• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.271-297
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• 2011

Recently, risk of space accident possibility increased in according to commercial space activity and space debris. It failed launch satellite second times in South Korea. Therefore was discussed on liability and insurance issue. Generally, discuss of space insurance be divided two type. Firstly, space insurance relevant to launching satellite and in-orbit. Satellite Launch Insurance and In-Orbit Insurance by the Satellite Operator Secondly, space insurance relevant to Third Party Liability. The former is to protect owner of satellite and operator. The latter is to liable and indemnify owner of satellite and operator's liability. US, UK, France, Russia, South Korea forced to buy space insurance following to domestic law. This is a brief overview of risk allocation and insurance practices in the commercial space transportation industry today. We begin with traditional space transportation, i.e., commercial satellite launches. This is a mature industry with known players. Industry practices have developed and legislation has been adopted in the U.S. and other countries over the past decades to address liability and insurance issues. The primary focus here is on U.S. law, but the discussion of industry practice applies more generally. We then move on to a more exotic form of space transportation: Commercial human space flight. Several private companies are now signing up space tourists for commercial suborbital human space flight, advertised to become available in the near future. The United States amended its launch legislation in 2004 to promote commercial human space flight. But questions remain as to how this new industry will respond to the risk allocation regime established by the U.S. legislation, which leaves both the space flight operator and space tourist exposed to risk and potential liability. As a general proposition, state statutes and contractual waivers alone cannot be relied upon to provide adequate liability protection, and insurance will be required. Federally mandated contractual waivers by space flight participants or liability caps would be helpful to complement insurance solutions. Eventually, as the industry matures, such practices could be extended to an international legal regime. For all the issues mentioned above, I have studied the existing international treaties and several country's domestic law to the space by referring U.S's Commercial Space Launch Amendment Act of 2004 and concluded that uniform legal regime to govern these insurance issues should be established domestically and internationally in the future.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.273-302
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• 2015

The term "peaceful uses of outer space" in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty appears in official government statements and multilateral outer space related treaties. However, the examination of the state practice leads to the conclusion that this term is still without an authoritative definition. As far as the meaning of 'peaceful use' in international law is concerned the same phrases in the UN Charter, the 1963 Treaty of Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1956 Statute of IAEA, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 United Nations Conference of the Human Environment were analysed As far as the meaning of 'peaceful uses of outer space' is concerned the same phrases the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques(ENMOD) were studied. According to Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space treaty, states shall not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies repeats in Article III much of the Outer Space Treaty. This article prohibits the threat or use of force or any other hostile act on the moon and the use of the moon to commit such an act in relation to the earth or to space objects. This adds IN principle nothing to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty relating to military space activities. The 1977 ENMOD refers to peaceful purposes in the preamble and in Article III. As far as the UN Resolutions are concerned, the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exp1oration and Use of Outer Space, the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space(NPS) were studied. And as far the Soft Laws are concerned the 2008 Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT), the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Prolifiration(HCoC) and 2012 Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities(ICoC) were studied.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.101-118
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• 1993

Generally there is no law and liability system which applies particulary to commercial space ventures. There are several international treaties and national statutes which deal with space ventures, but their impact on the liability of commercial space ventures has not been significant. Every state law in the United States will impose both tort and contract liability on those responsible for injuries or losses caused by defective products or by services performed negligently. As with the providers of other products and services, those who participate in commercial space ventures have exposure to liability in both tort and contract which is limited to the extent of the resulting damage The manufacturer of a small and cheap component which caused a satellite to fail to reach orbit or to operate nominally has the same exposure to liability as the provider of launch vehicle or the manufacturer of satellite into which the component was incorporaded. Considering the enormity of losses which may result from launch failure or satellite failure, those participated in commercial space ventures will do their best to limit their exposure to liability by contract to the extent permitted by law. In most states of the United States, contracts which limit or disclaim the liability are enforceable with respect to claims for losses or damage to property if they are drafted in compliance with the requirements of the applicable law. In California an attempt to disclaim the liability for one's own negligence will be enforceable only if the contract states explicitly that the parties intend to have the disclaimer apply to negligence claims. Most state laws of the United States will refuse to enforce contracts which attempt to disclaim the liability for gross negligence on public policy grounds. However, the public policy which favoured disclaiming the liability as to gross negligence for providers of launch services was pronounced by the United States Congress in the 1988 Amendments to the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act. To extend the disclaimer of liability to remote purchasers, the contract of resale should state expressly that the disclaimer applies for the benefit of all contractors and subcontractors who participated in producing the product. This situation may occur when the purchaser of a satellite which has failed to reach orbit has not contracted directly with the provider of launch services. Contracts for launch services usually contain cross-waiver of liability clauses by which each participant in the launch agrees to be responsible for it's own loss and to waive any claims which it may have against other participants. The crosswaiver of liability clause may apply to the participants in the launch who are parties to the launch services agreement, but not apply to their subcontractors. The role of insurance in responding to many risks has been critical in assisting commercial space ventures grow. Today traditional property and liability insurance, such as pre-launch, launch and in-orbit insurance and third party liability insurance, have become mandatory parts of most space projects. The manufacture and pre-launch insurance covers direct physical loss or damage to the satellite, its apogee kick moter and including its related launch equipment from commencement of loading operations at the manufacture's plant until lift off. The launch and early orbit insurance covers the satellite for physical loss or damage from attachment of risk through to commissioning and for some period of initial operation between 180 days and 12 months after launch. The in-orbit insurance covers physical loss of or damage to the satellite occuring during or caused by an event during the policy period. The third party liability insurance covers the satellite owner' s liability exposure at the launch site and liability arising out of the launch and operation in orbit. In conclusion, the liability in commercial space ventures extends to any organization which participates in providing products and services used in the venture. Accordingly, it is essential for any organization participating in commercial space ventures to contractually disclaim its liability to the extent permitted by law. To achieve the effective disclaimers, it is necessary to determine the applicable law and to understand the requirements of the law which will govern the terms of the contract. A great deal of funds have been used in R&D for commercial space ventures to increase reliability, safety and success. However, the historical reliability of launches and success for commercial space ventures have proved to be slightly lower than we would have wished for. Space insurance has played an important role in reducing the high risks present in commercial space ventures.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.79-112
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• 2010

The Beijing Convention of 2010 taken together effectively establishes a new broader and stronger civil aviation security framework. This adoption would significantly advance cooperation in prevent of the full range of unlawful acting relation to civil aviation and the prosecution and punishment of offenders. First, the Beijing Convention of 2010 will require parties to criminalize a number of new and emerging threats to the safety of civil aviation, including using aircraft as a weapon and organizing, directing and financing acts of terrorism. These new treaties reflect the international community's shared effort to prevent acts of terrorism against civil aviation and to prosecute and punish those who would commit them. Second, this convention will also require States to criminalize the transport of biological, chemical, nuclear weapons and related material. These provisions reflect the nexus between non-proliferation and terrorism and ensure that the international community will act to combat both. Third, this Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services. As a substitute, International Humanitarian Law will be applied in a case. Moreover, the National Jurisdiction and the application of the law will be extended farther. The treaty promotes cooperation between States while emphasizing the human rights and fair treatment of terrorist suspects.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.55-95
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• 2010

The meaning and application of 'lesion corporelle' in the context of a variety of mental or psychic injuries is less clear, while there is very little disagreement about its literal translation. U.S. Court decisions since Floyd allow recovery for a range of claims involving emotional injury under Article 17; in some cases there is no recovery, while in others there is full recovery, depending on the allegations and the nexus between the alleged injury and any related or accompanying physical injury. Courts are in agreement that pure emotional injury is not compensable under the Convention. Most courts agree that emotional injury is not compensable in those cases where it has resulted only in physical manifestations such as weight loss or sleeplessness. At the same time, most courts generally agree that emotional injury is compensable if it proximately flows from a physical injury. The issue as to whether the courts would associate PTSD with bodily injury as envisioned in the present Warsaw structure or even the new regime reflected in the Convention proposed by ICAO would largely depend on the extent to which courts would be ready to embrace the compelling scientific findings with regard to mental distress and its application within the term 'bodily injury'. Taken together, these points when the current under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, 'physical injury' notion of 'mental injury' is to be extended. Of course, the current terms of the Warsaw Convention have been maintaining a precedent for many countries appear to have a statue of the original purpose of the treaty does not contribute to the diffusion. Therefore, in future treaties 'bodily injury', the term 'injury', the term 'personal injury' or 'health undermined' the term should be replaced or revised.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.215-236
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• 2006

This article focused on the meaning of the 1979 Moon Treaty and its future. Although the Moon Treaty is one of the major 5 space related treaties, it was accepted by only 11 member states which are non-space powers, thus having the least enfluences on the field of space law. And this article analysed the relationship between the 1979 Moon Treay and 1967 Space Treaty which was the first principle treaty, and searched the meaning of the "Common Heritage of Mankind(hereinafter CHM)" stipulated in the Moon treaty in terms of international law. This article also dealt with the present and future problems arising from the Moon Treaty. As far as the 1967 Space Treaty is concerned the main standpoint is that outer space including the moon and the other celestial bodies is res extra commercium, areas not subject to national appropriation like high seas. It proclaims the principle non-appropriation concerning the celestial bodies in outer space. But the concept of CHM stipulated in the Moon Treaty created an entirely new category of territory in international law. This concept basically conveys the idea that the management, exploitation and distribution of natural resources of the area in question are matters to be decided by the international community and are not to be left to the initiative and discretion of individual states or their nationals. Similar provision is found in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention that operates the International Sea-bed Authority created by the concept of CHM. According to the Moon Treaty international regime will be established as the exploitation of the natural resources of the celestial bodies other than the Earth is about to become feasible. Before the establishment of an international regime we could imagine moratorium upon the expoitation of the natural resources on the celestial bodies. But the drafting history of the Moon Treaty indicates that no moratorium on the exploitation of natural resources was intended prior to the setting up of the international regime. So each State Party could exploit the natural resources bearing in mind that those resouces are CHM. In this respect it would be better for Korea, now not a party to the Moon Treaty, to be a member state in the near future. According to the Moon Treaty the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly the exploitation of the moon shall be given special consideration. The Moon Treaty, which although is criticised by some space law experts represents a solid basis upon which further space exploration can continue, shows the expression of the common collective wisdom of all member States of the United Nations and responds the needs and possibilities of those that have already their technologies into outer space.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.223-258
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• 2013

1967 Outer Space Treaty(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; OST) is a treaty that forms the basis of international space law. OST is based on the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space announced by UNGA resolution. As of May 2013, 102 countries are states parties to OST, while another 27 have signed the treaty but have not completed ratification. OST explicitly claimed that the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies are the province of all mankind. Art. II of OST states that "outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means", thereby establishing res extra commercium in outer space like high seas. However 1979 Moon Agreement stipulates that "the moon and its natural resources are the Common Heritage of Mankind(CHM)." Because of the number of the parties to the Moon Agreement(13 parties) it does not affect OST. OST also established its specific treaties as a complementary means such as 1968 Rescue Agreement, 1972 Liability Convention, 1975 Registration Convention. OST bars states party to the treaty from placing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit of Earth, installing them on the Moon or any other celestial body, or to otherwise station them in outer space. It exclusively limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, or establishing military bases, installations, and fortifications. However OST does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit. China and Russia submitted Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT) on the Conference on Disarmament in 2008. USA disregarded PPWT on the ground that there are no arms race in outer space. OST does not have some articles in relation to current problems such as space debris, mechanisms of the settlement of dispute arising from state activities in outer space in specific way. COPUOS established "UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" based on "IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" and ILA proposed "International Instrument on the Protection of the Environment from Damage Caused by Space Debris" for space debris problems and Permanent Court of Arbitration(PCA) established "Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities" and ILA proposed "1998 Taipei Draft Convention on the Settlement of Space Law Dispute" for the settlement of dispute problems. Although OST has shortcomings in some articles, it is very meaningful in international law in considering the establishment of basic principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. OST established the principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space as customary law and jus cogens in international law as follows; the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind; outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States; outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. The principles of global public interest in outer space imposes international obligations erga omnes applicable to all States. This principles find significant support in legal norms dealing with following points: space activities as the "province of all mankind"; obligation to cooperate; astronauts as envoys of mankind; avoidance of harmful contamination; space activities by States, private entities and intergovernmental organisations; absolute liability for damage cauesd by certain space objects; prohibition of weapons in space and militarization of the celestial bodies; duty of openness and transparency; universal application of the international space regime.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.4
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• pp.7-35
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• 1992

The expansion of air transport on a global scale with ever increasing traffic densities has brought about problems that must be solved through new multilateral mechanisms. Looking to the immediate future, air transport will require new forms of international cooperation in technical and economic areas. Air transport by its very nature should have been a counterforce to nationalism. Yet, the regulatory system in civil aviation is still as firmly rooted in the principle of national sovereignty as when it was first proclaimed at t-11e Paris Convention of 1919 and reaffirmed in the Chicago Convention. Sovereignty over the airspace has remained the cornerstone of relations between states in all respects of air transport. The importance of sovereignty over air space embodied in article 1 of the Chicago Conrenton also is responsible for restricting the authority of ICAO as an intergovernmental regulatory agency. The Orgenization, for all its extensive efforts, has only limited authority. ICAO sets standards but cannot enforce them; it devises solutions but cannot impose them. To implement its rules ICAO most rely not so much on legal requirements as on the goodwill of states. It has been forty-eight years since international community set the foundations of the international system in civil aviation action. Profound political, economic and technological changes have taken place in air transport. The Chicago Convention is living proof that staes can work together to make air transport a safe mode of travel. The law governing international civil auiation is principally based on international treaties and on other regulation agreed to by governments, for the most part through the mechanism of ICAO. The role of ICAO international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing with a broad range of technical matters could hardly be overestimated. The organization's ability to develop these standards and procedures, to adapt them continuously to the rapid sate of change and development of air transport, should be particularly stressed. The role of ICAO in the area of the development of multilateral conventions on international air law has been successful but to a certain degree. From the modest starting-point of the Tokyo Convention, we have seen more adequate international instruments prepared within the scope of ICAO activities, adopted: the Hague Convention of 1970 for the suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and the Montreal Convention of 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The work of ICAO in the new domain of international law conventions concerning what has been loosely termed above as the criminal problems connected with international air transport, in particular the problem of armed aggression against aircraft, should be positively appreciated. But ICAO records in the domain of developing a uniform legal system of international carriage by air are rather disappointing. The problem of maintaining and developing the uniformity of this regulation exceeds the scope of interest and competence of governmental transport agencies. The expectations of mankind linked to it are too great to give up trying to restore the uniform legal system of international air carriage that would create proper conditions for its further growth. It appears that ICAO has, at present, a good opportunity for doing this. The hasty preparation of ICAO draft conventions should be definitely excluded. Every Preliminary draft convention ought to be sent to Governments of all member-States for consideration, So that they could in form ICAO in due time of their observation. The problom of harmonizing a uniform law of international air carriage with that of other branches of international transport should demand more and more of its attention. ICAO cooperation with other international arganization, especially these working in the field of international transport, should be strengthened. ICAO is supposed to act as a link and a mediator among, at times the conflicting interests of member States, serving the happiness and peace of all of the world. The transformation of the contemporary world of developing international relations, stimulated by steadily growing international cooperation in its various dimensions, political, economic, scientific, technological, social and cultural, continuously confronts ICAO with new task.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.53-75
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• 1993

This article is concerned with the comment on "Some New Problems of International Aviation Security-Considerations Forcused on its Legal Aspects". Ever since 1970, in addition to the problem of failure to accept the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, there has been also the problem of parties to them, failing to comply with their obligations under the respective treaties, in the form especially of nominal penalties or the lack of any effort to prosecute after blank refusals to extradite. There have also been cases of prolonged detention of aircraft, passengers and hostages. In this regard, all three conventions contain identical clauses which submit disputes between two or more contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of the respective conventions to arbitration or failing agreement on the organization of the arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. To the extent to which contracting States have not contracted out of this undertaking, as I fear they are expressly allowed to do, this promision can be used by contracting States to ensure compliance. But to date, this avenue does not appear to have been used. From this point of view, it may be worth mentioning that there appears to be an alarming trend towards the view that the defeat of terrorism is such an overriding imperative that all means of doing so become, in international law, automatically lawful. In addition, in as far as aviation security is concerned, as in fact it has long been suggested, what is required is the "application of the strictest security measures by all concerned."In this regard, mention should be made of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Intereference. ICAO has, moreover, compiled, for restricted distribution, a Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which is highly useful. In this regard, it may well be argued that, unless States members of ICAO notify the ICAO Council of their inability to comply with opecific standards in Annex 17 or any of the related Annexes in accordance with Article 38 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, their failure to do so can involve State responsibility and, if damage were to insure, their liability. The same applies to breaches of any other treaty obligation. I hope to demonstrate that although modes of international violence may change, their underlying characteristics remain broadly similar, necessitating not simply the adoption of an adequate body of domestic legislation, firm in its content and fairly administered, but also an international network of communication, of cooperation and of coordination of policies. Afurther legal instrument is now being developed by the Legal Committee of ICAO with respect to unlawful acts at International airports. These instruments, however, are not very effective, because of the absence of universal acceptance and the deficiency I have already pointed out. Therefore, States, airports and international airlines have to concentrate on prevention. If the development of policies is important at the international level, it is equally important in the domestic setting. For example, the recent experiences of France have prompted many changes in the State's legislation and in its policies towards terrorism, with higher penalties for terrorist offences and incentives which encourage accused terrorists to pass informations to the authorities. And our government has to tighten furthermore security measures. Particularly, in the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescence to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. The general opinion is that the legal oystem could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the sovereign rights of states, and the human rights of the individuals. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co - ordinated measures.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.109-133
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• 2007

The legal labyrinth through which we have just walked is one in which even a highly proficient lawyer could easily become lost. Warsaw Convention's original objective of uniformity of private international aviation liability law has been eroded as the world community ha attempted again to address perceived problems. Efforts to create simplicity and certainty of recovery actually may have created less of both. In any particular case, the issue of which international convention, intercarrier agreement or national law to apply will likely be inconsistent with other decisions. The law has evolved faster for some nations, and slower for others. Under the Warsaw Convention of 1929, strict liability is imposed on the air carrier for damage, loss, or destruction of cargo, luggage, or goods sustained either: (1) during carriage in air, which is comprised of the period during which cargo is 'in charge of the carrier (a) within an aerodrome, (b) on board the aircraft, or (c) in any place if the aircraft lands outside an aerodrome; or (2) as a result of delay. By 2007, 151 nations had ratified the original Warsaw Convention, 136 nations had ratified the Hague Protocol, 84 had ratified the Guadalajara Protocol, and 53 nations had ratified Montreal Protocol No.4, all of which have entered into force. In November 2003, the Montreal Convention of 1999 entered into force. Several airlines have embraced the Montreal Agreement or the IATA Intercarrier Agreements. Only seven nations had ratified the moribund Guatemala City Protocol. Meanwhile, the highly influential U.S. Second Circuit has rendered an opinion that no treaty on the subject was in force at all unless both affected nations had ratified the identical convention, leaving some cases to fall between the cracks into the arena of common law. Moreover, in the United States, a surface transportation movement prior or subsequent to the air movement may, depending upon the facts, be subject to Warsaw, or to common law. At present, International private air law regime can be described as a "situation of utter chaos" in which "even legal advisers and judges are confused." The net result of this barnacle-like layering of international and domestic rules, standards, agreements, and criteria in the elimination of legal simplicity and the substitution in its stead of complexity and commercial uncertainty, which manifestly can not inure to the efficient and economical flow of world trade. All this makes a strong case for universal ratification of the Montreal Convention, which will supersede the Warsaw Convention and its various reformulations. Now that the Montreal Convention has entered into force, the insurance community may press the airlines to embrace it, which in turn may encourage the world's governments to ratify it. Under the Montreal Convention, the common law defence is available to the carrier even when it was not the sole cause of the loss or damage, again making way for the application of comparative fault principle. Hopefully, the recent entry into force of the Montreal Convention of 1999 will re-establish the international legal uniformity the Warsaw Convention of 1929 sought to achieve, though far a transitional period at least, the courts of different nations will be applying different legal regimes.