• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.29-36
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• 2019

Previous resarch demonstrated that moral judgment is not an outcome of rational reasoning, but an independent variable determined by diverse factors. The effects of disgust on moral harshness, audience effect on moralistic punishment are some examples that support this view. The variability of moral judgment raises a question on what effects video stimuli might have on moral judgments. Although a few studies (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010) have shown that watching a prosocial video clip promote moral behavior, no research have simultaneously tested the effects of both positive and negative video clips on moral (not bahavior but) judgments. Hence, this research tested the effects of viewing videos about good and evil on moral judgments regarding the self and others. To this end, participants were asked to view a video clip depicting content of either positive or negative human behavior and required to make moral judgments on conduct described in a scenario assuming that the person committing the act was either themselves or another person. The results showed significant effects of both video contents (positive, negative) and the actor (self, others) on moral judgments, but they were qualified by the interaction between the two. In particular, participants who watched evil deed of others made harsher judgments on others' moral transgression. Theses results demonstrate that video contents influence moral judgments, and the effect depends on the actor of the immoral behavior. In general discussion, we interpreted the results based on moral disgust, framing effect, and fundamental attribution error.

• Journal of Christian Education in Korea
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• v.64
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• pp.145-171
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• 2020

Christian communities have long sought to find what type of moral judgment is appropriate and what the Christian behavior is, by taking the church's ethical norms and behavior patterns as objects of reflection. In the same context, Christian education also tried to base the psychological rationalism of J. Piaget and L. Kohlberg, but the reason-centered structural development theory was not the answer. In fact, the structural development theory, which emphasized autonomy while excluding emotions from the moral judgment process, over-emphasizing cognition or reason, eventually led to moral relativism, unlike what was intended. In addition, it was criticized for not being able to adequately elucidate the gap between human moral reasoning and behavior, and for attempting to interpret morality excessively within the context of social culture. Recently, these limitations of structural developmental theory have been reinterpreted by neuroethics, especially moral psychology theories, which claim that moral judgment ability is physically wired in the brain and relies heavily on networks between cortical and limbic system. The purpose of this paper is to review some of the newly emerged research themes of neuroethics, and then to discuss two main theories that explain morality in the perspective of neuroethics and the implications that Christian education should pay attention to.

• Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.47-75
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• 2008

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rational factor or moral emotion, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning or moral intuitions. This research demonstrates that offender' anger can influence moral judgment. The study examined the role of offender's anger (control group versus anger group) on moral domain ( life, interpersonal ethic, traffic regulation: 6 case) : 2(groups) ×6(cases) mixed design. Participants were asked to judge the offender, case, sympathy and one's anger about the him or her who offended against the law or convention. Participants who perceived the offender's anger tended to assess questionnaire generous. In interpersonal ethic domain, participants have not been affected by anger. There was not significantly differences between two groups in interpersonal ethic domain. The results of experiment confirmed hypotheses that influence of anger varies with the moral domains affected a value system of culture. These findings indicate functional emotion for moral judgment and suggest people may be decide how much emotion is considered on moral judgment performance according to moral domains.

• Journal of Korean Academy of Nursing Administration
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.85-95
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• 1996

The purpose of this study was to investigate moral reasoning among 77 senior medical students. Data were collected through selfreported questionnaires in June, 1995. The short form of the DIT (Rest's Defining Issues Test) was adopted to measure the stage of moral development, which was classified with the stage 2(instrumental relativist orientation), the stage 3(interpersonal concordance), the stage 4(law and order), the stage 5A(societal consensus), and the stage 5B(intuitional humanism), stage 6(universal ethical practice). In particular, the level of principled thinking(P) was measured by summing those scores of the stages 5A, 5B, and 6. The possible range of P is O to 95. The data were analyzed by t-test, ANOVA. The results were as follows. 1. The mean score of P(%) was 44.67 (SD=12.82). And the mean score of the stage 5A was higher than the scores of other stages. The mean score of P was not significantly different by general characteristics of the students. 2. The mean score of the stage 5B revealed significant difference by religion (3.17, P=.019) ; The score was highest in buddhist (8.0), which was followed by protestant (6.1), catholic (5.6) and no religion (4.7). 3. The mean score of the stage 4 revealed significant difference by educational background of mother (3.24, P=.017) ; the Score was highest in graduate school (25.0), which was followed by high school (14.1), under-graduate school (13.9), elementary school (12.4), middle school (8.3).

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.28
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• pp.103-131
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• 2017

As the establishment of self-identity is based on 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence,' the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is the only road to the security and confirmation of self-existence. But given that our ordinary life almost entirely consists of actions objectifying others, the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is by no means easy. The formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' should be based on morality, controlling self-desire, and not objectifying others. Philosophy based on a priori reasoning describes self-control over selfdesire as the domination of the body through a priori reasoning. But this practical philosophy cannot present a self-evidential internal motivation behind moral actions. Due to this, the application of moral order given by a priori reasoning in response to reality is likely to be reinterpreted on basis of self-interest. With regards to this, the 'propensity towards sympathy' is given as new moral norm. The 'propensity towards sympathy' as emotion is direct and consistent given that feeling occurs prior to thinking. The 'propensity towards sympathy' is intuitive in the sense that it is an instinctual response preceeding a reasoned judgment. The 'propensity towards sympathy,' as a natural moral emotion, is self-validating given that all human beings know it and practice it. But previous studies on the 'propensity towards sympathy' have an obvious limitation because they adopt phenomenological approaches to the 'propensity towards sympathy' which eschew the investigation of morality. Though they present the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural emotion based on body rather than reason, they do not philosophically explain the 'propensity towards sympathy.' Thus the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural moral emotion is likely to be interpreted as a subjective and relative moral norm. This paper philosophically explains that the 'propensity towards sympathy' is a universal moral norm on the basis of Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh.' 'Flesh' is formed as the entanglement between oneself and others and presents the 'propensity towards sympathy' as its philosophical basis. In other words, 'flesh' formed as the mixture or entanglement between oneself and others is the material foundation upon which one can activate the 'propensity towards sympathy.' This paper's approach to the 'propensity of sympathy' can be desribed as a phenomenological approach to the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a universal moral norm.

• CELLMED
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• v.4 no.4
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• pp.24.1-24.4
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• 2014

When you act for a good or just when you make a choice, you should ask yourself if the result of your action coincides with the principle that has generated it. Health and respect for our own individuality are two essential goods for the human being and also values that medicine itself should guard carefully remembering that its goal is to take care for a person and not only to cure a sick body. The means to achieve all this can only be a person-centered medicine which has the honor and the burden of considering the person (in the Kantian sense) and his health as an end, not a means. The current mainstream concept of health defined in 1948 by the World Health Organization as a state of complete mental, physical and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity remind us that medical reasoning, based on the pathogenesis operator, is no longer sufficient in dealing with requests from the citizens: is now the right time to shift the focus from sickness to health giving emphasis to the salutogenic medicine approach.

• 한국사회정책
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.69-96
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• 2013

This paper is to critically review the economic reasoning of non-sustainability of welfare state due to its intrinsic incentive problems and to see how the nordic welfare state responds to them. The welfare state as a political design of state to pursue equality has social insurance as its main economic function. It survives market failure of private insurance to contribute to human capital investment and industrial restructuring. The universal tax-financed welfare state, however, has the problem of tragedy of commons such as reduced work incentive and work ethics. But, the existing nordic welfare state overcomes it through employment-focused policy arrangements, maintenance of work ethics and benefits moral, incentive mechanism of wage-compression, public educational investment and its complementation with social security. The Nordic model shows that problems of incentive and moral are not about those of theory and reasoning, but about their reality which policies and institutions could respond to.

• Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education
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• v.30 no.7
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• pp.887-900
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• 2010

This study aimed to identify some tendencies when college students got to making a decision on socioscientific issues. The guiding research questions were as follows. First, what are college students' tendencies in terms of their moral reactions and attitudes toward SSI when they get to making a decision? And second, how do their own circumstances, personalities, and values play a role in shaping their stance on SSI? Data was collected by individual interviews with thirty college students. The results indicated that most participants immediately brought in their own values, worldviews, and feelings in implicit or explicit ways when talking about SSI. Their reactions were influenced by their backgrounds such as religion, and family background, personality, past experiences, personal interests, and prior knowledge. In addition, the responses of the participants presented some tendencies in their decision-making process. The tendencies can be categorized into 1) bringing in personal values without further engagement, 2) being confused with incompatible values, 3) being overwhelmed by too many aspects to consider, and 4) trying to be detached from the issues.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.135-157
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• 2014

The present study investigated whether 6- and 12-month-old infants could infer an agent's social preference on the basis of intentions. In Experiment 1, 12-month-old infants were first familiarized with two kinds of event: the helping and the hindering events. In the helping event, an agent (either a square or triangle) tried to help a circle climb up the hill and the movie stopped right before the circle reached the top of the hill. Thus, the outcome of the helping behavior was made to be ambiguous. Similarly, in the hindering movie, another agent tried to hinder the circle from reaching the top of the hill and the movie stopped right before the circle slipped down to the base of the hill making the final outcome of the hindering behavior unclear. During the test trial, infants were either presented with an event in which the circle approached the helper (approach-helper condition) or an event in which the circle approached the hinderer (approach-hinderer condition). The results indicated that both 6- and 12-month-olds looked longer at the approach-helper event than at the approach-hinderer event. Thus, by 6 months of age, infants are sensitive to agents' intentions when reasoning about agents' social preference. The current findings add to the emerging evidence on social evaluation and moral reasoning during infancy.

• Korean Journal of Child Studies
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• v.4
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• pp.37-51
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• 1983

The purpose of this study was the investigation of theoretical and empirical relationships between Piagetian and psychometric assessments of intelligence. Specifically, the factor structure of Piagetian-type scales, the relationship between Piagetian scales and psychometric intelligence tests, and differences in the factor structure of Piagetian and psychometric assessments of intelligence were studied. The subjects of this stuby were 70 children (35 boys and 35 girls) in the 1st grade of an elementary school in Seoul The Piagetian-type scales and the K-WISC were administered individually, and the General Intelligence Test was administered to groups of children. Statistical analysis of the obtained data consisted of the SPSS Computer program including factor analysis and Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient. The Piagetian-type scales were found to consist of three factors, which accounted for 55 percent of the total common-factor variance. Factor-I was a factor indicating "conservation". Factor-II was a factor indicating "moral judgements". Factor-III was a factor indicating "classification and identity". Correlations between subtests of psychometric tests and Piagetian scales were relatively low or moderate. Relations between IQs assessed by the psychometric tests and Piagetian scales were also relativeyly low or moderate. Eight factors were extracted from the joint factor analysis of psychometric intelligence tests and Piagetian scales, and they accounted for 67 percent of the total common-factor variance. Factors-I, II, III, and V consisted of subtests of psychometric assessments, and Factors-IV, VI, VII and VIII were composed of Piagetian scales. Factor-I was a factor for "reasoning ability based upon language". Factor-II was a factor for "performance ability". Factor-III was a factor for "grouping ability". Factor-IV was a factor for "conservation". Factor-V was a factor indicating "symbol and language usage ability". Factor- VI was a factor indicating "moral judgments". Factor-VII was a factor indicating "length consevation". Factor-VIII was a factor indicating "classification and identity".