• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
• /
• v.25 no.1_2
• /
• pp.505-511
• /
• 2007

Recently, the equivalent relations between a symmetric dual problem and a matrix game B(x, y) were given in [6: D.S. Kim and K. Noh, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 298(2004), 1-13]. Using more simpler form of B(x, y) than one in [6], we establish the equivalence relations between a symmetric dual problem and a matrix game, and then give a numerical example illustrating our equivalence results.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.22 no.3
• /
• pp.113-143
• /
• 1997

Most of the conflict problems between 2 persons can be represented as a bi-matrix game, because player's utilities, in general, are non-zero sum and change according to the progress of game. In the bi-matrix game the equilibrium point set which satisfies the Pareto optimality can be a good bargaining or coordination solution. Under the condition of incomplete information about the risk attitudes of the players, the bargaining or coordination solution depends on additional elements, namely, the players' methods of making inferences when they reach a node in the extensive form of the game that is off the equilibrium path. So the investigation about the players' inference type and its effects on the solution is essential. In addition to that, the effect of an individual's aversion to risk on various solutions in conflict problems, as expressed in his (her) utility function, must be considered. Those kinds of incomplete information make decision maker Bayesian, since it is often impossible to get correct information for building a decision making model. In Baysian point of view, this paper represents an analytic frame for guessing and learning opponent's attitude to risk for getting better reward. As an example for that analytic frame. 2 persons'bi-matrix game is considered. This example explains that a bi-matrix game can be transformed into a kind of matrix game through the players' implicitly cooperative attitude and the need of arbitration.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
• /
• v.14 no.1
• /
• pp.43-49
• /
• 1988

The purpose of this paper is to study the sensitivity analysis of matrix game by means of linear programming. The relations between matrix game and linear programming is well known. In this paper we first transform matrix game into linear programming. The sensitivity analysis of matrix game is performed by that of linear programming.

• Korean Management Science Review
• /
• v.9 no.1
• /
• pp.87-92
• /
• 1992

The purpose of this paper is to study the sensitivity analysis in the matrix game. The third type sensitivity analysis is defined as finding the characteristic region of an element of the payoff matrix in which the set of current active strategies is preserved. First by using the relationship between matrix game and linear programming, we induce the conditions which must be satisfied for preserving the set of current active strategies. Second we show the characteristic regions of active and inactive strategy. It is found that the characteristic regions we suggests in this paper are same with that of the type one sensitivity analysis suggested by Sung[3] except only one case.

• International Journal of Fuzzy Logic and Intelligent Systems
• /
• v.15 no.1
• /
• pp.60-71
• /
• 2015

In this paper, a matrix game is considered in which the elements are represented as Z-numbers. The objective is to formalize the human capability for solving decision-making problems in uncertain situations. A ranking method of Z-numbers is proposed and used to define pure and mixed strategies. These strategies are then applied to find the optimal solution to the game problem with an induced pay off matrix using a min max, max min algorithm and the multi-section technique. Numerical examples are given in support of the proposed method.

• International Journal of Aeronautical and Space Sciences
• /
• v.17 no.2
• /
• pp.204-213
• /
• 2016

A differential game theory based approach is used to develop an automated maneuver generation algorithm for Within Visual Range (WVR) air-to-air combat of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). The algorithm follows hierarchical decisionmaking structure and performs scoring function matrix calculation based on differential game theory to find the optimal maneuvers against dynamic and challenging combat situation. The score, implying how much air superiority the UCAV has, is computed from the predicted relative geometry, relative distance and velocity of two aircrafts. Security strategy is applied at the decision-making step. Additionally, a barrier function is implemented to keep the airplanes above the altitude lower bound. To shorten the simulation time to make the algorithm more real-time, a moving horizon method is implemented. An F-16 pseudo 6-DOF model is used for realistic simulation. The combat maneuver generation algorithm is verified through three dimensional simulations.

• Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society
• /
• v.49 no.6
• /
• pp.1251-1254
• /
• 2012

Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most important concepts in game theory. Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon gave a "sufficient condition" for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in matrix games [5]. They also claimed that the condition was necessary for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in undominated matrix games. In this short note, we show that these claims are not true by giving two examples.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.52 no.6
• /
• pp.347-353
• /
• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society
• /
• v.37 no.2
• /
• pp.377-385
• /
• 2000

In this paper we find a sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in matrix games. In the process of formulating our condition, the alternative theorem of Farkas is used. The formulated condition is necessary and sufficient to the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in undominated matrix games.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.52 no.1
• /
• pp.62-67
• /
• 2003

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithim. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.