• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.555-570
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• 2011

In order to do morally right behavior that we cognitively know, prosocial moral motivation is necessary. Previous studies revealed emotion is important for prosocial moral motivation. This was supported by cognitive neuroscience studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging(fMRI) in which the activity of ventral striatum(VS) was observed when people made moral decision. VS was originally known as the core area of reward process but recently VS was found to respond also to social reward and even feeling of prosocial emotion itself. However it is not clear why VS was activated when people experience prosocial moral sentiments. The aims of this review article were to find situations in which people are prosocially and morally motivated and to understand more about the role of emotion as a moral motivator by examining evidence regarding the neural network, including VS, of prosocial moral motivation and moral decision-making.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.121-132
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• 2016

Emotion is considered to be involved in the moral decision-making process consisting of moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior. This research investigated the distinct role of two specific moral emotions, guilt and shame, when they are suppressed, on moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior through an online experiment. Moral emotion (guilt vs. shame) as well as suppression of these emotions (suppressing vs. control) was manipulated to infer the causality of moral emotions and the moral decision-making process when they are suppressed. The results suggest that suppressing guilt was involved in moral judgment and moral intention, but was not involved in moral behavior. In particular, participants who maintained guilt evaluated moral vignettes as more moral and perceived that they would follow the behavior described in the vignettes than those participants who suppressed their guilt. On the other hand, our data showed that suppressing shame was not involved in moral judgment and intention but was in behavior. Participants who maintained shame engaged in moral behavior more than participants who suppressed shame. We delineate the different mechanisms between guilt and shame on the moral decision-making process with the discrete emotion theory.

• Journal of the Korean Home Economics Association
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• v.45 no.7
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• pp.17-33
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• 2007

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between aggression and moral emotion including guilt, shame, and empathy in early adolescence. In a sample of 359 early adolescents (187 boys, and 172 girls) in Daejeon city, data were analyzed by frequency, t-test, Pearson's correlations, and multiple regressions. The following study results were obtained: 1. Boys showed more linguistic and roundabout aggression, and girls showed more anger, guilt and empathy. Older adolescents showed more shame than younger adolescents did, whereas younger adolescents showed more guilt and empathy than did older adolescents. 2. Shame had significant relationships with all types of aggression, whereas guilt and empathy had significant relationships with different types of aggression. 3. Moral emotions - guilt, shame, and empathy - showed significant effects on aggression among early adolescents. The degree of the effectiveness of moral emotions on aggression depends on the types of aggression, gender, and age of participants.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.41
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• pp.93-127
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• 2014

Toegye and Yulgok both tried to obtain the extent of goodness from the emotion they feel in reality. Toegye thought the extent of goodness is being obtained by Li[理], Yulgok thought it by Chi[氣]. But Four Bases[四端] as goodness from Li[理] would possibly threat the human identity, and the emotion of appropriateness as goodness from Chi[氣] doesn't even prove itself that it is appropriate. They explain the problems and answers through Theory of Human Mind?Moral Mind. Toegye explains that Moral Mind is meaningful as it make people identify themselves as moral existence, Yulgok explains Moral Mind is meaningful that it satisfies standard of appropriateness. While Toegye and Yulgok define Moral Mind and Human Mind as emotion of Yi-fa[已發], Chutzu defines Moral Mind and Human Mind as consciousness. and he defines consciousness as 'preparing Li(理) and practicing the emotion'. So according to Chutzu, Moral Mind and Human Mind derives the reaction from the Li(理) in order to respond to the external stimulation. Supervision of mind is completed by consciousness of Moral Mind. It means that mind not limited to Yi-fa[已發]. Then we should think that Toegye and Yulgok's Theory of Human Mind?Moral Mind is something newly resulted from their own philosophic problem. Toegye and Yulgok's Theory of Human Mind?Moral Mind is commonly explaining human mind in experiential aspect, and it will be esteemed as definite and realistic theory of Mind because it emphasizes willingness which motivates an essential activity.

• Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.47-75
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• 2008

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rational factor or moral emotion, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning or moral intuitions. This research demonstrates that offender' anger can influence moral judgment. The study examined the role of offender's anger (control group versus anger group) on moral domain ( life, interpersonal ethic, traffic regulation: 6 case) : 2(groups) ×6(cases) mixed design. Participants were asked to judge the offender, case, sympathy and one's anger about the him or her who offended against the law or convention. Participants who perceived the offender's anger tended to assess questionnaire generous. In interpersonal ethic domain, participants have not been affected by anger. There was not significantly differences between two groups in interpersonal ethic domain. The results of experiment confirmed hypotheses that influence of anger varies with the moral domains affected a value system of culture. These findings indicate functional emotion for moral judgment and suggest people may be decide how much emotion is considered on moral judgment performance according to moral domains.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.141
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• pp.313-342
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• 2017

This paper illuminates the philosophical meaning of appropriateness(中節) in Yi Yik(李瀷) and Shin Hudam(愼後聃)'s theories of moral emotion. According to this paper, there was a difficult problem in Toegye Yi Hwang (退溪 李滉)'s philosophy. That is, How we could regulate the relation between Four Beginnings(四端) and appropriate Seven Feelings(七情). Yi Yik tried to solve this problem by elucidating philosophical significances of appropriate Seven Feelings as it were, one hand, he approved the morality of appropriate Seven Feelings, and on the other hand, differentiated appropriate Seven Feelings from Four Beginnings. Thereby He achieved to explain this problem. His solution was dependent on the concept of 'impartial sympathic spectator' that he suggested. It is valuable that Yi Yik reexamined the ethical meaning of appropriateness. His pupil Shin Hudam, however, criticised Yi Yik's opinion and identified Four Beginnings with appropriate Seven Feelings. Shin Hudam deconstructed the conceptual scheme of moral emotion suggested by Yi Yik and regarded appropriate Seven Feelings as Four Beginnings. According to Shin Hudam, the concept of appropriate Seven Feelings designed by Yi Yik was very ambiguous, actually there was no any dividing line between Four Beginnings and appropriate Seven Feelings. Both are equally moral principle manifestation(理發)and moral public(公). Now old concept category of moral emotion(Sadan and Chiljeong) was disappeared and new concept category of moral emotion was appeared, that is public and private.

• The Korean Journal of Community Living Science
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.169-180
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• 2009

This study was performed to examine the emotion expectations and explanations of four participants(an actor, a recipient, a child observer, and an adult observer) in moral, social-conventional, and personal rule transgression situations. Six vignettes describing the rule transgressions were presented to 200 children who were either five or seven years old. The children were asked to predict and explain each participant's emotions. The children's emotion expectations were different depending on the domain of the rule transgressions and on the type of the participant. The actors were predicted to feel happy during all transgressions, while the recipients and two observers(a child and an adult) were predicted to feel unhappy. The seven-year-old children attributed more happiness to the actors, and more negative affect to the recipients compared to the five-year-olds. This result was inconsistent with the previous findings that older children attributed more happiness to actors. This finding was discussed in relation to the 'happy victimizer'. Some categories of emotion explanations were differentiated according to the domain of rule transgressions. The personal rule transgressions, newly defined and examined in this study, were judged to be less serious than the moral rule transgressions in terms of the intensity of the negative affect.

• Korean Journal of Child Studies
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.95-114
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• 1993

The purpose of this study was to examine developmental trends in children's understanding of the effect of emotion on moral transgressions. The subjects were 120 children, 15 boys and 15 girls each at 4, 6, 8, and 10 years of age. The subjects listened to the moral transgression stories which were revised by this investigator based on Arsenio and Kramer's(1992) study. They reported their emotional attribution, justification, and emotional intensity about the story children engaged in moral transgression. The data of the present study were analyzed by ${\chi}^2$ and 2-way ANOVA for repeated measures. The results showed that (1) most of the children expected victimizers to feel happy. While happy responses decreased with age, fear responses increased with age. Most of the four-year-olds expected victims to feel sad, but 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds expected anger. (2) Most children justified victimizers' emotions in terms of the outcome produced by victimization. This outcome-focused justification decreased with age, but morality-focused justification increased with age. In contrast, most children justified victims' emotion in terms of the victimization. This victimization-focused justification decreased with age, but morality-focused justification increased with age. (3) Most children viewed physical harm more negatively than theft on the part of victims.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.15-24
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• 2015

Past experimental research reported that people become stricter in moral judgements when cleanliness-related concepts are activated. However, it is not clear whether pre-experimental individual differences in cleanliness desire is also related to moral judgment. This research examined whether cleanliness desire in various daily activities is related to diverse types of moral judgments (Study 1), and whether experimentally manipulated physical cleanness affects the relationship between cleanliness desire and moral judgments (Study 2). The results showed reliable relationship between everyday cleanliness desire and moral judgements in that people who were high (or low) in the desire was stricter (or more tolerant) in moral judgments. The relationship was also observed when physical cleanness was manipulated, but there was no difference in moral judgments depending on actual physical cleanness.

• Korean Journal of Child Studies
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.1-12
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• 2012

This study examined the influences of age, offenders' intention, victims' emotional reactions on the moral emotional understanding of preschool children. Eighty eight children aged 4, 5, and 6 participated in this study, and were interviewed using four moral transgression stories. The responses of the children were then analyzed in terms of the levels of moral emotional understanding, from error through to the understanding of secondary emotions. The results indicated that older children showed higher levels of moral emotional understanding than younger children. Additionally, children's moral emotional understanding was higher in situations in which offenders' behaviors were intentional, and in which the victims expressed sadness. The attribution of moral emotions was influenced by victims' emotional reactions only in 6-year-old children. Discussion of these results also included the development of intervention programs for children with aggressive behaviors, as well as a number of suggestions for future study.