• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권5호
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제10권2호
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• pp.167-172
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• 2024

21세기의 주요 전쟁에서 드론은 감시정찰을 넘어 정밀타격 또는 자폭공격, 인지전 등의 목적으로 지상 및 공중은 물론 해상 및 수중으로 그 영역이 확장되고 있다. 이러한 드론은 다영역작전을 수행할 것이며 이를 위해 자율화 수준을 향상하고 High-Low Mix 개념에 기반한 확장성을 강화하는 등의 발전을 이어 나갈 것이다. 최근 드론은 세계의 주요 전쟁에서 주요한 수단으로 활용되고 있으며 향후 게임체인저(Game-Changer)로 진화할 개연성이 충분해 보인다. 북한 또한 오래전부터 정찰 및 공격드론을 운용하기 위해 상당한 노력을 기울여 왔다. 북한은 근래에 들어 드론을 활용한 도발을 지속하고 있고, 그 능력도 점차 고도화되고 있다. 또한, 최근 새로운 전략 드론의 등장으로 이를 활용한 북한의 대남 감시정찰 및 조기경보 능력 확보와 새로운 유형의 도발 등 전·평시 위협이 강화될 것으로 보인다. 이에 이번 연구에서는 북한 전략 드론의 능력을 분석하고 운용 양상을 예측하여 시사점을 제공하고, 이후 우리 군의 드론 전력화 및 대드론체계 솔루션 등 종합적인 전략 수립에 대한 활발한 후속 연구가 이루어지길 바란다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.294-332
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• 2017

The aim of this study is to find ways to apply the strategic communications to the Republic of Korea Navy. It may be a little bit late for the ROK Navy to accommodate the SC in these days because the adoption and implementation of the SC by the Combined Forces Command has already been begun. It was in 2007 when the SC was in place in the CFC. ROK's Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff have also mulled over the SC and begun to apply it in part in the annual exercises such as Key Resolve command post drills and Foal Eagle field training exercise, etc. For the ROK Navy, in addition to those exercises, it is faced with further areas like North Korean maritime provocations and other maritime incidents where its version of SC is needed. As noted, the SC is not intended to deter or defend directly those provocations and incidents, but aims to create conditions favorable to the achievement of the navy's strategic objectives. The ROK Navy has to establish a SC planning center and implementing organizations within the Headquarters to be consistent with its above organizations such as MND, JCS, and CFC that have already applied the SC in part or in entirety. SC center and other related organizations need to be under the control of VCNO and the center needs to be located and administered by the policy division in N-5 at the HQs. The vision of the navy's SC is the winning without combats and the least damages in time of war. In other for the navy to reach the vision, the strategies to be executed are early establishment of SC implementing organizations, forming consensus over the need for the SC within the navy, strengthening core competencies to apply the SC, acquiring the SC experts and making doctrines on the SC. The SC, in addition, in the navy has to be planned and implemented in not only peace time and crisis time but also war time.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제15권5호
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• pp.61-70
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• 2015

우리와 대치하고 있는 적 북한은 1950년 6월 25일 불법 기습남침을 하였고 1953년 7월 27일 정전협정 조인 이후에도 약 5,000여 회에 이르는 크고 작은 도발을 자행하였다. 특히, 북한은 2010년 3월 26일 천안함을 폭침하여 동년 5월 24일 단행된 5.24대북 재제조치 상태에서도 2010년 11월 23일 연평도 포격도발을 감행하였으며 지난 2015년 8월 4일 또다시 DMZ 목함 지뢰 도발을 하였다. 우리군은 그에 대한 대응으로 확성기 방송을 재개하여 대북 심리전을 재개하자 북한은 준전시 상태를 선포하며 파국으로 가던 중, 남북한은 협상을 시도하여 고위급접촉 과정과 그 결과 공동합의문을 타결하였다. 이러한 고위급접촉을 보며 우리는 너무나 안이한 대응을 하고 있는 것은 아닌지 돌아보며 향후 계속될 북한과의 협상을 어떻게 준비하고 대응할 것인가에 대하여 북한의 협상전술과 우리의 대응방향을 제시하였다.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.43-81
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• 2016

Security environment we face in the Korean Peninsula is unexpectable. Tensions between Seoul and Pyeongyang and its threats are continuously evolving. Kim Jung Un will keep on conducting provocations and DPRK's isolation will result uncertainty to their objective and intention. KPA is centered on ground forces with conventional weapons but they possess modernized missiles and nuclear capabilities. What's more concerning is that North Korea continuously pursue and develop nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Pursuing defense reform is inevitable for the ROK to deal adequately against the security threats posed by the North and to prepare for the environment of future warfare. If we are satisfied with the current capabilities then our military capabilities and security status will retrogress. We have to reorganize our units to make a small but FMC, smart military organization. Organization analysis is an urgent issue for reorganizing units. However, it isn't an easy task to reform an organization. There are vague parts for analysis and strong resistance from the people within the organization. Therefore should not focus on the reduction of people and the organization. Organization reform should be done with the acknowledgement of most of the personnel and should focus on the task and its method. These should be reflected to the organization analysis.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제16권6_1호
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• pp.51-58
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• 2016

"역사는 거울"이라는 말은 반복되는 역사적 사실을 통해 우리는 적을 대비해야 한다는 뜻이다. 현재 우리는 북한의 핵과 미사일을 포함하는 각종 도발에 직면해 있다. 우리가 북한을 주적으로 설정하고 국민의 생명과 재산을 보전하기 위해서는 우리 군은 적의 위협에 항상 철저히 준비되어야 한다. 6.25 전쟁 전투사례를 보면 준비된 적과 무방비 상태의 국군 간에 벌어진 전쟁으로 요약할 수 있다. 북한군은 해방 이후 치밀한 계획 하에 중공군을 편입시키고 소련군 군사고문단 지원 하에 전투 장비를 배치하여 군단 급 훈련까지 마친 상태에 비해, 당시 국군은 대대급 훈련도 마무리 못한 상태였다. 전 평시 군사보안을 위해 나의 정보는 숨기고 적은 찾아서 대비해야 한다. 북한군은 전쟁을 준비하면서 치밀하게 국군의 편성과 배치, 그리고 운용사항에 대한 정보를 수집했으나 국군은 이에 대비하지 못해 초전에 고전을 면치 못했다. 이에 본고에서는 6.25 전쟁 초기, 개성일대 전투사례를 중심으로 군사보안의 교훈과 그 중요성을 제시하고자 한다.