• IE interfaces
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.25-32
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• 1989

We study the joint cost allocation based on the book profit producing power of the output through the A-S price mechanism. We show what part of the A-S book profit is allocated to the joint cost and what part is allocated to the variable total book profit of the short-run book profit function. Also we compare some other classical joint cost allocation methods with this A-S price method.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.49-68
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• 2012

When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.177-196
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• 2008

The megatrend of convergence in finance, telecommunication, and service industries is being spread over the whole industry. It has generated various kinds of contractual alliance or joint venture. Our paper builds a theoretical model for the profit sharing between two firms that participate in a joint venture. The model shows how the profit sharing rule affects the incentives of the participants, and, eventually, the efficiency. We derive the first-best solution of the profit sharing, where no incentive distortion exists. Then, we compare the incentive-affecting cases with the first best outcome, and assess the efficiency and the fairness of distribution. Our analysis shows that if we properly design the decision-making structure on transfer price and production quantity, we can reach the socially optimal efficiency.

• Journal of the Korean Regional Science Association
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.51-64
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• 1998

This paper investigates how the factor inputs of firms are affected by the expectation about land-price increase in the future. We develope a two-factor (land and labor) model, in which expectation about land-price increase plays a key role in determining the "optimal" input level of labor and land. Expecting capital gains from input of the land when land price increases, firms input land up to the point where the marginal productivity of land falls short of the marginal cost of purchasing the land, in order to maximize the "joint-profit". That is, firms have an incentive to use more land than they do when capital gains are not expected. We mean joint-profit by profit in the standard sense plus capital gains. Once the land is input "excessively", the productivity of labor increase and labor is also input more, since land and labor are assumed as complementary in production. This mechanism works in the opposite direction when land price decrease. This paper suggests that land price fluctuation is a major destabilizer of an economy.or destabilizer of an economy.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.1-17
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• 2005

In this article we consider a supply chain consisting of a risk-sensitive manufacturer and a riskneutral retailer. The manufacturer maximizes her individual expected profit by designing a supply chain coordinating returns contract (SCRC) that consists of (i) a channel coordinating returns policy that maximizes the supply chain joint expected profit, and (ii) a profit sharing arrangement that gives the retailer an expected profit only slightly higher than that in the no returns case so that it is just enough to induce the retailer to accept the SCRC. Thus, the manufacturer captures as high a percentage as possible of the jointly maximum supply chain profit. However, this contract can sometimes lead to the manufacturer's resulting realized profit being lower than that in the no returns case when demand is lower than expected. In this context, even though profit is sufficiently attractive on average, will the risk-sensitive manufacturer ever consider applying a SCRC? Our research raises this question and focuses on designing a SCRC that can significantly increase the probability of the manufacturer's resulting realized profit being at least higher than that in the no returns case.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.1-18
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• 2019

The competition between port authorities (PAs) and terminal operating companies (TOCs) in providing port logistics services has gained importance. The PAs enter into leasing contracts with TOCs in various ways. This study aims to model a contract method that maximizes the joint profit between a PA and a TOC. Particularly, this study aims to model the equilibrium by comparing four types of contract schemes in the non-coordination, cooperation, Cournot, and collusion models. The results of the analysis show that the two-part tariff scheme generates a higher joint profit than the fixed and fee contracts. It is understood that risk- and profit-sharing between the PAs and TOCs helps the latter to maximize the throughput and the joint profit. These results are expected to provide an important theoretical basis for decision-making about port rent and freight between the PAs and TOCs.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.15-24
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• 2019

Fair Allocation of profits or costs arising from joint participation by multiple individuals or entities with different purposes is essential for their continuing involvement and for their dissatisfaction reduction. In this research, fair allocation of the profits of forming a grand coalition in Three-Echelon Supply Chain (TESC) game that is composed of manufacturer, distributor and retailer, is studied. In particular, the solutions of the proportional method of profit, the proportional method of marginal profit, and Shapley value based on cooperative game theory are proved to be in the desirable characteristics of the core. The proportional method of profit and the proportional method of marginal profit are often used because of their ease of application. These methods distribute total profit in proportion to profits or marginal profits of each game participant. In addition, Shapley value can be defined as the average marginal profit when one game player is added at a time. Even though the calculation of the average of all possible marginal profits is not simple, Shapley value are often used as a useful method. Experiments have shown that the solution of the incremental method, which calculates the marginal cost of adding game players in the order of manufacturers, distributors and retailers, does not exist in the core.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.3-6
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• 2007

In the traditional inventory problem, market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous. But incorporating these factors into the model can provide an opportunity for increasing the total profit. So we investigate the joint price-inventory policy in a supply chain consisting of a single retailer and a single manufacturer. Demand at the retailer depends on the retail price. The retailer and the manufacturer cooperate closely each other to maximize overall profit of the supply chain. The mathematical model is presented and the solution procedure is developed in order to jointly determine the optimal policy including the retail price, the production lot sizes, and the delivery frequency from the manufacturer to the retailer.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.46-58
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• 2019

Purpose - This paper analyzes how Research and Development (R&D) cartelization and Research Joint Ventures (RJV) affect firms that engage in Cournot competition in their product market using a model in which the Home and Foreign firm produce differentiated products and export their total output to a third country's market. Design/Methodology - In a two-stage game, research expenditures incurred in the first stage improve product quality and are subject to various degrees of spillovers. We consider four different scenarios. Findings - In a symmetric equilibrium we observe the following: (i) an RJV that cooperates in R&D decision yields the highest R&D expenditure. However, the scenario which yields the lowest expenditure depends on the extent of differentiation between the goods and the degree of spillovers; (ii) RJV cartelization yields the highest product quality, output, and consumer surplus in the third country; however, the lowest is produced by R&D competition if spillovers are strong and by R&D cartelization if spillovers are weak; and (iii) each firm's profit is at its minimum in R&D competition and its maximum in RJV cartelization. Furthermore, if spillovers are strong, the profit of each firm in R&D cartelization is greater than that in RJV competition, and vice versa. Originality/value - By analyzing product innovation in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between process R&D and product R&D in international markets.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-13
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• 2009

This paper presents a coordinated planning model of price-dependent demand for a single-manufacturer and a single-retailer. The demand is assumed to be normally distributed, with its mean being price dependent. The manufacturer and retailer coordinate with each other to jointly and simultaneously determine the retail selling price and the retailer order quantity to maximize the joint expected total profit. This model is then compared to a 'returns' policy model where manufacturer buys back unsold items from the retailers. It is shown that the optimal total profit is higher for coordinated planning model than that for the returns policy model, in which the retail price is set by the retailer. A compensation or profit sharing scheme is then suggested and it is shown that the coordinated model with profit sharing yields a 'win-win' situation. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the profit patterns for both linear and nonlinear demand functions. The coordinated planning model, in addition, has a lower optimal price than for a returns policy model, which would result in higher sales, thus expanding the markets for the whole supply chain.