• Title/Summary/Keyword: Private Capital

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A Study on the Characteristics of Landfill Expenses on Urban and Residential Environment Maintenance Project - Centered around Seoul City - (도시 및 주거환경정비사업 매몰비용 특성에 관한 연구 - 서울시를 중심으로 -)

  • Lee, Mi-Ok;Lee, Im-Jung
    • KIEAE Journal
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    • v.17 no.2
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    • pp.35-43
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    • 2017
  • Purpose: The purpose of this study is to find out the characteristics of service (landfill) costs (hereinafter, the "landfill costs") applied to the dissolution promotion committee and analyze the characteristics of landfill costs at the time where the dissolution of promotion body is increasing with the authority of the head of local government regarding the territory difficult with the continuous promotion by delaying or suspending the project for a prolonged period or suspending the project through the dissolution of the project body by the promotion committee and cooperative union since the flawless promotion of the maintenance project. Method: After revising the law in February 2012, the survey and analysis is made for the status of applying landfill costs and maintenance project scale of the dissolution promotion committee not confirmed in details around a total of 20 regions, including, 9 regions of redevelopment projects completed with the advance review, 7 regions of re-construction projects and 4 regions of urban environment maintenance projects from the total of 59 regions, Result: The influence on the landfill costs is shown to be greatest in the service expenses and management and supervision on this field has significance for the maintenance project perceived as private project, rather than public project, that the public management is neglected with insufficient presentation of operation criteria and so forth that it displays the tendency to lead to the discrete operation of the project body. In order to enhance the transparency of operating costs for the projects that are led by private capital, it is required to strengthen the role of public sector through enthusiastic intervention by the public sector in standardization of operation criteria, presentation of guideline and so forth.

A Review of the Improvement of Construction Management (CM) System and the CM Policy for the Public Construction Works (공공사업의 CM제도 개선 및 정책방향)

  • Jang Kie-Chang
    • Proceedings of the Korean Institute Of Construction Engineering and Management
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    • autumn
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    • pp.207-212
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    • 2002
  • The Construction Management(CM) System in Korea is systematized both in name and reality by being prescribed in Construction Industry Act('97) and Construction Management Act('01) through various discussions considering reformation of construction industry structure and enhancement of construction technology competitiveness. Specially in the public construction works, CM Pilot Project is promoted by central government for the activation of CM system introduced for efficiency of public construction project. The promotion of Pilot Project is not only the settlement and activation of CM system but also the process to embody and diversify the CM system. Now we should develop various CM application type such as Owner type, PM type and type for private capital project in doing so. And with this efforts, we could expect that CM system should play an important role to enhance the efficiency of public construction works and should affect private construction sector.

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The Effect of Children's Leadership and Self-regulation Upon Peer Play Behaviors (유아의 리더십과 자기조절능력이 또래 놀이행동에 미치는 영향)

  • Jang, Yun-Hee;Moon, Hyuk-Jun
    • Journal of Families and Better Life
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    • v.29 no.2
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    • pp.73-87
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    • 2011
  • The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of children's socia-demographic variables(i.e., gender, birth order, and the amount of time staying in kindergarten) on, leadership, self-regulation and children's peer play behaviors. The participants of this study are 336 children aged between five and seven in four classes in a private kindergarten and eight classes in a private preschool located in the capital region. The results revealed that, girls showed more leadership, self-regulation, and play interaction section than boys: whereas, boys showed higher response in play disruption and the lack of play disconnection. However, birth order, did not have a significant effect on the sub-domain of leadership, self-regulation competence, and peer play behaviors. As for the duration children stay in preschool or in preschool or kindergarten, children who spend half-day showed higher reaction in behavioral self-control and emotional taking abilities than children who stay in the preschool or kindergarten full day. On the other hand, self-esteem of full-time children was higher than half-time children. Children who were emotionally sensitive, knew how to lead their peer group, and those who were sociable and self-regulated presented to be more active in peer-interaction than others. Second, as the result of the correlation analysis reveals, children's leadership, self-regulation competence, peer play behaviors, and play interaction had a meaningful effect on the sub-variations of children's leadership and self-regulation and they showed significant influence upon play disruption and play disconnection. In addition, girls who were not able to manage or to inspect their behavior and had insensitive emotion demonstrated higher tendency to play disconnected. Children, who participated in full-day program with having difficulties in self-regulation or inspecting their behavior properly but had a strong leadership and insensitive showed play disruption highly.

Efficiency in Express highway operation agency in Korea (한국의 고속국도 운영기관의 효율성 분석)

  • Kim, Jong-Heun;Kang, Kyung-Woo
    • International Journal of Highway Engineering
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    • v.11 no.4
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    • pp.117-126
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    • 2009
  • Korea Highway Corporation has played a role of the construction and operation of the highway for the past for 40 years. The private sector since the 90s has made highway construction and operation. Central government and local governments were paid at subsidy in least operating income to 1.5896 trillion won for private operators from 2001 to 2008. Thus, Korea Highway Corporation will have important implications for understanding the cost structure. Korea Highway Corporation, a general analysis of the input element is used efficiently. And the operation of labor and capital estimated highly of the substitution elasticities. Korea Highway Corporation are judged to need financial separation of a strategic outsourcing(business) enabled and the construction(maintenance and management) and business institutions. In addition, currently running at highway the operation of institutions combined to configure a new institution, if that institution invigorate the hi-pass, more of the country's highway believe to be increase operational efficiency.

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A Blockchain Framework for Investment Authorities to Manage Assets and Funds

  • Vinu Sherimon;Sherimon P.C.;Jeff Thomas;Kevin Jaimon
    • International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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    • v.23 no.11
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    • pp.128-132
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    • 2023
  • Investment authorities are broad financial institutions that carefully manage investments on behalf of the national government using a long-term value development approach. To provide a stronger structure or framework for In-vestment Authorities to govern the distribution of funds to public and private markets, we've started research to create a blockchain-based prototype for managing and tracking numerous finances of such authorities. We have taken the case study of Oman Investment Authority (OIA) of Sultanate of Oman. Oman's wealth is held in OIA. It is an organization that oversees and utilizes the additional capital generated by oil and gas profits in public and private markets. Unlike other Omani funds, this one focus primarily on assets outside the Sultanate. The operation of the OIA entails a huge number of transactions, necessitating a high level of transparency and administration among the parties involved. Currently, OIA relies on various manuals to achieve its goals, such as the Authorities and Responsibilities manual, the In-vestment Manual, and the Code of Business Conduct, among others. In this paper, we propose a Blockchain based framework to manage the operations of OIA. Blockchain is a part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and it is re-shaping every industry. The main components of every blockchain are assets and participants. The funds are the major assets in the proposed study, and the participants are the various fund shareholders/recipients. The block-chain's transactions are all safe, secure, and immutable, and it's part of a trustless network. The transactions are simple to follow and verify. By replacing intermediary firms with smart contracts, blockchain-based solutions eliminate any middlemen in the fund allocation process.

A Study on the Forest Land System in the YI Dynasty (이조시대(李朝時代)의 임지제도(林地制度)에 관(關)한 연구(硏究))

  • Lee, Mahn Woo
    • Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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    • v.22 no.1
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    • pp.19-48
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    • 1974
  • Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.

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An Exploratory Study on Fitness Consumer: Focusing on Established and Outsider Relations of the Body among Fitness Members of Gangnam and Gangbuk (피트니스 소비자에 대한 탐색적 고찰: 강남과 강북 피트니스 회원 간 몸의 기득권자-아웃사이더 권력관계를 중심으로)

  • Choo, Hye-Won
    • The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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    • v.17 no.2
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    • pp.415-428
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    • 2017
  • This article is a socio-cultural research on the fitness members by employing an original synthesis of the work of Elias and Bourdieu. The purpose of this research is to provide a multidimensional and in-depth analysis of fitness members, by researching the relationship between body groups with differing economic and cultural capital (e.g. Gangnam and Gangbuk, private and public center). Through interviews and participant observation, the established and outsider relations of fitness members in both Gangnam and Gangbuk are examined (Gangnam 12: Gangbuk 12). Participants in social space differentiated by fitness capital and socio-economic positions gather in certain spaces that identify them as members of the same class location: the established body in Gangnam (Gangnam E), the outsider body in Gangnam (Gangnam O), the established body in Gangbuk (Gangbuk E), and the outsider body in Gangbuk (Gangbuk O). The E-O figuration of the body in fitness clubs shows differences in their body tastes and habitus (selecting a fitness centre, body ostentation, social assessment, making muscles, participation in other sports) and civilizing process (fitness manners and etiquette). The fitness centers in Gangnam and Gangbuk were not simply spaces for exercise but symbolic spaces that both recreate and perpetuate socio-cultural hierarchies between members.

A Study on Social Finance Market in Korea ; Focused on Social Impact Bond (한국형 사회적금융시장 조성에 관한 연구 ; 사회성과연계채권(SIB)을 중심으로)

  • Cho, Young-Bohk
    • Journal of Digital Convergence
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    • v.16 no.4
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    • pp.11-22
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    • 2018
  • The Social Economy including social enterprise is solving various social problems of our society by innovative business Nevertheless, social economic companies have limited investment ingrowth due to insufficient capital. There are various attempts to solve the limit of capital investment by social finance. Social iImpact bonds that introduced performance-based compensation into financial system is recognized as a new means of procuring that capital lacks. 89 social impact bonds were issued in 19 countries around the world. )f the 22 social impact bonds reporting performance, 21 bonds report positive performance. The twelve bonds paid incentives to investors. It can be said that the government provides incentives to review the issuance of social impact bonds at the government level, which is difficult to expand the social welfare budget. This study confirmed the performance of the social impact bonds and confirmed the possibility of introducing it in korea. There is a limit to continuously increasing the government's social expenditure to meet demand. Therefore, in order to support the growth of social economy based on private investment, the issuing of social impact bonds should create a virtuous circle of social financial market.

Inequalities in Self-rated Health among Middle-aged and Young-old Waged Workers: The Contribution of Precarious Employment and Social Capital (중고령기에서 초기노년기에 걸친 주관적 건강상태의 격차: 고용형태와 사회적 자본의 효과를 중심으로)

  • Ahn, Joonhee
    • 한국노년학
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    • v.37 no.3
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    • pp.727-745
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    • 2017
  • This study purported to examine the effects of precarious employment and social capital on the changes of self-rated health status among the middle aged and the young-old population in South Korea. The study analyzed 12 year follow-up data generated by the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study(KLIPS 6-17), which included 10532 employed subjects aged 55 to 75. Multi-level growth curve modeling was performed by fixed and random effect models using STATA 13.0 program. Afterwards, Hausman test was performed, which resulted in support of the estimation by fixed effect model. The results showed that a day labor position was significant factor affecting the deteriorated changes of self-rated health status over time. In addition, wage, weekly working hours, and private/relational social capitals were also found to be significant factors affecting the changes of the self-rated health status. The results supported the divergence hypothesis as well as the cumulative advantage theory. Efforts should be made to develop and implement various employment support policies and social service programs to alleviate the health inequality of the employed workers over their middle-aged to young-old period.

Underpricing of Initial Offerings and the Efficiency of Investments (신주(新株)의 저가상장현상(低價上場現象)과 투자(投資)의 효율성(效率成)에 대한 연구(硏究))

  • Nam, Il-chong
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.12 no.2
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    • pp.95-120
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    • 1990
  • The underpricing of new shares of a firm that are offered to the public for the first time (initial offerings) is well known and has puzzled financial economists for a long time since it seems at odds with the optimal behavior of the owners of issuing firms. Past attempts by financial economists to explain this phenomenon have not been successful in the sense that the explanations given by them are either inconsistent with the equilibrium theory or implausible. Approaches by such authors as Welch or Allen and Faulhaber are no exceptions. In this paper, we develop a signalling model of capital investment to explain the underpricing phenomenon and also analyze the efficiency of investment. The model focuses on the information asymmetry between the owners of issuing firms and general investors. We consider a firm that has been owned and operated by a single owner and that has a profitable project but has no capital to develop it. The profit from the project depends on the capital invested in the project as well as a profitability parameter. The model also assumes that the financial market is represented by a single investor who maximizes the expected wealth. The owner has superior information as to the value of the firm to investors in the sense that it knows the true value of the parameter while investors have only a probability distribution about the parameter. The owner offers the representative investor a fraction of the ownership of the firm in return for a certain amount of investment in the firm. This offer condition is equivalent to the usual offer condition consisting of the number of issues to sell and the unit price of a share. Thus, the model is a signalling game. Using Kreps' criterion as the solution concept, we obtained an essentially unique separating equilibrium offer condition. Analysis of this separating equilibrium shows that the owner of the firm with high profitability chooses an offer condition that raises an amount of capital that is short of the amount that maximizes the potential profit from the project. It also reveals that the fraction of the ownership of the firm that the representative investor receives from the owner of the highly profitable firm in return for its investment has a value that exceeds the investment. In other words, the initial offering in the model is underpriced when the profitability of the firm is high. The source of underpricing and underinvestment is the signalling activity by the owner of the highly profitable firm who attempts to convince investors that his firm has a highly profitable project by choosing an offer condition that cannot be imitated by the owner of a firm with low profitability. Thus, we obtained two main results. First, underpricing is a result of a signalling activity by the owner of a firm with high profitability when there exists information asymmetry between the owner of the issuing firm and investors. Second, such information asymmetry also leads to underinvestment in a highly profitable project. Those results clearly show the underpricing entails underinvestment and that information asymmetry leads to a social cost as well as a private cost. The above results are quite general in the sense that they are based upon a neoclassical profit function and full rationality of economic agents. We believe that the results of this paper can be used as a basis for further research on the capital investment process. For instance, one can view the results of this paper as a subgame equilibrium in a larger game in which a firm chooses among diverse ways to raise capital. In addition, the method used in this paper can be used in analyzing a wide range of problems arising from information asymmetry that the Korean financial market faces.

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