• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.250-254
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• 2013

Faster and cheaper transportation of the war supplies to the frontlines is essential for winning a war. This paper proposes a method to select the optimal location of the strategic military base, e.g., the Quartermaster Corps, that minimally connects three frontlines using the optimization technique. The results are also compared to the Steiner Tree theoty.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.45-60
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• 2003

As we live in real If era, If become a mandatory component for nations and organizations to survive in severe competition. If is also thought of as strategic asset for effective business operations, yet there is no proved statement on the interoperability and system integration which causes serious problem in terms of requirement engineering among current systems. The National Defense Enterprise Architecture Framework is a strategic information asset base, which define the military operation activities for the mission, the information necessary for military operations, the technologies necessary for implementing new technology in response to changing operational needs. It is an integrated model or representation. Information Systems will be evolved by the National Defense Enterprise Architecture framework. The purpose of this framework is to present overall picture of national defense information system domain so that information systems are interoperated, integrated and information sharing is increased among affiliated organization of Defense Military.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.140-162
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• 2016

The construction of Jeju Naval Base was finally completed and donated to the Republic of Korea Navy on February 26th this year. There is no doubt that the new base will contribute to the substantial augmentation of Korea's naval power and maritime security. However, we should note that the new naval base took a long and hard twenty-three years to be completed. In the 21st century, Korea should adopt a new strategy that can fulfill the security requirements of Korea for the new age of international relations. The 21st century is characterized by globalization, and in the world of globalization, a national boarder has become meaningless. In the late 20th century, after the Cold War, trade between countries have greatly increased and so did the importance of the seas. Having transformed from an agricultural country into a commercial country, Korea went from a continental state to a maritime state. Korea has become the 9th largest trading state, and obviously, the importance of the sea has become significant. Korea's national strategic focus needs to be on the sea for national survival. Thus, since the 1990s, the Korean Navy has planned to build the Jeju Naval Base. Jeju, due to its geopolitical characteristics, is extremely important to the 21st century Korea's economy and national security. Jeju is the starting point of the sea route that reaches out to the world, and at the same time, the ending point of the sea route that heads towards Korea. Jeju is located in the center of Northeast Asia and thus, Jeju Naval Base is extremely important for the area's security and order. Jeju Naval Base will be very useful not only for the maritime security of Korea, but also for keeping peace and order in Northeast Asia. Jeju Naval Base was the minimal effort against the six sea route security threats towards Korea. The six sea route threats are: 1) Threat from North Korea; 2) China's Threat towards Korea's sovereignty; 3) China's treat towards Korea's fishery; 4) Threat from Japan; 5) Threat towards Korea's sea routes; 6) Threat from recent phenomena of isolationism of the United States. Jeju Naval Base is built for both warships and civilian ships--such as cruise ships--to use. Just like the United States' Pearl Harbor, Jeju Naval Base will become not only the largest military base, but a beautiful tourist site.

• Maritime Security
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.73-102
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• 2024

The recent rise of China has the potential to intensify competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China. China is strengthening its influence in the region through maritime military actions represented by Anti-Access/Area Denial(A2/AD). The U.S. is establishing a new concept of operation to respond to China's A2/AD and achieve superiority in the U.S - China competition. In particular, this study focused on the U.S. Marine Corps' contribution to naval operations as a means of sea denial through Expeditionary Advanced Base Operation(EABO), which mainly centered on islands, and changes to strengthen its influence in the sea. By applying these changes in the U.S. Marine Corps to the ROK Marine Corps, the future direction of the ROK Marine Corps' offensive island area operations that can contribute to joint and naval operations was suggested. This study is meaningful in that it presents the ROK Marine Corps' offensive island area operations using the strategic value of the island from the perspective of sea denial. However, by presenting the direction of operational performance and military power construction / development conceptually, specific discussions of this aspect are needed in the future. I hope that this study will be the starting point.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.163-197
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• 2016

The completion of Jeju Naval Base on February 2016 made the Republic of Korea Navy(ROKN) review the size and role of the Maritime Task Flotilla(MTF). The new strategic environment for the 12st century and the new challenges require the Navy to counter North Korea's provocations and prevent potential enemy's threat. The Navy is also required to take part in the variety of international roles and missions commensurated with Korea's global status to maximize the national interest. Despite these changes, Korea's military construction concept is still unable to break away from the old paradigm of the North Korean threat largely centered. In order to develop the current MTF into the Task Group with the construction of Jeju Naval Base, the Navy must newly not only establish new force development plan and fleet management concepts but also go to persuade and convince policy decision makers. To this end, the following efforts should be promoted. First, the ROK Navy steps up efforts in order to share with the Task Group's vision and strategy. The Navy should also provide the size and structure as well as the missions and roles of the Task Group to react to new maritime security environment. Second, the Navy analyse the MTF's ability and what is required and necessary to perform its duty. After that, it must set out the direction of the Task Group's force development. Third, the current missions and roles of the MTF should be re-established to respond various threats. Finally, accommodating of new technology to the MTF should intensify its strengths. The ROK Navy has a mixed force structure consisting of three fixed- base fleets and a MTF. The fixed base fleet has a passive force to defend and protect its own sea areas, but the MTF should actively not only counter North Korea's threats, including ballistic missiles, but also fight potential threats and takes international missions as a primary task force. However, the MTF has a limited capability to accomplish given missions and long-range operations, and thus, the ROK Navy is strongly required to construct the Task Group.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.142-163
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• 2013

Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.19 no.10
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• pp.386-393
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• 2018

The Korean military supplies industry tends to become limited in terms of its development to specific areas in line with strategic promotion policies of the local private direct industrial site. However, the relation between base and small cluster is getting lower of the local industrial site. In this study, information related to authorized test reports for munitions was collected through the military quality information system and subjected to social network analysis(SNA). SNA was performed through the relationships among defense quality assurance agencies, test institutions, contracts and cooperative firms through UCINET's Two-Mode Network. In the field of weapon systems, the median technology industry, and the test analysis dependent are high in Seoul, so the analysis revealed that strengthening the infrastructure for test analysis is needed. Also, it was deemed necessary for government-driven political support. Besides, the field support system was efficiently utilizing a relatively local test analysis. It was analyzed that they are overcoming the regional boundaries of small clusters by strategically changing their contract and cooperative firms' status. The research found some spatial inconsistencies between base and small clusters in the military supplies industry, and it was judged that a political suggestion was needed.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.35-42
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• 2017

This paper analyzes the intention of the PRC (People's Republic of China) to establish and operate CADIZ to implement the government's maritime policy and strategy and to project its air power in preparation for maritime provocation and contingency, especially over the area where East Asia countries have claimed to have maritime jurisdiction over one another. This paper is also intended to guide the Republic of Korea's response measures for coping with the maritime intention and threat of China by such measures as reinforcing military power, constructing the strategic air base in Jeju, and expanding the present KADIZ.