• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.13
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• pp.699-733
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• 2000

This article analyzes the state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement for first four and a half years. Remarkable points found on this analysis are as follows: First, the Quad consisting of the United States, the European Community (EC), Canada and Japan has participated in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism more frequently than any other WTO member. Second, among developing country members some leading countries such as Korea, Brazil and India have relied actively upon the mechanism to claim and defend their rights and obligations under the WTO rules. Third, bilateral dispute settlements generally have been preferred to multilateral dispute settlements by the panel or Appellate Body. Fourth, observation of the Appellate Body proceedings well shows WTO members' strategy to use every process available to them. Fifth, the provisions of GATT 1994 have been most frequently invoked by the members. GATS and TRIPS Agreement disputes are mainly involved in developed countries, in particular the U.S. and the EC. Sixth, very high winning ratio in the panel and Appellate Body process indicates that complaining parties review the possibility to get favorable rulings even before referring to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and prepare for the case very thoroughly. Seventh, roughly speaking, disputes were settled within two or three years. Therefore, seeking bilateral dispute settlement can be more advantageous to a complaining party than referring to a panel or an arbitrator because of low costs and short time period in dispute settlement. Finally, the DSB approved retaliatory actions for winning complaining parties against the defending parties who had rejected implementation of its rulings and recommendations. In conclusion, it can be said that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been operated very successfully for the first four and a half years. It is hoped that continued study on state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement mechanism will be contributory to improved national interest of Korea.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.45 no.2
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• pp.177-189
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• 2020

The dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is in great peril. The Appellate Body has ceased to function last December as the United States has blocked the appointment of new Appellate Body members since 2017. The focus of this study is on the examination of US's discontent on the Appellate Body and various efforts to reform the Appellate Body. In a recent report, the US Trade Representative raises its concerns on the Appellate Body including 90 days mandatory deadline, transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members, scope of appeal, advisory opinions, precedent, recommendation, and overreach without offering any viable solutions. Some of WTO members and experts proposed several Appellate Body reform measures but agreement between WTO members is unlikely in a foreseeable future. Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms should be seriously considered such as interim appeal arbitration arrangements, separate dispute settlement mechanisms for trade remedies, unilateral retaliatory measures without WTO authorization. Rules-based multilateral dispute settlement system is imperative to small open economies like Korea. The Korean government should actively participate in Appellate Body reform discussions with other WTO members to keep the WTO dispute settlement system from collapsing.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.3-29
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• 2020

The WTO's dispute settlement system has played a significant role in settling trade disputes between countries, and its function and role have been expanded by handling about 596 disputes since its establishment in 1995. This shows that the WTO's dispute settlement system is gaining enormous trust among member countries that it recognizes as a fair, effective, and efficient system for resolving trade disputes. The U.S. remains uncooperative in the WTO dispute settlement system, citing disregard for the 90-day deadline for appeals, continued service by persons who are no longer A.B. members, issuing advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute, A.B. review of facts, and review of a member's domestic law de novo. The A.B. claims its reports are entitled to be treated as a precedent. These problems should be gradually improved through various discussions and agreements by establishing a multilateral forum for resolving disputes and gradually ending the problems through reform of the DSU.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.618-642
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• 2009

Currently the nations which join the WTO shall observe understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes in WTO agreement. In addition this agreement provides it will be able to apply dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. Korea and the United States are accomplishing an important role as the core members of the WTO. Regardless of this, The Korea - US FTA is providing a separate dispute settlement system. This paper pursues a comparative analysis concerning rules and procedures of dispute settlement between The Korea - US FTA and the WTO, and furthermore derives problems from the viewpoint of effectiveness, and suggests alternatives and implications in view of trade policy. I hope this study contributes to setting-up and development of national trade policy and is applied to FTA negotiation hereafter.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.81-113
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• 2013

The World Trade Organization (WTO) offers remedies for non-compliance by the introduction of compensation or retaliation in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). There are no the provisions under the WTO DSU and it seems unclear what retaliation is attempting to achieve. Therefore, it is unclear whether the goal of WTO retaliation is to induce compliance or to restore the balance between the rights and the obligations of WTO members. It has been claimed the WTO has a strong dispute settlement system by providing retaliation when the recommendations and rulings of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are not complied with. But this seems to be inadequate to bring about effective and timely compliance. Especially there is a problem with free riding by a violating member because the level of retaliation is determined from the expiration of a reasonable period of time, providing an incentive to delay compliance. Also the level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, according to DSU Article 22.4. However, if the member concerned objections to the level of the suspension proposed, the matter shall be referred to arbitration. The arbitrator shall not examine the nature of the suspension of concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the nullification or impairment. The arbitrator makes an assessment standard of equivalence by comparing the suspension of concessions or other obligations and the nullification or impairment calculated in terms of the amount of trade. But it is necessary that other standards replace the quantitative standards when the level of the nullification or impairment cannot be quantified by concrete damages.

• Current Industrial and Technological Trends in Aerospace
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.11-21
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• 2008

This paper focuses on finding the way of aerospace industry promotion in Korea compatible with fair trade system under international rules by considering and analysing the WTO subsidy rules and WTO dispute settlement cases. As for subsidy rules in WTO, the paper deals with two matters such as financial contribution and benefit and further studies provisions on the prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies. And as for the dispute settlement matters, it reviews the Brazil-Canada case and the US-EC case on civil aircraft export subsidies. While aerospace industry in Korea is not yet internationally competitive still requiring government's continuous supports, it must not be in conflict with subsidy rules under WTO mechanism. This paper makes several suggestions to meet these conditions.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.337-348
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• 2020

Although the WTO has fulfilled several key tasks it was set up to do - providing periodic reviews of members' trade policies, resolving disputes, supporting negotiations - with the notable exceptions of the Trade Facilitation and Information Technology agreements, WTO members have not been able to negotiate new rules on "bread and butter" trade policies. The importance of doing so was illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic which saw widespread uncoordinated recourse to trade policy instruments. This paper highlights four reforms that would bolster the effectiveness of the WTO as a forum for trade cooperation: (1) improving collection and reporting of information on trade-related policies; (2) supporting analysis-informed deliberation to establish a common understanding of the need and scope for cooperation in specific policy areas; (3) putting in place a stronger multilateral governance framework for plurilateral cooperation between groups of WTO members; and (4) reestablishing an effective dispute settlement system.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.155-187
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• 2017

In the US, the Sections 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 are still being used to resolve disputes. The U.S' such unilateral retaliations grounded on the Sections 301 of the Trade Act, in fact, violate the WTO agreements and hinder the development of international trade as the trade partner may assume it as a reprisal move impeding the fair settlement of disputes. Here, this study is going to examine the characteristics and functions of the WTO dispute settlement system briefly and compare the countermeasures recognized to be legitimate by the WTO with the U.S' unilateral retaliation. Also, this author will analyse the US-Japan Automobiles (DS6) and EC-Bananas III (DS27) as one of the typical cases resulted from the unilateral retaliation. According to the result, these cases do not conform to WTO-consistency, and it implies that it is absurd to accept the US' unilateral retaliation internationally. In conclusion, presently, it is a global trend to solidify protectionism, and to vitalize trade and resolve trade disputes efficiently, it is needed to prohibit the recourse to unilateral retaliations and also positively apply the WTO dispute settlement system(DSU) defining rules about how to strengthen the multilateral system.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.187-210
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• 2019

This article examines the necessity for the introduction of an ICSID Appellate System. In comparison with the WTO appellate system, the ICSID ad hoc Committee has a very limited mandate. An annulment inquiry under the ICSID arbitration system barely focuses on whether the arbitral decision resulted from a justifiable process. As long as there is procedural legitimacy, the resulting awards remain unaffected under the annulment procedure, irrespective of mistakes of fact or law. In contrast, in the WTO DSS the AB substantively reviews panel rulings and suggestions that are founded on any deficiency of objectivity or error in the interpretation of a particular WTO provision. This defect intrinsic in the annulment procedure could cause injustice to a party earnestly interested in correcting recognized misapplication of law by ICSID tribunals. Accordingly, the establishment of an appellate system would result in a more substantive and procedural review of awards. The creation of such an ICSID appellate system would ensure thorough scrutiny of the decisions of the tribunal of first instance, leading to better reasoned outcomes. This could lead to a crystallization of predictability in investment relations. The end result would be that fairness, clarity, reliability, and legality in the ICSID adjudicative process would be unassailable, to the advantage of all the contracting parties.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.27-47
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• 2009

Concepts of mediation and conciliation as alternative dispute resolutions are often confusingly used. As to what is meant by mediation and conciliation, there is no uniform legal definition. However, there has been a distinction between two methods of dispute settlement under the international law (UN Charter, WTO DSU, NAFTA, EU mediation directive, WIPO Mediation Rules) although there is no clear definition on the terms of mediation and conciliation. And also under the domestic law such as U.K, France, Germany, a clear distinction has been made between two terms. Mediation means a facilitated negotiation between two parties through the intervention of a third party. A third and neutral party (mediator) help the parties in dispute to find their solution by managing a certain mediation protocol and facilitating communication between the parties while in conciliation, a third party evaluative the case and can suggest the parties a legally non-binding solution. Once the parties accept it, it becomes binding between them. However, in the U.S,, it seems that there is no practical use of distinguishing mediation and conciliation. The term of mediation is more commonly used than the term of conciliation and it has two kinds of mediation such as facilitative and evaluative mediation. Korea's conciliation system is close to conciliation or evaluative mediation. In conclusion, what is distinct between mediation and conciliation is the role of third party. If a neutral third party takes a role of advisor or facilitator, then he or she may employ a proper protocol to help the parties to find themselves their solution (mediation) while if a neutral person plays a role of evaluator, then he or she listens to the parties and suggest a solution to them (conciliation).