• 무역상무연구
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• 제13권
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• pp.699-733
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• 2000

This article analyzes the state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement for first four and a half years. Remarkable points found on this analysis are as follows: First, the Quad consisting of the United States, the European Community (EC), Canada and Japan has participated in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism more frequently than any other WTO member. Second, among developing country members some leading countries such as Korea, Brazil and India have relied actively upon the mechanism to claim and defend their rights and obligations under the WTO rules. Third, bilateral dispute settlements generally have been preferred to multilateral dispute settlements by the panel or Appellate Body. Fourth, observation of the Appellate Body proceedings well shows WTO members' strategy to use every process available to them. Fifth, the provisions of GATT 1994 have been most frequently invoked by the members. GATS and TRIPS Agreement disputes are mainly involved in developed countries, in particular the U.S. and the EC. Sixth, very high winning ratio in the panel and Appellate Body process indicates that complaining parties review the possibility to get favorable rulings even before referring to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and prepare for the case very thoroughly. Seventh, roughly speaking, disputes were settled within two or three years. Therefore, seeking bilateral dispute settlement can be more advantageous to a complaining party than referring to a panel or an arbitrator because of low costs and short time period in dispute settlement. Finally, the DSB approved retaliatory actions for winning complaining parties against the defending parties who had rejected implementation of its rulings and recommendations. In conclusion, it can be said that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been operated very successfully for the first four and a half years. It is hoped that continued study on state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement mechanism will be contributory to improved national interest of Korea.

• 무역학회지
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• 제45권2호
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• pp.177-189
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• 2020

The dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is in great peril. The Appellate Body has ceased to function last December as the United States has blocked the appointment of new Appellate Body members since 2017. The focus of this study is on the examination of US's discontent on the Appellate Body and various efforts to reform the Appellate Body. In a recent report, the US Trade Representative raises its concerns on the Appellate Body including 90 days mandatory deadline, transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members, scope of appeal, advisory opinions, precedent, recommendation, and overreach without offering any viable solutions. Some of WTO members and experts proposed several Appellate Body reform measures but agreement between WTO members is unlikely in a foreseeable future. Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms should be seriously considered such as interim appeal arbitration arrangements, separate dispute settlement mechanisms for trade remedies, unilateral retaliatory measures without WTO authorization. Rules-based multilateral dispute settlement system is imperative to small open economies like Korea. The Korean government should actively participate in Appellate Body reform discussions with other WTO members to keep the WTO dispute settlement system from collapsing.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제30권4호
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• pp.3-29
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• 2020

The WTO's dispute settlement system has played a significant role in settling trade disputes between countries, and its function and role have been expanded by handling about 596 disputes since its establishment in 1995. This shows that the WTO's dispute settlement system is gaining enormous trust among member countries that it recognizes as a fair, effective, and efficient system for resolving trade disputes. The U.S. remains uncooperative in the WTO dispute settlement system, citing disregard for the 90-day deadline for appeals, continued service by persons who are no longer A.B. members, issuing advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute, A.B. review of facts, and review of a member's domestic law de novo. The A.B. claims its reports are entitled to be treated as a precedent. These problems should be gradually improved through various discussions and agreements by establishing a multilateral forum for resolving disputes and gradually ending the problems through reform of the DSU.

• 국제지역연구
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• 제13권2호
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• pp.618-642
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• 2009

현재 WTO에 가입한 국가는 국가 간 무역분쟁을 다룸에 있어서 WTO협정의 DSU 등에서 규정하고 있는 분쟁해결제도의 틀을 준수해야 한다. 더욱이 동 협정에서는 지역 자유무역협정을 체결하더라도 WTO의 분쟁해결제도를 원용할 수 있도록 규정하고 있다. 우리나라와 미국은 WTO의 핵심 회원국으로서 주요한 역할을 수행하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 한미 자유무역협정에는 별도의 분쟁해결제도를 도입하고 있다. 물론 일부 WTO의 분쟁해결제도를 벤치마킹한 부분이 존재하기도 하지만 분쟁해결을 위한 공동위원회 설치, 분야별 분쟁해결제도 별도 도입 등 상당부분 WTO 분쟁해결제도와는 차별화된 시도를 하고 있다. 본 연구에서는 한미 FTA와 WTO 양자의 무역분쟁해결제도를 상호 비교 고찰함으로써 실효성 측면 등 제 관점에서의 문제점을 도출하고 이를 근거로 그 대안 및 정책적 함의를 제시하고자 하였다. 이는 현재 추진하고 있거나 향후 추진할 FTA 협상에의 반영 및 국가 통상정책수립, 운용의 관점에서도 시사하는 바가 클 것으로 판단되며 특히 우리나라 일각에서는 한미 FTA 분쟁해결규정에 일부 문제가 있다는 지적이 제기되고 있는 바 이러한 관점에서 더욱 논의 및 연구 검토의 필요성이 존재한다.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.81-113
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• 2013

The World Trade Organization (WTO) offers remedies for non-compliance by the introduction of compensation or retaliation in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). There are no the provisions under the WTO DSU and it seems unclear what retaliation is attempting to achieve. Therefore, it is unclear whether the goal of WTO retaliation is to induce compliance or to restore the balance between the rights and the obligations of WTO members. It has been claimed the WTO has a strong dispute settlement system by providing retaliation when the recommendations and rulings of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are not complied with. But this seems to be inadequate to bring about effective and timely compliance. Especially there is a problem with free riding by a violating member because the level of retaliation is determined from the expiration of a reasonable period of time, providing an incentive to delay compliance. Also the level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, according to DSU Article 22.4. However, if the member concerned objections to the level of the suspension proposed, the matter shall be referred to arbitration. The arbitrator shall not examine the nature of the suspension of concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the nullification or impairment. The arbitrator makes an assessment standard of equivalence by comparing the suspension of concessions or other obligations and the nullification or impairment calculated in terms of the amount of trade. But it is necessary that other standards replace the quantitative standards when the level of the nullification or impairment cannot be quantified by concrete damages.

• 항공우주산업기술동향
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• 제6권2호
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• pp.11-21
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• 2008

본 논문은 WTO 협정의 보조금규정 및 WTO 분쟁사례를 검토, 분석하여 공정무역체제하에서 국제규범에 저촉되지 않는 방향으로 우리나라의 항공우주산업지원방안을 마련하는데 중점을 두었다. 먼저 보조금의 요건인 재정적 공여 및 혜택에 대해 분석하였으며 보조금 중에서 금지보조금, 상계조치가능보조금으로 나뉘어 있는 규정을 검토하였고, 브라질과 캐나다, 미국과 EC 간의 항공기 분쟁사례에서 어떠한 쟁점이 있었는지를 검토하였다. 우리나라의 항공우주산업은 아직 국제경쟁력을 확보하지 못한 상태이므로 정부의 적극적인 지원이 필요하나 WTO 메카니즘에 의거하여 보조금에 해당해서는 안되므로 국제규범에 저촉되지 않는 다양한 지원방안을 제안했다.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• 제24권4호
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• pp.337-348
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• 2020

Although the WTO has fulfilled several key tasks it was set up to do - providing periodic reviews of members' trade policies, resolving disputes, supporting negotiations - with the notable exceptions of the Trade Facilitation and Information Technology agreements, WTO members have not been able to negotiate new rules on "bread and butter" trade policies. The importance of doing so was illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic which saw widespread uncoordinated recourse to trade policy instruments. This paper highlights four reforms that would bolster the effectiveness of the WTO as a forum for trade cooperation: (1) improving collection and reporting of information on trade-related policies; (2) supporting analysis-informed deliberation to establish a common understanding of the need and scope for cooperation in specific policy areas; (3) putting in place a stronger multilateral governance framework for plurilateral cooperation between groups of WTO members; and (4) reestablishing an effective dispute settlement system.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.155-187
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• 2017

WTO에서는 GATT체제에서 나타났던 분쟁해결에 따른 문제점을 해결하기 위해 복잡한 절차를 분쟁해결양해(DSU)로 통일하였으며, 분쟁해결을 담당하는 상설기관으로 DSB와 상소기관(the Appellate Body)을 설치하였다. 또한 패널보고서의 신속한 의사결정을 위해 역총의제(reverse consensus system)를 도입하고, 사법적 기능을 크게 강화하는 등 절차에서 많은 개선이 이루어졌다. 그러나 미국은 아직도 자국법인 통상법 제301조를 통하여 일방적으로 분쟁해결을 시도하고 있다. 이와 같은 301조에 의한 일방적 보복조치는 공정한 분쟁해결을 저해하는 WTO협정위반에 해당한다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 DSU의 특성과 최근 동향을 검토하고, WTO에서 합법적으로 인정하고 있는 대항조치와 미국의 일방적 보복조치를 비교하였다. 또한 일방적 보복조치에 따른 대표적인 US-Japan Automobiles (DS6) 사건과 EC-Bananas III (DS27) 사건을 법제적으로 분석하였다. 결과적으로 이러한 사건들은 WTO의 정합성(WTO-consistency)에 맞지 않는 것으로 미국의 일방적 보복조치가 국제적으로 인정되기 어렵다는 점을 시사점으로 제시하였다.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제29권4호
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• pp.187-210
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• 2019

This article examines the necessity for the introduction of an ICSID Appellate System. In comparison with the WTO appellate system, the ICSID ad hoc Committee has a very limited mandate. An annulment inquiry under the ICSID arbitration system barely focuses on whether the arbitral decision resulted from a justifiable process. As long as there is procedural legitimacy, the resulting awards remain unaffected under the annulment procedure, irrespective of mistakes of fact or law. In contrast, in the WTO DSS the AB substantively reviews panel rulings and suggestions that are founded on any deficiency of objectivity or error in the interpretation of a particular WTO provision. This defect intrinsic in the annulment procedure could cause injustice to a party earnestly interested in correcting recognized misapplication of law by ICSID tribunals. Accordingly, the establishment of an appellate system would result in a more substantive and procedural review of awards. The creation of such an ICSID appellate system would ensure thorough scrutiny of the decisions of the tribunal of first instance, leading to better reasoned outcomes. This could lead to a crystallization of predictability in investment relations. The end result would be that fairness, clarity, reliability, and legality in the ICSID adjudicative process would be unassailable, to the advantage of all the contracting parties.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.27-47
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• 2009

Concepts of mediation and conciliation as alternative dispute resolutions are often confusingly used. As to what is meant by mediation and conciliation, there is no uniform legal definition. However, there has been a distinction between two methods of dispute settlement under the international law (UN Charter, WTO DSU, NAFTA, EU mediation directive, WIPO Mediation Rules) although there is no clear definition on the terms of mediation and conciliation. And also under the domestic law such as U.K, France, Germany, a clear distinction has been made between two terms. Mediation means a facilitated negotiation between two parties through the intervention of a third party. A third and neutral party (mediator) help the parties in dispute to find their solution by managing a certain mediation protocol and facilitating communication between the parties while in conciliation, a third party evaluative the case and can suggest the parties a legally non-binding solution. Once the parties accept it, it becomes binding between them. However, in the U.S,, it seems that there is no practical use of distinguishing mediation and conciliation. The term of mediation is more commonly used than the term of conciliation and it has two kinds of mediation such as facilitative and evaluative mediation. Korea's conciliation system is close to conciliation or evaluative mediation. In conclusion, what is distinct between mediation and conciliation is the role of third party. If a neutral third party takes a role of advisor or facilitator, then he or she may employ a proper protocol to help the parties to find themselves their solution (mediation) while if a neutral person plays a role of evaluator, then he or she listens to the parties and suggest a solution to them (conciliation).