• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제5권
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• pp.53-75
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• 1993

This article is concerned with the comment on "Some New Problems of International Aviation Security-Considerations Forcused on its Legal Aspects". Ever since 1970, in addition to the problem of failure to accept the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, there has been also the problem of parties to them, failing to comply with their obligations under the respective treaties, in the form especially of nominal penalties or the lack of any effort to prosecute after blank refusals to extradite. There have also been cases of prolonged detention of aircraft, passengers and hostages. In this regard, all three conventions contain identical clauses which submit disputes between two or more contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of the respective conventions to arbitration or failing agreement on the organization of the arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. To the extent to which contracting States have not contracted out of this undertaking, as I fear they are expressly allowed to do, this promision can be used by contracting States to ensure compliance. But to date, this avenue does not appear to have been used. From this point of view, it may be worth mentioning that there appears to be an alarming trend towards the view that the defeat of terrorism is such an overriding imperative that all means of doing so become, in international law, automatically lawful. In addition, in as far as aviation security is concerned, as in fact it has long been suggested, what is required is the "application of the strictest security measures by all concerned."In this regard, mention should be made of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Intereference. ICAO has, moreover, compiled, for restricted distribution, a Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which is highly useful. In this regard, it may well be argued that, unless States members of ICAO notify the ICAO Council of their inability to comply with opecific standards in Annex 17 or any of the related Annexes in accordance with Article 38 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, their failure to do so can involve State responsibility and, if damage were to insure, their liability. The same applies to breaches of any other treaty obligation. I hope to demonstrate that although modes of international violence may change, their underlying characteristics remain broadly similar, necessitating not simply the adoption of an adequate body of domestic legislation, firm in its content and fairly administered, but also an international network of communication, of cooperation and of coordination of policies. Afurther legal instrument is now being developed by the Legal Committee of ICAO with respect to unlawful acts at International airports. These instruments, however, are not very effective, because of the absence of universal acceptance and the deficiency I have already pointed out. Therefore, States, airports and international airlines have to concentrate on prevention. If the development of policies is important at the international level, it is equally important in the domestic setting. For example, the recent experiences of France have prompted many changes in the State's legislation and in its policies towards terrorism, with higher penalties for terrorist offences and incentives which encourage accused terrorists to pass informations to the authorities. And our government has to tighten furthermore security measures. Particularly, in the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescence to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. The general opinion is that the legal oystem could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the sovereign rights of states, and the human rights of the individuals. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co - ordinated measures.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제38권
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• pp.181-226
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• 2008

The purpose of this paper is to describe the settling procedures of the investor-state disputes in the FTA Investment Chapter, and to research on the international arbitration system for the settlement of the investor-state disputes under the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The UNCTAD reports that the cumulative number of arbitration cases for the investor-state dispute settlement is 290 cases by March 2008. 182 cases of them have been brought before the ICSID, and 80 cases of them have been submitted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID reports that the cumulative 263 cases of investor-state dispute settlement have been brought before the ICSID by March 2008. 136 cases of them have been concluded, but 127 cases of them have been pending up to now. The Chapter 11 Section B of the Korea-U.S. FTA provides for the Investor_State Dispute Settlement. Under the provisions of Section B, the claimant may submit to arbitration a claim that the respondent has breached and obligation under Section A, an investment authorization or an investment agreement and that the claimant has incurred loss or damage by reason of that breach. Provided that six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim referred to under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings; under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID Convention provides for the jurisdiction of the ICSID(Chapter 2), arbitration(Chapter 3), and replacement and disqualification of arbitrators(Chapter 5) as follows. The jurisdiction of the ICSID shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the ICSID. Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the Secretary General who shall send a copy of the request to the other party. The tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree. The tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention Section 3 and in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. The award of the tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by members of the tribunal who voted for it. The award shall deal with every question submitted to the tribunal, and shall state the reason upon which it is based. Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary General on one or more of the grounds under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. In conclusion, there may be some issues on the international arbitration for the settlement of the investor-state disputes: for example, abuse of litigation, lack of an appeals process, and problem of transparency. Therefore, there have been active discussions to address such issues by the ICSID and UNCITRAL up to now.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제35권2호
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• pp.3-40
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• 2020

국제항공운송에서 운송인의 책임을 규율하는 1929년 바르샤바 협약과 1999년 몬트리올 협약의 "사고"는 운송인의 배상 책임을 결정하는 중요한 판단 기준임에도 불구하고, 조문상 명시된 바가 없어 법원의 판단과 해석에 상당 부분을 위임하고 있다. 바르샤바 체제에서 몬트리올 협약의 체결에 이르기까지 협약의 목적이나 사정 등에 많은 변화가 있었으나, 협약상 "사고"의 개념은 논의되지 않았으며, 심지어 몬트리올 협약이 채택된 이후에도 동일한 의미로 해석된다는 점에는 논쟁의 여지가 없었다. 이와 연관하여 미국 연방 대법원의 "Air France v. Saks" 판결은 "사고"의 개념을 명확히 하였으며 현재도 중요한 선례로써 인용되고 있다. 최근 유럽 사법재판소는 GN v. ZU 판결에서 몬트리올 협약상 "사고"의 새로운 개념을 제시하였다. "사고"는 "일반적 의미를 적용해야 하며, 이는 항공기 내에서 발생하는 모든 상황을 포괄하는 의미로 해석"되어야 한다고 보았다. 또한, 이전 선례에서 논쟁이 있었던 "항공과 연관된 위험"의 여부는 포함되지 않는다고 보았다. 이러한 해석은 몬트리올 협약과 유럽연합 규칙(Regulation EC: No.889/2002)의 기본 이념인 "소비자 이익 보호"에 초점을 맞추어 "사고"의 개념을 확대한 것으로 합리적인 예측이 가능하다. 유럽 사법재판소의 "사고"에 대한 자체적인 해석은 "운송인 보호"에 중점을 두었던 바르샤바 협약과 "Saks" 판결에서의 사고의 정의에서 탈피하여 "여객 보호" 중심의 몬트리올 협약에 기준을 맞추고 있으며, 법원의 판단영역과 운송인의 위험관리 책임을 확대하는 결과를 보여준다. 이러한 유럽 사법 재판소의 "사고"에 대한 해석은 "여객 보호"의 측면에서 몬트리올 협약의 취지에 부합한다고 볼 수 있다. 그러나 "사고"의 확대해석으로 고려하여야 할 문제점이 상존한다. 첫째, 협약의 기본 취지인 항공운송인과 여객의 '공평한 이익 분배'와 관련하여 '여객 보호'에 치우쳤다는 점에서 '균형성'에 논란이 제기될 수 있다. 둘째, 유럽연합 내 국가를 취항하는 자국의 항공사가 많다는 점에서 막대한 손실이 예상된다. 셋째, 유럽과 미국의 "사고"를 해석함에 있어 간극이 발생하며, 이는 협약의 기본이념인 "규칙의 통일성"에 문제가 제기된다. 넷째, 유럽 사법재판소의 "사고"의 해석은 '항공기 운용과의 연관성' 및 '항공기 내의 상황'만을 언급하고 있다는 점에서 적용 범위에 의문이 제기된다. 대상 사안에서 유럽 사법재판소는 몬트리올 협약상 "사고"의 새로운 판단 기준을 최초로 제시하였는바, "사고"의 해석에 대한 논점을 제시하므로 추후 판례 변화를 주목할 필요성이 있다. 또한, 항공운송인의 위험관리에 대한 무한책임을 인식하고 체계적인 체제 개편을 실시함으로써 여객의 안전을 위해 적극적인 자구책을 모색해야 함을 시사한다.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제30권2호
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• pp.311-336
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• 2015

본 논문은 무인항공기 관련 현행 국제법을 국제항공공법과 국제항공사법의 관점에서 조사하고, 무인항공기관련 현행 호주 국내법과 입법 예고된 호주 국내법을 무인항공기 운항에 따른 위험요소 (민사책임, 안전, 사생활보호)에 중점을 두면서 검토한다. 현재 전체 상업용 비행에서 무인항공기 운항이 차지하는 비율은 미미한 수준이지만, 상업용 목적의 국제무인항공비행은 현실이 될 것이다. 무인기 관련산업이 빠르게 발전하고 있으므로, 빠른 시일 내에 정책적인 해결방안이 연구되어야만, 무인항공기관련 위험요소들이 실제로 일어났을 때 적절하게 대응할 수 있는 법규범이 만들어 질 수 있을 것이다. 호주의 무인항공기관련 성공적인 국내입법에서 보듯이, 국내법적 또는 지역단위의 접근이 무인항공기 관련 문제를 주도하고 있고, 계속해서 주도할 것이다. 안전문제는 호주의 현행 입법 예고된 무인항공기관련 법규에 가장 중요한 요소이고, 국제적으로도 마찬가지이다. 안전관련 법규를 만드는 것은 매우 중요하고, 민사책임 관련법규를 만드는 것보다 선행되어야 한다. 그 이유는 안전관련 법규를 만드는 것이 민사책임 법규가 적용되는 사고의 발생위험 자체를 줄일 수 있기 때문이다. 무인항공기 운항자에 대한 구속력 있는 감항기준이 구비되어 있지 않다는 점은, 운항자의 엄격책임이 적용되는 민사책임 체계가 무인항공기 분야에는 적절하지 않다는 주장을 가능하게 할 수 있다. 이에 대한 해결책으로 ICAO 지침개정과 무인기 안전 및 감항관련 SARPs 개정, 또한 잠재적으로는 민사책임 (참가자, 승객, 지상손해 대상)관련 문제들을 포함하는 SARPs 개정의 필요성을 제안한다. 이러한 ICAO지침은 적절한 절차를 거쳐서 각국의 국내법으로 차용될 수 있을 것이고, 이럴 경우 국제협약을 제정하고 발효까지 필요한 행정적 부담과 시간을 피할 수 있을 것이다.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제25권1호
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• pp.3-26
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• 2010

환경 문제에 있어서 세계의 리더로서 앞 서 가는 구주연합(EU)은 2012년 1월 1일부터 EU 역.내외 항공기를 막론하고 EU 회원국 영토를 출발하고 도착하는 모든 항공기 운항자에 대하여 이들 항공기 엔진에서 배출되는 이산화탄소의 배출량을 규제하는 법 Directive 2008/101/EC를 2008년 제정, 공포하였다. 이에 따라 대한항공과 아시아나를 포함하여 EU를 운항하는 많은 EU 역외 항공사들은 지난 2004-2006년 3년간 연 평균 배출량의 97%만을 2012년 배출하고 2013년부터는 95%만을 배출 허용 받으며 부족한 배출량은 배출권 거래 시장에서 구입하여 충당하여야 한다. 상기 EU 조치는 다음과 같은 법적 문제를 야기한다. 첫째, EU의 법은 범 세계적 환경조약인 교토의정서가 선진국 그룹인 기후변화협약의 Annex I 국가에게만 이산화탄소 등 지구온난화가스 배출을 감축토록 한 것에 반한다. 교토의정서 제2조 2항은 지구온난화가스 감축에 있어서 항공기 배출에 관련한 체제를 ICAO를 통하여 해결하도록 위임하였는데 지역 기구인 EU가 이를 자체 지역에만 적용하기 위하여 작성한 것도 문제이다. 둘째, 역외 항공사들이 EU로 운항하는 데에 있어서 공해와 제3국의 상공을 비행하는데 EU 역내 비행에서 이루어지지 않는 여사한 비행 중 발생하는 배출을 어떤 근거로 EU가 규제할 수 있는가이다. 셋째, EU 회원국들이 Annex I 국가로서 교토의정서 상 항공기의 국내운항 배출에 대하여서는 2012년까지 이미 배출 감축의무를 지고 있음을 감안할 때, 2012년부터 시행되는 항공기 배출 감축 조치에 non-Annex I 국가의 항공 운항자를 끌어들이면서 EU 항공사들이 적어도 2012년에는 예상치 않은 이득을 얻는다는 문제도 발생한다. 과거 유사한 EU 주도의 환경관련 국제 분쟁을 살펴본 후, 상기 EU 조치를 국제법적으로 조명하고 결론에서 EU의 조치에 대한 국내적 대처를 간략기술하였다.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제22권2호
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• pp.109-133
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• 2007

The legal labyrinth through which we have just walked is one in which even a highly proficient lawyer could easily become lost. Warsaw Convention's original objective of uniformity of private international aviation liability law has been eroded as the world community ha attempted again to address perceived problems. Efforts to create simplicity and certainty of recovery actually may have created less of both. In any particular case, the issue of which international convention, intercarrier agreement or national law to apply will likely be inconsistent with other decisions. The law has evolved faster for some nations, and slower for others. Under the Warsaw Convention of 1929, strict liability is imposed on the air carrier for damage, loss, or destruction of cargo, luggage, or goods sustained either: (1) during carriage in air, which is comprised of the period during which cargo is 'in charge of the carrier (a) within an aerodrome, (b) on board the aircraft, or (c) in any place if the aircraft lands outside an aerodrome; or (2) as a result of delay. By 2007, 151 nations had ratified the original Warsaw Convention, 136 nations had ratified the Hague Protocol, 84 had ratified the Guadalajara Protocol, and 53 nations had ratified Montreal Protocol No.4, all of which have entered into force. In November 2003, the Montreal Convention of 1999 entered into force. Several airlines have embraced the Montreal Agreement or the IATA Intercarrier Agreements. Only seven nations had ratified the moribund Guatemala City Protocol. Meanwhile, the highly influential U.S. Second Circuit has rendered an opinion that no treaty on the subject was in force at all unless both affected nations had ratified the identical convention, leaving some cases to fall between the cracks into the arena of common law. Moreover, in the United States, a surface transportation movement prior or subsequent to the air movement may, depending upon the facts, be subject to Warsaw, or to common law. At present, International private air law regime can be described as a "situation of utter chaos" in which "even legal advisers and judges are confused." The net result of this barnacle-like layering of international and domestic rules, standards, agreements, and criteria in the elimination of legal simplicity and the substitution in its stead of complexity and commercial uncertainty, which manifestly can not inure to the efficient and economical flow of world trade. All this makes a strong case for universal ratification of the Montreal Convention, which will supersede the Warsaw Convention and its various reformulations. Now that the Montreal Convention has entered into force, the insurance community may press the airlines to embrace it, which in turn may encourage the world's governments to ratify it. Under the Montreal Convention, the common law defence is available to the carrier even when it was not the sole cause of the loss or damage, again making way for the application of comparative fault principle. Hopefully, the recent entry into force of the Montreal Convention of 1999 will re-establish the international legal uniformity the Warsaw Convention of 1929 sought to achieve, though far a transitional period at least, the courts of different nations will be applying different legal regimes.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제1권
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• pp.147-162
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• 1989

The current status of the application and interpretation of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent Protocols in Asian countries is in its fredgling stages compared to the developed countries of Europe and North America, and there is thus little published information about the various Asian governments' treatment and courts' views of the Warsaw System. Due to that limitation, the accent of this paper will be on Korea and Japan. As one will be aware, the so-called 'Warsaw System' is made up of the Warsaw Convention of 1929, the Hague Protocol of 1955, the Guadalajara Convention of 1961, the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971 and the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 1,2,3 and 4 of 1975. Among these instruments, most of the countries in Asia are parties to both the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol. However, the Republic of Korea and Mongolia are parties only to the Hague Protocol, while Burma, Indonesia and Sri Lanka are parties only to the Warsaw Convention. Thailand and Taiwan are not parties only to the convention or protocol. Among Asian states, Indonesia, the Phillipines and Pakistan are also parties to the Guadalajara Convention, but no country in Asia has signed the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971 or the Montreal Additional Protocols, which Protocols have not yet been put into force. The People's Republic of China has declared that the Warsaw Convention shall apply to the entire Chinese territory, including Taiwan. 'The application of the Warsaw Convention to one-way air carriage between a state which is a party only to the Warsaw Convention and a state which is a party only to the Hague Protocol' is of particular importance in Korea as it is a signatory only to the Hague Protocol, but it is involved in a great deal of air transportation to and from the united states, which in turn is a party only to the Warsaw Convention. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Korea appears to be, that parties to the Warsaw Convention were intended to be parties to the Hague Protocol, whether they actually signed it or not. The effect of this decision is that in Korea the United States and Korea will be considered by the courts to be in a treaty relationship, though neither State is a signatory to the same instrument as the other State. The first wrongful death claim in Korea related to international carriage by air under the Convention was made in Hyun-Mo Bang, et al v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. case. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed for damages based upon breach of contract as well as upon tort under the Korean Civil Code. The issue in the case was whether the time limitation provisions of the Convention should be applicable to a claim based in tort as well as to a claim based in contract. The Appellate Court ruled on 29 August 1983 that 'however founded' in Article 24(1) of the Convention should be construed to mean that the Convention should be applicable to the claim regardless of whether the cause of action was based in tort or breach of contract, and that the plaintiffs' rights to damages had therefore extinguished because of the time limitation as set forth in Article 29(1) of the Convention. The difficult and often debated question of what exactly is meant by the words 'such default equivalent to wilful misconduct' in Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention, has also been litigated. The Supreme Court of Japan dealt with this issue in the Suzuki Shinjuten Co. v. Northwest Airlines Inc. case. The Supreme Court upheld the Appellate Court's ruling, and decided that 'such default equivalent to wilful misconduct' under Article 25(1) of the Convention was within the meaning of 'gross negligence' under the Japanese Commercial Code. The issue of the convention of the 'franc' into national currencies as provided in Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol has been raised in a court case in Korea, which is now before the District Court of Seoul. In this case, the plaintiff argues that the gold franc equivalent must be converted in Korean Won in accordance with the free market price of gold in Korea, as Korea has not enacted any law, order or regulation prescribing the proper method of calculating the equivalent in its national currency. while it is unclear if the court will accept this position, the last official price of gold of the United States as in the famous Franklin Mint case, Special Drawing Right(SDR) or the current French franc, Korean Air Lines has argued in favor of the last official price of gold of the United States by which the air lines converted such francs into us Dollars in their General Conditions of Carriage. It is my understanding that in India, an appellate court adopted the free market price valuation. There is a report as well saying that if a lawsuit concerning this issue were brought in Pakistan, the free market cost of gold would be applied there too. Speaking specifically about the future of the Warsaw System in Asia though I have been informed that Thailand is actively considering acceding to the Warsaw Convention, the attitudes of most Asian countries' governments towards the Warsaw System are still wnot ell known. There is little evidence that Asian countries are moving to deal concretely with the conversion of the franc into their own local currencies. So too it cannot be said that they are on the move to adhere to the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 3 & 4 which attempt to basically solve many of the current problems with the Warsaw System, by adopting the SDR as the unit of currency, by establishing the carrier's absolute liability and an unbreakable limit and by increasing the carrier's passenger limit of liability to SDR 100,000, as well as permiting the domestic introduction of supplemental compensation. To summarize my own sentiments regarding the future, I would say that given the fact that Asian air lines are now world leaders both in overall size and rate of growth, and the fact that both Asian individuals and governments are becoming more and more reliant on the global civil aviation networks as their economies become ever stronger, I am hopeful that Asian nations will henceforth play a bigger role in ensuring the orderly and hasty development of a workable unified system of rules governing international commercial air carriage.