Over the last $15{\sim}20$years, many countries have adopted policies of railway privatization to keep up with increasing competition from road and air transport. Although each country and case has its own history, market characteristics, political context as well as administrative process, railway privatizations (including railway restructure, concession etc.) in the west usually are accompanied with the establishment of new regulatory regimes. Therefore, railway governance has been innovating towards an interaction of government, regulator, industry bodies, user groups, trade unions and other interested groups within the regulatory framework. However, it is not the case in China. Although China had seen a partial privatization in some branch lines and is experiencing a much larger-scale privatization by establishing joint-ventures to build and operate high-speed passenger lines and implementing an asset-based securitization program, administrative control still occupies absolutely dominant position in the railway governance in China. Ministry of Railway (MOR) acts as the administrator, operator as well as regulator. There is no national policy that clearly positions railway in the transportation network and clarifies the role of government in railway development. There is also little participation from interested groups in the railway policy making, pricing, service standard or safety matter. Railway in China is solely governed by the mere executive agency. Efficiency-focused economic perspective explanation is far from satisfaction. A wider research perspective from political and social regime is of great potential to better explain and solve the problem. In the west, separation and constrains of power had long been established as a fundamental rule. In addition to internal separation of political power(legislation, execution and jurisdiction), rise of corporation in the 19th century and association revolution in the 20th century greatly fostered the growth of economic and social power. Therefore, political, social and economic organizations cooperate and compete with each other, which leads to a balanced and resonable power structure. While in China, political power, mainly party-controlled administrative power has been keeping a dominated position since the time of plan economy. Although the economic reform promoted the growth of economic power of enterprises, it is still not strong enough to compete with political power. Furthermore, under rigid political control, social organizations usually are affiliated to government, independent social power is still too weak to function. So, duo to the limited and slow reform in political and social regime in China, there is an unbalanced power structure within which political power is dominant, economic power expanding while social power still absent. Totally different power structure in China determines the fundamental institutional environment of her railway privatization and governance. It is expected that the exploration of who act behind railway governance and their acting strength (a power theory) will present us a better picture of railway governance as a relevant transportation mode. The paper first examines the railway governance in China and preliminarily establishes a linkage between railway governance and its fundamental institutional environment, i.e. power structure in a specific country. Secondly, the reason why there is no national policy in China is explored in the view of political power. In China, legislative power is more symbolic while party-controlled administrative power dominates political process and plays a fundamental role in Chinese railway governance. And then, in the part three railway finance reform is analyzed in the view of economic power, esp. the relationship of political power and economic power.