• Proceedings of KOSOMES biannual meeting
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• 2017.11a
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• pp.229-229
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• 2017

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.145-167
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• 2016

UN Security Council is entitled to power for determining the existence of the threat to the peace. Specifying the provisions adopted in accordance with the chapter 7 of the UN Charter, its resolution is deemed as document confirming its decision about the threat to the peace. In general, resolutions adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, are considered binding, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter. Regarding to the terms of the Resolutions to be interpreted, the word "decide" is used as to the suspension of the ballistic missile program, the word "demand" is used as to the stopping of the the launch of ballistic missile, and the word "demand" is used as to return to the missile test moratorium. These provisions may be deemed to determining specific obligations to be imposed upon the States in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. On the other hand, the Resolutions may be limited to the decision, not leading to a sort of international legislation, the main purpose of which is to provide a legal basis for international sanctions against Northe Korea. North Korea missile test case has reminded us of continuing discussion about whether the decision of the Security Council lacks the legislative authority due to its decision process. Furthermore, having regard to the outer space and space activities, the outer space law regime would be not compatible with the Security Council decision process in that the former presupposes the agreement among all States parties, while the latter based upon the agreement between Council member States. Therefore, it is premature to consider the Security Council decision as becoming the lex specialis of the space law regime.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.5-26
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• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.211-234
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• 2009

North Korea conducted the launcher test, which, as North Korea claimed, belonged to the sovereign rights for the purpose of peaceful utilization and exploration of the outer space. The launching was allegedly done for the sole purpose of putting the satellite into earth orbit, while international community stressed the fact that the orbiting of satellite was not confirmed and that the technology used was not distinct from the purpose of building intercontinental ballistic missile. UN Security Council adopted the resolutions which took the effect that the launching was deemed as the missile launching, not the mere launcher test. North Korea declared the moratorium of suspending its test activity. Controversial issues have been raised regarding whether the launcher itself has the legal status of enjoying the freedom of space flight based upon the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The resolutions, however, has put forward a binding instrument forbidding the launching. UN Security Council resolutions, however, should be read not as defining the missile test illegal, in that the language of resolutions, such as 'demand', should be considered as not formulating a sort of obligatory act or inact. On the other hand, the resolutions should be read as having binding force with respect to any activity relating to the weapons of mass destruction. The resolution 1718 is written in more specific language such as 'decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching'. Therefore, the lauching activity of the North Korea is banned by the UN Security Council resolution. It should be noted that the resolution does not include any specific provisions defining the space of activity of the North Korea as illegal. But, the legal effect of the moratorium is not denied as to its launching itself, which is corresponding to the missile test clearisibanned in accordance with the resolutions.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.45 no.4
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• pp.83-93
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• 2020

Sanctions by the international community can increase their effectiveness with the participation of major countries with global economic influence, and can lead to efficient sanctions against the target countries when different sanctions procedures and methods can be operated in an integrated manner. To this end, it is being carried out with the aim of maximizing the performance of sanctions through collective economic solidarity by inducing international participation centered on the joint agenda, such as drawing up a resolution for sanctions. In this study, the definition and purpose of sanctions imposed by the international community and by major specific countries were explained and an empirical analysis was conducted on the economic impact of each sanctions, focusing on the United Nations Security Council and the United States, which directly implement them. Based on the selected research model, the effects of economic sanctions on the international community and countries subject to sanctions by certain countries were mutually compared and analyzed in the data. Finally, the conclusion obtained from this study was stated and the implications were derived and the possibility of further research expansion was described.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.42
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• pp.309-335
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• 2009

Over the last several years, regarding to the strategic items, the international community has seen governments make more formal commitments to adopt and implement effective export controls to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMD). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540(that is "S/RES/1540") stands as the most important of these commitments. Many UN members already have export control laws and regulations in place to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Many members also participate in a variety of formal and informal international arrangements to coordinate their export control efforts. Nonetheless, each of these countries has its own unique legal framework for export controls. This generates considerable diversity in the construction of the specific national legal authorities. Over the last few years, however, a consensus over what constitutes the key elements of effective legal authorities for export controls has begun to emerge. Evidence for this development comes in the identification of best legal authorities or principles at several multilateral conferences on export controls.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.53-83
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• 2023

The investment agreement prepared at the beginning of inter-Korean economic cooperation in 2000 can be evaluated as very ineffective as a product of mutual political and diplomatic compromise rather than an effective protection for our investment assets. South Korean companies suffered a lot of losses due to the freezing of assets in the Geumgang mountain district and the closure of the Kaeseung Industrial Complex, but they did not receive practical damage relief due to institutional vulnerabilities. Currently, North Korea is under international economic sanctions of the UN Security Council, so it is true that the resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation is far away, but North Korea's human resources and geographical location are still attractive investment destinations for us. Therefore, if strained relations between the two Koreas recover in the future and international economic sanctions on North Korea are eased, Korean companies' investment in North Korea will resume. However, the previous inter-Korean investment agreement system was a fictional systemthat was ineffective. Therefore, if these safety devices are not reorganized when economic cooperation resumes, unfair damage to Korean companies will be repeated again. The core of the improved investment guarantee system is not a bilateral system between the two Koreas, but the establishment of a multilateral system through North Korea's inclusion in the international economy. Specifically, it includes encouraging North Korea to join international agreements for the execution of arbitration decisions, securing subrogation rights through membership of international insurance groups such as MIGA, creating matching funds by international financial organizations. Through this new approach, it will be possible to improve the safety of Korean companies' investment in North Korea, and ultimately, it will be necessary to lay the foundation for mutual development through economic cooperation between the two Koreas.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.438-457
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• 2019

The main purpose of this paper is to identify the entry types and locational determinants of North Korean workers in cross-border regions between North Korea and China. More specifically, the paper has attempted to divide the entry type of them in the regions into two; 1) entry via transactions between Chinese traders with North Korea and North Korea trade companies, and 2) entry via transactions between Korean-Chinese middlemen and North Korean trade companies. Also, it has analyzed main factors of their locational determinants in the spatial contexts of the regions. There have been changes in two perspectives in terms of the entry paths and types of them in accordance with the transformation of characteristics of United Nations sanction against North Korea from 'call-upon' to 'decide' after UN Security Council Resolution 2094 in 2013. Firstly, main agents who have dealing with North Korean trade companies which have right to dispatch North Korean workers have been changed from Chinese traders into Korean-Chinese brokers who are specialized in the introduction of North Korean workers with one-stop service from visa administrative to labor managements. Secondly, there has been a transfer of North Korean workers in the regions from formal to informal workers who has been admitted into China with a short stay or a tourist visa, and then remained illegally to be employed in China. Therefore, as demands on service which is able to guarantee the security of North Korean informal workers and their managements have increased, Korean-Chinese brokers have been stimulated in the regions after the operation of real international sanctions against overseas North Korean workers. In addition, the main factors of their locational determinants in cross-border regions between North Korea and China are could be analyzed in three perspectives; 1) an increase in real wages in accordance with the reform of the Chinese social insurance system after 2011, 2) the structural vulnerability of labor markets in the regions, 3) the utilization of stable and manageable workers.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.297-321
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• 2011

Under the UN Security Council Resolution 1540/1810 in 2004 to restrict the proliferation of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and their means of delivery, many countries have taken great efforts to, control the export of strategic items, thereby preventing the transfer of ABCM (atomic, biological, chemical weapons, missiles) and technologies and goods related to conventional weapons or dual-use items, Compliance Program (CP) in Korea or Internal Compliance Program(ICP) in Japan refers to a company's internal system or rules to comply with the export control laws and regulations, and is to prevent the unintentional illegal export of strategic items. This paper analyzes the Compliance Program (CP) of strategic export control system between Korea and Japan. Both countries have very similar legal frameworks under the guiding principles of multilateral export control regimes. However, there are some differences in actual procedures, classification service, supporting system, export license, sanctions for illegal exporters, etc. Korea should take more active and customer-oriented measures to promote the Compliance Program (CP) into Korean export companies for better awareness and positive attitude, practical information and education, smoothy government-firm communication, closer cooperation between Korea and Japan, etc.