• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.3-40
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• 2020

The term "accident" in the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the Montreal Convention of 1999, which govern carrier liability in international air transport, is an important criterion for determining carrier liability. However, because there is no explicit definition of the term in the treaty provisions, the term is largely subjected to the judgment and interpretation of the courts. Although there have been numerous changes in purpose and circumstance in the transition from the Warsaw regime to the conclusion of the Montreal Convention, there was no discussion on the concept of "accident" therefore, even after the adoption of the Montreal Convention, there is no doubt that the term is to be interpreted in the same manner as before. On this point, the United States Supreme Court's Air France v. Saks clarified the concept of "accident" and is still cited as an important precedent. Recently, the CJEU, in GN v. ZU, presented a new concept of "accident" introduced in the Montreal Convention: that "reference must be made to the ordinary meaning" in interpreting "accident" and that the term "covers all situations occurring on aboard an aircraft." Furthermore, the CJEU ruled that the term does not include the applicability of "hazards typically associated with aviation," which was controversial in previous cases. Such an interpretation can be reasonably seen as the court's expansion of the concept of "accident," with a focus on "protecting consumer interests," a core tenet of both the Montreal convention and the European Union Regulations(EC: No 889/2002). The CJEU's independent interpretation of "accident" is a departure from the Warsaw Convention and the Saks case, with their focus on "carrier protection," and instead focuses on the "passenger protection" standard of the Montreal Convention. Consequently, this expands both the court's discretion and the carrier's risk management liability. Such an interpretation by the CJEU can be said to be in line with the purpose of the Montreal Convention in terms of "passenger protection." However, there are problems to be considered in tandem with an expanded interpretation of "accident." First, there may be controversy concerning "balance" in that it focused on "passenger protection" in relation to the "equitable balance of interests" between air carriers and passengers, which is the basic purpose of the agreement. Second, huge losses are expected as many airlines fly to countries within the European Union. Third, there is now a gap in the interpretation of "accident" in Europe and the United States, which raises a question on the "unity of rules," another basic tenet of the Convention. Fourth, this interpretation of "accident" by the CJEU raises questions regarding its scope of application, as it only refers to the "hazards typically associated with aviation" and "situations occurring aboard an aircraft." In this case, the CJEU newly proposed a novel criterion for the interpretation of "accident" under the Montreal Convention. As this presents food for thought on the interpretation of "accident," it is necessary to pay close attention to any changes in court rulings in the future. In addition, it suggests that active measures be taken for passenger safety by recognizing air carriers' unlimited liability and conducting systematic reforms.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.31-66
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• 2008

Until Montreal Convention was established in 1999, the Warsaw System is undoubtedly accepted private international air law treaty and has played major role on the carrier's liability in international aviation transport industry. But the whole Warsaw System, though it was revised many times to meet the rapid developments of the aviation transport industry, is so complicated, tangled and outdated. This thesis, therefore, aim to introduce the Montreal Convention by interpreting it as a new legal instrument on the air carrier's liability, specially on the passenger's, and analyzing all the issues relating to it. The Montreal Convention markedly changed the rules governing international carriage by air. The Montreal Convention has modernized and consolidated the old Warsaw System of international instruments of private international air law into one legal instrument. One of the most significant features of the Montreal Convention is that it sifted its priority to the protection of the interest of the consumers from the protection of the carrier which originally the Warsaw Convention intended to protect the fledgling international air transport business. Two major features of the Montreal Convention adopts are the Two-tier Liability System and the Fifth Jurisdiction. In case of death or bodily injury to passengers, the Montreal Convention introduces a two-tier liability system. The first tier includes strict liability up to 100,000SDR, irrespective of carriers' fault. The second tier is based on presumption of fault of carrier and has no limit of liability. Regarding Jurisdiction, the Montreal Convention expands upon the four jurisdiction in which the carrier could be sued by adding a fifth jurisdiction, i.e., a passenger can bring suit in a country in which he or she has their permanent and principal residence and in which the carrier provides a services for the carriage of passengers by either its own aircraft or through a commercial agreement. Other features are introducing the advance payment, electronic ticketing, compulsory insurance and regulation on the contracting and actual carrier etc. As we see some major features of the Montreal Convention, the Convention heralds the single biggest change in the international aviation liability and there can be no doubt it will prevail the international aviation transport world in the future. Our government signed this Convention on 20th Sep. 2007 and it came into effect on 29th Dec. 2007 domestically. Thus, it was recognized that domestic carriers can adequately and independently manage the change of risks of liability. I, therefore, would like to suggest our country's aviation industry including newly-born low cost carrier prepare some countermeasures domestically that are necessary to the enforcement of the Convention.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.18
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• pp.9-39
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• 2003

The rule of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 are well known and still being all over the world. The Warsaw Convention is undoubtedly the most widely accepted private international air law treaty with some 140 countries. In the international legal system for air transportation, the Warsaw Convention has played a major role for more than half century, and has been revised many times in consideration of the rapid developments of air high technology, changes of social and economic circumstances, need for the protection of passengers. Some amendments became effective, but others are still not effective. As a result, the whole international legal system for air transportation is at past so complicated and tangled. However, the 'Warsaw system' consists of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 the Guadalajara Convention of 1961, a supplementary convention, and the following six protocols: (1) the Hague Protocol of 1955, (2) the Guatemala Protocol of 1971, (3) the Montreal Additional Protocols, No.1, (4) the Montreal Additional Protocol No.2, (5) the Montreal Additional Protocol No.3, and (6) the Montreal Additional Protocol No.4. of 1975. As a fundamental principle of the air carrier's liability in the international convention and protocols, for instance in the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, the principle of limited liability and a presumed fault system has been adopted. Subsequently, the Montreal Inter-carrier Agreement of 1966, the Guatemala City Protocol, the Montreal Additional Protocol No.3, and the Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4 of 1975 maintained the limited liability, but substituted the presumed liability system by an absolute liability, that is, strict liability system. The Warsaw System, which sets relatively low compensation limits for victims of aircraft accidents and regulates the limited liability for death and injury of air passengers, had become increasingly outdated. Japanese Airlines and Inter-carrier Agreement of International Air Transport Association in 1995 has been adopted the unlimited liability of air carrier in international flight. The IATA Inter-Carrier Agreement, in which airlines in international air transportation agree to waive the limit of damages, was long and hard in coming, but it was remarkable achievement given the political and economic realities of the world. IATA deserves enormous credit for bringing it about. The Warsaw System is controversial and questionable. In order to find rational solution to disputes between nations which adopted differing liability systems in international air transportation, we need to reform the liability of air carriers the 'Warsaw system' and fundamentally, to unify the liability system among the nations. The International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) will therefore reinforce its efforts to further promote a legal environment that adequately reflects the public interest and the needs of the parties involved. The ICAO Study Group met in April, 1998, together with the Drafting Committee. The time between the "Special Group on the Modernization and Consolidation of the 'Warsaw system'(SGMW)" and the Diplomatic Conference must be actively utilized to arrange for profound studies of the outstanding issues and for wide international consultations with a view to narrowing the scope of differences and preparing for a global international consensus. From 11 to 28 May 1999 the ICAO Headquarters at Montreal hosted a Diplomatic Conference convened to consider, with a view to adoption, a draft Convention intended to modernize and to integrate replace the instruments of the Warsaw system. The Council of ICAO convened this Conference under the Procedure for the Adoption of International Conventions. Some 525 participants from 121 Contracting States of ICAO attended, one non-contracting State, 11 observer delegations from international organizations, a total of 544 registered participants took part in the historic three-week conference which began on 10 May. The Conference was a success since it adopted a new Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air. The 1999 Montreal Convention, created and signed by representatives of 52 countries at an international conference convened by ICAO at Montreal on May 28, 1999, came into effect on November 4, 2003. Representatives of 30 countries have now formally ratified the Convention under their respective national procedures and ratification of the United States, which was the 30th country to ratify, took place on September 5, 2003. Under Article 53.6 of the Montreal Convention, it enters into force on the 60th day following the deposit of the 30th instrument of ratification or acceptation. The United States' ratification was deposited with ICAO on September 5, 2003. The ICAO have succeeded in modernizing and consolidating a 70-year old system of international instruments of private international law into one legal instrument that will provide, for years to come, an adequate level of compensation for those involved in international aircraft accidents. An international diplomatic conference on air law by ICAO of 1999 succeeded in adopting a new regime for air carrier liability, replacing the Warsaw Convention and five other related legal instruments with a single convention that provided for unlimited liability in relation to passengers. Victims of international air accidents and their families will be better protected and compensated under the new Montreal Convention, which modernizes and consolidates a seventy-five year old system of international instruments of private international law into one legal instrument. A major feature of the new legal instrument is the concept of unlimited liability. Whereas the Warsaw Convention set a limit of 125,000 Gold Francs (approximately US$ 8,300) in case of death or injury to passengers, the Montreal Convention introduces a two-tier system. The first tier includes strict liability up to l00,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR: approximately US$ 135,000), irrespective of a carrier's fault. The second tier is based on presumption of fault of a carrier and has no limit of liability. The 1999 Montreal Convention also includes the following main elements; 1. In cases of aircraft accidents, air carriers are called upon to provide advance payments, without delay, to assist entitled persons in meeting immediate economic needs; the amount of this initial payment will be subject to national law and will be deductable from the final settlement; 2. Air carriers must submit proof of insurance, thereby ensuring the availability of financial resources in cases of automatic payments or litigation; 3. The legal action for damages resulting from the death or injury of a passenger may be filed in the country where, at the time of the accident, the passenger had his or her principal and permanent residence, subject to certain conditions. The new Montreal Convention of 1999 included the 5th jurisdiction - the place of residence of the claimant. The acceptance of the 5th jurisdiction is a diplomatic victory for the US and it can be realistically expected that claimants' lawyers will use every opportunity to file the claim in the US jurisdiction - it brings advantages in the liberal system of discovery, much wider scope of compensable non-economic damages than anywhere else in the world and the jury system prone to very generous awards. 4. The facilitation in the recovery of damages without the need for lengthy litigation, and simplification and modernization of documentation related to passengers. In developing this new Montreal Convention, we were able to reach a delicate balance between the needs and interests of all partners in international civil aviation, States, the travelling public, air carriers and the transport industry. Unlike the Warsaw Convention, the threshold of l00,000 SDR specified by the Montreal Convention, as well as remaining liability limits in relation to air passengers and delay, are subject to periodic review and may be revised once every five years. The primary aim of unification of private law as well as the new Montreal Convention is not only to remove or to minimize the conflict of laws but also to avoid conflict of jurisdictions. In order to find a rational solution to disputes between nations which have adopted differing liability systems in international air transport, we need fundamentally to reform their countries's domestic air law based on the new Montreal Convention. It is a desirable and necessary for us to ratify rapidly the new Montreal Convention by the contracting states of lCAO including the Republic of Korea. According to the Korean and Japanese ideas, airlines should not only pay compensation to passengers immediately after the accident, but also the so-called 'condolence' money to the next of kin. Condolence money is a gift to help a dead person's spirit in the hereafter : it is given on account of the grief and sorrow suffered by the next of kin, and it has risen considerably over the years. The total amount of the Korean and Japanese claims in the case of death is calculated on the basis of the loss of earned income, funeral expenses and material demage (baggage etc.), plus condolence money. The economic and social change will be occurred continuously after conclusion of the new Montreal Convention. In addition, the real value of life and human right will be enhanced substantially. The amount of compensation for damage caused by aircraft accident has increased in dollar amount as well as in volume. All air carrier's liability should extend to loss of expectation of leisure activities, as well as to damage to property, and mental and physical injuries. When victims are not satisfied with the amount of the compensation for damage caused by aircraft accident for which an airline corporation is liable under the current liability system. I also would like to propose my opinion that it is reasonable and necessary for us to interpret broadly the meaning of the bodily injury on Article 17 of the new Montreal Convention so as to be included the mental injury and condolence. Furthermore, Korea and Japan has not existed the Air Transport Act regulated the civil liability of air carrier such as Air Transport Act (Luftverkehrsgestz) in Germany. It is necessary for us to enact "the Korean Air Transport Contract Act (provisional title)" in order to regulate the civil liability of air carrier including the protection of the victims and injured persons caused by aircraft accident.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.195-225
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• 2009

One of the most significant additions to the Warsaw Convention liability system, brought about by the coming into force of the Montreal Convention 1999(MC 99), was the creation of the new so-called fifth jurisdiction, whereby an Article 17 action for damages for passanger bodily injury or death only, may be brought at the option of the claimant/plaintiff. The fifth jurisdiction-the pernanent residence of the passenger at the time of the accident,provided that the carrier has a specified business presence in that jurisdiction-was one of the provisions of MC99 that provoked the most debate at the Montreal Conference leading to the adoption of MC99. Some scholars in China fear that the fifth jurisdiction will be abused after the MC99 came into force to China in 2005. The present article argues that the fifth jurisdiction would not be abused as long as such international private doctrines as forum non-conveniens are applied by the trial court appropriately. The article also points out that the challenge before the legislative body of China is to amend the civil aviation law and other related laws so that to solve the conflicts among the laws and meet the obligations provided by the MC99.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.109-133
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• 2007

The legal labyrinth through which we have just walked is one in which even a highly proficient lawyer could easily become lost. Warsaw Convention's original objective of uniformity of private international aviation liability law has been eroded as the world community ha attempted again to address perceived problems. Efforts to create simplicity and certainty of recovery actually may have created less of both. In any particular case, the issue of which international convention, intercarrier agreement or national law to apply will likely be inconsistent with other decisions. The law has evolved faster for some nations, and slower for others. Under the Warsaw Convention of 1929, strict liability is imposed on the air carrier for damage, loss, or destruction of cargo, luggage, or goods sustained either: (1) during carriage in air, which is comprised of the period during which cargo is 'in charge of the carrier (a) within an aerodrome, (b) on board the aircraft, or (c) in any place if the aircraft lands outside an aerodrome; or (2) as a result of delay. By 2007, 151 nations had ratified the original Warsaw Convention, 136 nations had ratified the Hague Protocol, 84 had ratified the Guadalajara Protocol, and 53 nations had ratified Montreal Protocol No.4, all of which have entered into force. In November 2003, the Montreal Convention of 1999 entered into force. Several airlines have embraced the Montreal Agreement or the IATA Intercarrier Agreements. Only seven nations had ratified the moribund Guatemala City Protocol. Meanwhile, the highly influential U.S. Second Circuit has rendered an opinion that no treaty on the subject was in force at all unless both affected nations had ratified the identical convention, leaving some cases to fall between the cracks into the arena of common law. Moreover, in the United States, a surface transportation movement prior or subsequent to the air movement may, depending upon the facts, be subject to Warsaw, or to common law. At present, International private air law regime can be described as a "situation of utter chaos" in which "even legal advisers and judges are confused." The net result of this barnacle-like layering of international and domestic rules, standards, agreements, and criteria in the elimination of legal simplicity and the substitution in its stead of complexity and commercial uncertainty, which manifestly can not inure to the efficient and economical flow of world trade. All this makes a strong case for universal ratification of the Montreal Convention, which will supersede the Warsaw Convention and its various reformulations. Now that the Montreal Convention has entered into force, the insurance community may press the airlines to embrace it, which in turn may encourage the world's governments to ratify it. Under the Montreal Convention, the common law defence is available to the carrier even when it was not the sole cause of the loss or damage, again making way for the application of comparative fault principle. Hopefully, the recent entry into force of the Montreal Convention of 1999 will re-establish the international legal uniformity the Warsaw Convention of 1929 sought to achieve, though far a transitional period at least, the courts of different nations will be applying different legal regimes.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.201-248
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• 2015

In Korea the number of unlawful interference act on board aircrafts has been increased continuously according to the growth of aviation demand, and there were 55 incidents in 2000, followed by 354 incidents in 2014, and an average of 211 incidents a year over the past five years. In 1963, a number of states adopted the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (the Tokyo Convention 1963) as the first worldwide international legal instrument on aviation security. The Tokyo Convention took effect in 1969 and, shortly afterward, in 1970 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(the Hague Convention 1970) was adopted, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation(the Montreal Convention 1971) was adopted in 1971. After 9/11 incidents in 2001, to amend and supplement the Montreal Convention 1971, the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation(the Beijing Convention 2010) was adopted in 2010, and to supplement the Hague Convention 1970, the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(the Beijing Protocol 2010) was adopted in 2010. Since then, in response to increased cases of unruly behavior on board aircrafts which escalated in both severity and frequency,, the Montreal Protocol which is seen as an amendment to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft(the Tokyo Convention 1963) was adopted in 2014. Korea ratified the Tokyo Convention 1963, the Hague Convention 1970, the Montreal Convention 1971, the Montreal Supplementary Protocol 1988, and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosive 1991 which have proven to be effective. Under the Tokyo Convention ratified in 1970, Korea further enacted the Aircraft Navigation Safety Act in 1974, as well as the Aviation Safety and Security Act that replaced the Aircraft Navigation Safety Act in August 2002. Meanwhile, the title of the Aviation Safety and Security Act was changed to the Aviation Security Act in April 2014. The Aviation Security Act is essentially an implementing legislation of the Tokyo Convention and Hague Convention. Also the language of the Aviation Security Act is generally broader than the unruly and disruptive behavior in Sections 1-3 of the model legislation in ICAO Circular 288. The Aviation Security Act has reflected the considerable parts of the implementation of national legislation under the Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol 2010, and the Montreal Protocol 2014 that are the modernized international conventions relating to aviation security. However, in future, when these international conventions would come into effect and Korea would ratify them, the national legislation that should be amended or provided newly in the Aviation Security Act are as followings : The jurisdiction, the definition of 'in flight', the immunity from the actions against the aircraft commander, etc., the compulsory delivery of the offender by the aircraft commander, etc., the strengthening of penalty on the person breaking the law, the enlargement of application to the accomplice, and the observance of international convention. Among them, particularly the Korean legislation is silent on the scope of the jurisdiction. Therefore, in order for jurisdiction to be extended to the extra-territorial cases of unruly and disruptive offences, it is desirable that either the Aviation Security Act or the general Crime Codes should be revised. In conclusion, in order to meet the intelligent and diverse aviation threats, the Korean government should review closely the contents of international conventions relating to aviation security and the current ratification status of international conventions by each state, and make effort to improve the legislation relating to aviation security and the aviation security system for the ratification of international conventions and the implementation of national legislation under international conventions.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.55-81
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• 2008

Most compensation issues are regulated under domestic law where third parties are suffered damage from crushes of aircrafts or their falling objects. This issue was internationally recognized. A Convention to unify the rules of the law concerning damage caused by aircraft to the third parties on the surface was signed in May, 1933( the 1933 Rome Convention) and it became effective in 1942. Later, modernization was carried out through the 1952 Rome Convention and the 1978 Montreal Protocol amending the 1933 Rome Convention. Ratifying States either to the Convention or to the Protocol is not as many as those States to the Warsaw Convention concerning air-transport. In 1999, which was a turning point of changes of centuries from the twentieth century to the twenty first century, the Montreal Convention was passed to modernize the Warsaw Convention, and was quickly widespread. On September 11 2001, the coordinated simultaneous terror attacks occurred. In the circumstances, the issue modernizing the Rome Convention came up. Thus, workout under the initiatives of the Legal Committee of the ICAO is under operation to adopt new Rome Convention. In Japan, a study on the ICAO Draft Convention was operated by which a working study group composed of experts from academy, industry and government was set up. This article, being based on that study, clarifies issues and gives future perspectives. This article presents author's individual views.

• 한국항공우주법학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2008.05a
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• pp.121-140
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• 2008

Most compensation issues are regulated under domestic law where third parties are suffered damage from crushes of aircrafts or their falling objects. This issue was internationally recognized. A Convention to unify the rules of the law concerning damage caused by aircraft to the third parties on the surface was signed in May,1933( the 1933 Rome Convention) and it became effective in 1942. Later, modernization was carried out through the 1952 Rome Convention and the 1978 Montreal Protocol amending the 1933 Rome Convention. Ratifying States either to the Convention or to the Protocol is not as many as those States to the Warsaw Convention concerning air transport. In 1999, which was a turning point of changes of centuries from the twentieth century to the twenty first century, the Montreal Convention was passed to modernize the Warsaw Convention, and was quickly widespread. On September 11 2001, the coordinated simultaneous terror attacks occurred. In the circumstances, the issue modernizing the Rome Convention came up. Thus, workout under the initiatives of the Legal Committee of the ICAO is under operation to adopt new Rome Convention. In Japan, a study on the draft of the treaty was operated by which a working study group composed of experts from academy, industry and government was set up. This article, being based on that study, clarifies issues and gives future perspectives. This article presents author's individual views.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.279-310
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• 2015

The Montreal Convention is an agreement that governs the liability of air carriers for injury and death to passengers travelling internationally by air. The Montreal Convention serves as the exclusive legal framework for victims and survivors seeking compensation for injuries or death arising from accidents involving international air travel. The Montreal Convention sets monetary liability caps on damages in order to promote the financial stability of the international airline transport industry and protect the industry from exorbitant damages awards in courts that would inevitably bankrupt an airline. The Convention allows a litigant suing under the Convention to avoid the liability caps in instances where the airline's culpability for the injury or death is the direct result of negligence, another wrongful act, or an omission of the airline or its agents. The Montreal Convention identifies specific locations as appropriate venues to advance claims for litigants seeking compensation. These venues are closely tied to either the carrier's business operations or the passenger's domicile. In March 2015, in an act of suicide stemming from reactive depression, the co-pilot of Germanwings flight 9525 intentionally crashed the aircraft into the French Alps killing the passengers and the remaining crew. Subsequent to the crash, there were media reports that Lufthansa made varying settlement offers to families of the passengers who died aboard the flight ranging from $8,300 USD to $4.5 Million USD depending on the passengers' citizenship. The unverified offers by Lufthansa prompted outcries from the families of the decedent passengers that they would institute suit against the airline in a more plaintiff friendly jurisdiction such as the United States. The first part of this article accomplishes two goals. First, it examines the Montreal Convention's venue requirement along with an overview of the recoverable damages from countries comprising the citizenship of the passengers who were not American. The intentional crash of Germanwings flight 9525 by its First Officer encompasses the possibility that Lufthansa may be exposed to unlimited compensatory damages beyond the liability caps contained in the Convention. The second part of this article explores the application of the Convention's liability limits to the Germanwings flight to demonstrate that the likelihood of escaping the liability limits is slim.