the growth of each. All three organisations believe in a coming paradise, and the article explores their respective attempts to interest the populace in their appeal. Discussion is given to membership statistics and the problems of measuring allegiance and moves on to consider methods of propagation. Most obviously, evangelisation strategy is important: Jehovah's Witnesses and Unificationists have tended to engage the interest of strangers, while followers of Daesoon Jinrihoe are more inclined to evangelise family and friends. Additionally, there are other factors that determine an organisation's progress: cultural appropriateness, engagement in social and educational work, and attitudes to conflict and peace, the latter being particularly important in a society that has experienced war and occupation. Reference is made to the ways in which these three organisations finance themselves, and it is argued that financial resources merit greater attention in the scholarly study of religion, since monetary assets are needed to secure a spiritual movement's existence. Of the three organisations under discussion, the Daesoon Jinrihoe has been the most successful, being South Korea's largest new religion, while Jehovah's Witnesses are in steady state, and the Unification movement is experiencing slight decline.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.119-148
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of neighboring countries on the gray zone and to explore Korea's maritime strategy. The concept of gray zones appears in various ways from country to country. In international relations, the gray zone is a comprehensive space between war and peace. The gray zone in the ocean is an unstable space in which competition between the US and China is represented and proxy wars are possible, and the gray zone needs strategic management. This study summarizes the concept of gray zones in the maritime security field, examines the gray zone strategies of neighboring countries, and suggests Korea's gray zone strategies. In particular, the recognition of the gray zone itself is the core of the problem, and it is necessary to strengthen information sharing to clarify the problem about the gray zone and accurately recognize the gray zone situation. The CMG(Complex Maritime Geostrategy) framework attempted in this study is expected to be helpful in understanding the nature of various gray zone issues around Korea and preparing for a geostrategy based on the analysis.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.140-162
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• 2016

The construction of Jeju Naval Base was finally completed and donated to the Republic of Korea Navy on February 26th this year. There is no doubt that the new base will contribute to the substantial augmentation of Korea's naval power and maritime security. However, we should note that the new naval base took a long and hard twenty-three years to be completed. In the 21st century, Korea should adopt a new strategy that can fulfill the security requirements of Korea for the new age of international relations. The 21st century is characterized by globalization, and in the world of globalization, a national boarder has become meaningless. In the late 20th century, after the Cold War, trade between countries have greatly increased and so did the importance of the seas. Having transformed from an agricultural country into a commercial country, Korea went from a continental state to a maritime state. Korea has become the 9th largest trading state, and obviously, the importance of the sea has become significant. Korea's national strategic focus needs to be on the sea for national survival. Thus, since the 1990s, the Korean Navy has planned to build the Jeju Naval Base. Jeju, due to its geopolitical characteristics, is extremely important to the 21st century Korea's economy and national security. Jeju is the starting point of the sea route that reaches out to the world, and at the same time, the ending point of the sea route that heads towards Korea. Jeju is located in the center of Northeast Asia and thus, Jeju Naval Base is extremely important for the area's security and order. Jeju Naval Base will be very useful not only for the maritime security of Korea, but also for keeping peace and order in Northeast Asia. Jeju Naval Base was the minimal effort against the six sea route security threats towards Korea. The six sea route threats are: 1) Threat from North Korea; 2) China's Threat towards Korea's sovereignty; 3) China's treat towards Korea's fishery; 4) Threat from Japan; 5) Threat towards Korea's sea routes; 6) Threat from recent phenomena of isolationism of the United States. Jeju Naval Base is built for both warships and civilian ships--such as cruise ships--to use. Just like the United States' Pearl Harbor, Jeju Naval Base will become not only the largest military base, but a beautiful tourist site.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.141-151
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• 2023

Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, European countries have cut defense costs and reduced armaments as an era of peace without large-scale wars continues, and as a result, the West's defense industry base has gradually weakened. On the other hand, South Korea, the world's only divided country, was able to achieve high growth in the defense industry as a result of continuous arms strengthening in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. With the rapid increase in demand for conventional weapons systems and changes in the structure of the global defense market due to the Russia-Ukraine war, Korea's weapons system drew great attention as a large-scale defense export contract with Poland was signed in 2022. In 2023, K-Defense ranked ninth in the world's arms exports and aims to become the world's fourth-largest defense exporter by 2027. Therefore, this study analyzed the case of Korea-Poland defense exports to derive problems, and presented development strategies related to export revitalization of K-Defense, a national strategic industry. In order for the defense industry to become Korea's next growth engine, it is necessary to establish a defense organization, prepare government-level measures to protect defense industry technology, and expand military and security cooperation with allies linked to defense exports.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.177-212
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• 2018

The purpose of this article is to examine the 'Discussion of maritime defense' which began to be discussed from the late Goryeo dynasty to the early Joseon dynasty and the process of establishing a maritime defense system. Also it can identify changes in the aspects of the naval ship operation and their strategic tactics during the reign of King Sejong. Japanese raiders began a full-scale invasion from 1350 at the late Goryeo Dynasty, So the government realized the need to raise the 'Sea power' and to organize the maritime defense system for defending enemy invasion. for example, the reinforcement of naval forces, construction of warships, develoment of weapon systems and so on. which have achieved remarkable growth while continuing, have also been used to carry out a three-time 'Conquest of Daemado' in 1389, 1396, 1419. Until then, however, it is difficult to interpret that the naval forces had a systematic and organizational combat operation system. According to fighting patterns on combat reports before the early days of King Sejong's reign, Our naval forces had no advantage over the Japanese raiders in terms of their capabilities and tactics. Then, the period of King Sejong marked a watershed in maritime defense history. Based on accumulated experience of naval battles and force Projections, The paradigm shift of the naval strategic tactics for maritime defense has occurred. First, the capability of the naval vessels has improved. for example, ship speed, durability, and weather resistance. Through these efforts, navy forces were able to pursue and attack, destroy enemy's ships by taking advantage of the 'Ship speed superiority'. This has led to tactical shifts from defensive to offensive. Second, purpose to support offensive tactics, the government put a strategic plan into practice that is the forward depolyment of naval bases from the inland to the coast, considering the 'sea environment' and 'threat'. By doing so, Joseon dynasty was able to secure 'the command of the sea'. This may be a little different from the perception of the so-called 'peace period' that King Sejong's era. We need to remember that Joseon dynasty was working hard for its defense. When studying history of maritime defense, these strategic and tactical elements must be fully considered. Only then we can have a coherent understanding of the many naval battles in the past, including the Imjin War(1592-1598).

• Industry Promotion Research
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.175-180
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• 2023

On the day of 24 February 2022, Ukraine was invaded by Russia which signed to ensure definitely the Ukraine's national sovereignty, territorial integrity and security under the UN General Assembly Security Council A/49/765, named as the Budapest Agreement. This invasion is the 2nd invasion succeeded in Crimean Peninsula invasion of March 2014 after the Ukraine's national independence in 1991 from the USSR. However this invasion has been continuing for much more than one year. Although Ukraine President appealed the 'peace' toward Russia and claimed also to justify the Budapest Agreement of 1994 toward U.S.A., even any justifications were not appealed. The critical moment of the national abolition could be escaped from the unified desperate spirit of all nations including the president, political-social leaders and military members. Such patriotic and self-help spirits in Ukraine resulted in the active supports from the U.S.A., western and eastern free democratic countries, NATO and EU, and even the neutral countries. Furthermore these supports are increasing much more day-after-day. The lessons which the Ukraine War offers to the Korean national security should be cored with the development of self-reliant national defense capabilities, self-strenuous efforts and unity strengthening of the Korean-U.S. Alliance with the deep confidence.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.15
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• pp.57-86
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• 2018

The ROKAF has been training for a number of exercise for victory in the war, but the lack of aviation ammunition has become a big issue every year. However, due to the limitation of defense resources, there are many difficulties in securing and stockpiling ammunition for the war readiness. Therefore, there is a need to find a way to secure aviation ammunition for war readiness in a more economical way, so In this study, we analyze the precedent research case and the case of the reduction of the purchase cost of weapon system of other countries, and then I have suggested a plan that is appropriate for our situation. As a result of examining previous research cases for this study, there were data that KIDA studied in 2012, Precision-guided weapons acquisition cost reduction measures pursued by US Air Force And the use of procurement agencies that are being implemented by NATO member countries. Based on this study, the following four measures were proposed to reduce the purchase cost of aviation ammunition. First, the mutual aid support agreement was developed to sign the ammunition joint operation agreement. Second, join the NATO Support & Procurement Agency (NSPA) Third, it builds a purchasing community centered on the countries operating the same ammunition Fourth, participating in the US Air Force's new purchase plan for ammunition and purchase it jointly. The main contents of these four measures are as follows. 1. the mutual aid support agreement was developed to sign the ammunition joint operation agreement. Korea has signed agreements on mutual logistics support with 14 countries including the United States, Israel, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia, and Taiwan. The main purpose of these agreements is mutual support of munitions and materials, also supporting the training of the peace time and promoting exchange and cooperation. However, it is expected that there will be many difficulties in requesting or supporting mutual support in actual situation because the target or scope of mutual aid of ammunition is not clearly specified. Thus, a separate agreement on the mutual co-operation of more specific and expanded concepts of aviation ammunition is needed based on the current mutual aid support agreements 2. join the NATO Support & Procurement Agency (NSPA) In the case of NATO, there is a system in which member countries purchase munitions at a low cost using munitions purchase agencies. It is the NATO Purchasing Agency (NSPA) whose mission is to receive the purchasing requirements of the Member Nations and to purchase them quickly and efficiently and effectively to the Member Nations. NSPA's business includes the Ammunition Support Partnership (ASP), which provides ammunition purchase and disarming services. Although Korea is not a member of NATO, NSPA is gradually expanding the scope of joint procurement of munitions, and it is expected that Korea will be able to join as a member. 3. it builds a purchasing community centered on the countries operating the same ammunition By benchmarking the NSPA system, this study suggested ways to build a purchasing community with countries such as Southeast Asia, Australia, and the Middle East. First, it is necessary to review prospectively how to purchase ammunition by constructing ammunition purchasing community centered on countries using same kind of ammunition. 4. participating in the US Air Force's new purchase plan for ammunition When developing or purchasing weapons systems, joint participation by several countries can reduce acquisition costs. Therefore, if the US Air Force is planning to acquire aviation ammunition by applying it to the purchase of aviation ammunition, we will be able to significantly reduce the purchase cost by participating in this plan. Finally, there are some limitations to the method presented in this study, but starting from this study, I hope that the research on these methods will be actively pursued in the future.