• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.47-81
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• 2016

This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6^th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23^th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제10권3호
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• pp.299-304
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• 2024

미국과 소련이 맞서는 제1차 핵시대를 넘어 지금은 크고 작은 국가들로 핵 사용 결정권자가 다양화된 제2차 핵시대라고 할 수 있다. 이에 해당하는 국가인 인도와 파키스탄은 서로 적대국으로 맞서며 핵무기를 보유하고 있지만 핵태세, 핵전략은 상반돼 있다. 두 국가의 사례는 우리나라가 마주한 북한이 앞으로 어떤 핵태세를 취할 것인지에 대해 실마리를 줄 수 있다. 특히 파키스탄이 선택한 선행적 확전 태세는 상대 위협에 대해 핵무기를 선제적으로 쓸 수있다고 위협해서 적의 침략을 억제시키는 매우 공세적인 핵태세이다. 이는 선제공격할 수 있는 소규모 핵무기로도 할수 있는 옵션이다. 따라서 핵능력이 열세한 파키스탄이 인도의 위협에 대응하여 선택할 수 있는 최적의 태세로 보인다. 미국과 한국에 비해 열세인 북한은 앞으로도 파키스탄처럼 핵무기를 선제적으로 사용할 수 있다고 위협할 것으로 보인다. 반면 정권 유지를 위해 실제 사용하기까지는 인도와 같이 수세적이고 상당히 보수적일 것으로 전망된다.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권4호
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• pp.241-287
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• 2006

16th CPC National Party Congress established multi-polarization strategy as an external strategy, and 'The Great Reinvigoration of Chinese Nation' as the aim of The Great Strategy of China. It is required to maintain stabilized and peaceful surrounding circumstance in order to make it possible. The ideal surrounding circumstance that China is aiming for is to achieve multi-polarization of international society while maintaining strategic deterrence. Multi-polarization now in 'One super Multi powers' is that 'Multi powers' deter 'One super' to prevent predominance of USA and to decentralize the power. China wishes to realign international order as it accomplishes multi-polarization. China who wants 'Peace and Stabilization' emphasizes autonomy, peace and unification of Korean peninsula. Autonomy means the restraint intervention of foreign power, that is, American influence in Korean peninsula. Multi-polarization strategy of China will be used in Korean peninsula to solve nuclear issue of North Korea, to support neutral unification and to keep balance of power with USA, Japan and Russia as it renders economic advantages to South Korea and security engagement to North Korea, based on special geographical, cultural and historical relationship with two Koreas. The nuclear issue of North Korea will be a stage to test multi-polarization of China. When it deduces positive solution of nuclear issue due to successful six-party talks, and advances to security talks of Northeast Asia, it will contribute a lot to power and elevation of national stature of China in international society. Thus, the Chinese strategy will be an accommodative condition for the security of South Korea, and it requires wise decision of South Korea to make hay while the sun shine.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제17권2호
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• pp.89-100
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• 2017

지난 2017년 1월, 트럼프가 미국의 제 45대 대통령으로 취임하였다. 그는 대선기간 중에 '미국 우선주의'(America First)를 적극적으로 표방하였다. 그의 이런 주장이 대외정책에 있어서 '고립주의'(Isolationism)를 표방하는 것으로 비취지고 있다. 북한의 핵위협에 대하여 미국의 '확장억제'(Extended Deterrenc)에 전적으로 의존하고 있는 한국에 있어서 이는 단순한 문제가 아니다. 즉 미국이 고립주의로 회귀하여 한미동맹 공약이행 의지가 약화되는 것으로 인식될 경우 북한의 오판 가능성은 그만큼 높아질 것이기 때문이다. 그동안 한국사회에서는 미국으로부터 안보를 지원받고 정책적 공조를 제공하는 전형적인 '비대칭 동맹'(Asymmetry Alliance)인 한미동맹의 가치를 재평가하려는 다양한 시도가 있었다. 이에 북한의 고도화된 핵도발 위협에 효과적으로 대응하고, 신장된 한국의 국력수준에 부합된 한미동맹의 효용성을 동맹이론에 입각하여 평가해보고 대책을 강구하였다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 한미동맹을 '자율성-안보 교환 모델'에 기초하여, 위협인식, 정책공조와, 동맹국으로서 가치 측면으로 구체화하여 평가해보고, 향후 한미동맹의 전략적 함의를 도출하였다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• 한국과 국제사회
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

본 논문은 북한 핵전략의 유형적 특징과 전망을 분석하기 위한 것이다. 이를 위해 핵전략의 개념과 유형, 북한의 핵능력과 선언적 핵전략, 북한 핵전략의 운용상의 특징과 전망을 살펴본 후 결론에서 우리의 대응을 도출해본 것이다. 최근 북한의 핵무기 배치와 핵능력 증강은 우리의 안보와 군사적 대비태세에 매우 심각한 문제를 제기하고 있다. 핵전략이란 핵무기의 구성 배치 운용을 둘러싼 군사전략을 의미한다. 북한의 핵전략에 대한 연구는 북한의 핵무장이 실체화되었다는 매우 현실적인 가정에서 출발한다. 우리 국방당국이 북핵에 대한 대응책으로 선제공격, 미사일방어, 대량응징보복 개념을 제시하고 그 도입과 전개를 서두르는 것은 북한의 핵무장을 전제로 한 조치이다. 표출된 북한의 선언적 핵전략은 (1)'핵보유국법'상의 핵억제 보복전략, (2)핵선제공격론, (3)제7차 당대회에 나타난 '핵선제 불사용원칙으로, 그리고 북한 핵전략의 저의 및 운용상의 특징은 (1)기존핵국가 관행모방을 통한 비난회피, (2)선언적 핵전략을 통한 자신의 핵전략의 호도, (3)핵전력과 핵태세간 격차로 인한 핵전략의 미정착 등으로 각각 요약해 볼 수 있다. 북한은 개정헌법(2012.7), '핵무력과 경제건설의 병진노선(2013.3),' 그리고 핵보유국법(2013.4) 등을 통해 스스로 핵보유국임을 규정 선언하고 있다. 하지만 '핵보유국(핵국가)' 지위는 오로지 NPT만 부여할 수 있는데, 이것은 이미 닫힌 시스템이다. 현실적으로 우리가 당면한 북핵위협을 억제 극복해 나가기 위해서는 튼튼한 한미동맹과 긴밀한 한미 공조하에 북한핵의 억제는 물론 비핵화 무력화를 위한 우리의 단 중 장기적인 정치 군사적 대응책의 수립 이행노력이 긴요하다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.5-27
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• 한국과 국제사회
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.71-96
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• 2017

이 연구는 북한 핵위협에 대한 대응과 미래 한반도 통일과정에서 한 미 중 3개국의 공조체제와 협력구상에 관한 것이다. 북핵문제와 한반도 통일문제에서 한 미 중의 공조와 협력 및 역할과 책임에 있어서 한국은 민족분단의 당사자이고, 미국은 국제문제의 책임국가이자 북한과는 적대적 미수교국이라는 점이며, 중국은 전통적 사회주의 우호관계의 당사국이자 북한 후견인 당사국이라는 점을 지적할 수 있다. 북한의 핵무기와 탄도미사일 등의 전략무기는 국제적 문제로서 향후 김정은의 돌발적 행동에 대비하기 위해서는 한 미 중 3국의 적극적인 공조와 협력 등 대응방안이 모색되어져야 할 시점이다. 그러나 북핵문제의 로드맵에 있어서 G2체제의 미국과 중국의 인식과 대응방법은 유엔안 보리결의사항인 대북제재 이행에서 미묘한 차이를 보이고 있다. 미국은 북핵위협에 대해 한미동맹차원에서 공동위협에 기반한 대북제재와 대북군사력 억제정책을 강력히 추진한 반면, 중국은 북핵위협에 대해 미국의 한반도개입에 대한 안보불안 등으로 북핵해결 과정에서 소극적인 입장을 보이고 있다. 북한은 체제생존 차원에서 중동국가들과 전략무기 거래를 지속적으로 해 온 전례국가라는 점에서 세계평화유지 차원에서라도 중단된 6자회담 다자안보 채널가동 등 압박과 외교협상의 현실적 방안으로 전환해야 한다. 한반도 통일문제는 남북한 당사자의 문제가 전제되어야 함에도 남북한은 민족적 문제를 강대국에 논리에 편승하려는 기현상을 보이고 있다. 그럼에도 북핵과 남북통일문제는 민족 당사자문제로서 국제적 지지를 확보하지 못한 북한의 해법보다는 한국주도의 평화적 해법에 더 설득력이 있어 보인다. 하지만 한 미 중은 한반도 평화정착을 위한 북한에 대한 '대북제재'와 '북한과의 대화'라는 투트랙 전략을 전방위적으로 강구해 나갈 필요성이 있으며, 북한자체의 경제적 자생력을 꾸준히 향상시키는 지원노력을 지속적으로 추진해 나가야 한다.