• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.198-213
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• 2012

Navy ship acquisition management business contributed to the korean Navy and defense exports with government suppliers in Korea for over 40 years. But due to advanced technology, development trend of Navy ship and defense export requirements, it enable to make a contribution to a better system improvement are being demanded. In this paper, an adjective Navy ship acquisition process is presented in order to improve the acquisition process takes the first step for acquisition planning process to enhance the efficiency and rationality that is based on consensus of Navy ship expert and experienced. In addition, systems engineering (SE) and quality control (QC) techniques based on Modeling and Simulation are investigated to carry out efficient project management and scientific quality control system in Navy ship acquisition process. Finally, it is suggested to apply SE/QC based on M&S for Navy ship acquisition process using civilian infrastructure and organizations in order to take advantage of the world's leading domestic industry based on considering the difficult conditions of Navy ship suppliers.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.332-339
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• 2024

Safety is essential for organizations operating in high-risk environments, such as the Navy. Effective safety management requires continuous improvement and supplementation, commonly achieved through the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) cycle. Despite reinforced safety regulations and expanded education, safety accidents persist in the Navy, indicating a need to enhance the safety accident analysis and classification system. This study aims to analyze and identify the shortcomings of the current Navy safety accident classification system to establish a more effective framework. By doing so, we will be able to register the results of safety accidents, identify their root causes, and propose a 12-digit Navy safety accident classification code. This code will contribute to the development of mid- to long-term safety management policies.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.28-53
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• 2018

The U.S. has recently developed Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and Distributed Lethality strategy based on a common perception that they are responding to China's threats. In the future, it is anticipated the following. Strengthen cooperation of the U.S.-India-Vietnam navy, Maximizing the combined combat power between the U.S. and regional navies, Improving its ability to restore damage control, Economic cooperation between the Pacific and Indian countries. The meanings given to the Korean navy are as follows. First, South Korea should pursue cooperation with the Indian Navy, which will grow into a regional balance on China's growth. The growth of the Indian navy is expected to increase cooperation with other Pacific countries. The government should seek ways to promote cooperation with india navy in various fields. Secondly, it is a joint drill between the U.S. Navy and the Korean Navy. Recently, the Korea-U.S. joint drill has not been conducted and many changes are expected to be made regarding the implementation of the joint drill in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to respond to possible changes in the naval relationship between Korea navy and the U.S. navy Also, due to distributed lethality strategy, preparations for operations and training with U.S.navy will be necessary. Lastly, it should contribute to cooperation among regional countries in preparation for maritime territorial disputes. The growth of the Chinese navy and the territorial disputes in the East and South China sea has raised the possibility of accidental military clashes at sea. Therefore, the government should make efforts to create multilateral security cooperation systems that can continue to promote the prevention of armed conflict.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.163-197
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• 2016

The completion of Jeju Naval Base on February 2016 made the Republic of Korea Navy(ROKN) review the size and role of the Maritime Task Flotilla(MTF). The new strategic environment for the 12st century and the new challenges require the Navy to counter North Korea's provocations and prevent potential enemy's threat. The Navy is also required to take part in the variety of international roles and missions commensurated with Korea's global status to maximize the national interest. Despite these changes, Korea's military construction concept is still unable to break away from the old paradigm of the North Korean threat largely centered. In order to develop the current MTF into the Task Group with the construction of Jeju Naval Base, the Navy must newly not only establish new force development plan and fleet management concepts but also go to persuade and convince policy decision makers. To this end, the following efforts should be promoted. First, the ROK Navy steps up efforts in order to share with the Task Group's vision and strategy. The Navy should also provide the size and structure as well as the missions and roles of the Task Group to react to new maritime security environment. Second, the Navy analyse the MTF's ability and what is required and necessary to perform its duty. After that, it must set out the direction of the Task Group's force development. Third, the current missions and roles of the MTF should be re-established to respond various threats. Finally, accommodating of new technology to the MTF should intensify its strengths. The ROK Navy has a mixed force structure consisting of three fixed- base fleets and a MTF. The fixed base fleet has a passive force to defend and protect its own sea areas, but the MTF should actively not only counter North Korea's threats, including ballistic missiles, but also fight potential threats and takes international missions as a primary task force. However, the MTF has a limited capability to accomplish given missions and long-range operations, and thus, the ROK Navy is strongly required to construct the Task Group.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.5-35
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• 2013

The purpose of this thesis is to suggest how to plan ROK(Republic of Korea) Navy's strategy concerning to JOAC(Joint Operation Access Concept) and ASB(Air-Sea Battle) concept of US(United States) armed forces. Since 2006, US armed forces has been developing CONOPS(Concepts of Operations), JOAC & ASB. These concepts will not only affect security environment for Korea Peninsula and West Pacific Area, but also will be affected to ROK Navy's Strategy. Therefore, Korea Navy has to consider and review those concepts and should discuss the way to secure peace of Korea Peninsula. JOAC & ASB have been developed for securing operational access ability of US armed forces against enemy forces. A2/AD(Anti-Access, Area-Denial) is the strategy of possible enemy forces against US forces' approaching into the operation area and impede operations within area. US forces had to overcome enemy's A2/AD strategy in coming century to protect national interest and sustain global leadership. The main concept of JOAC & ASB is "Cross-domain Synergy", which means 'to eliminate duplicate and improve joint operability containing space and cyber operation area.' Korea Navy's acceptance of JOAC & ASB without any revising is not a rational choice. Without the amendment some problems can be occurred by the Korea navy's acceptance for the original version of JOAC & ASB. Those are "Missing differences of operation environment between Korea and US", "Impediment from neighbor nations, especially PRC (People's Republic of China)", and "Impediment inside from Korea armed forces". Therefore, Korea Navy has to evaluate and find out the way to solve for JOAC & ASB to apply for their strategy and minimise those possible problems above. This thesis is expected to be the solution.

• Journal of the Ergonomics Society of Korea
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.353-362
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• 2012

Objective: The aim of this study is developing the navigation radar display of navy ship with ecological interface design (EID) framework. Background: Navy ship radar operator must perform navigation support tasks by monitoring the complex and diverse information presented on the radar display. Current radar display is limited in effective navigation aid and response to an unusual state immediately. It is necessary to develop an effective radar display. Method: Ten navy radar operators performed a series of trials in a low-fidelity radar simulation in which they attempted to solve the problems of current navigation situation. Results: The result demonstrated that the ecological interface's performance was better than the existing radar display on performance time and subjective mental workload. Conclusion: This study expand EID study field to navy ship radar display and confirm ecological display is better than existing radar display in performance time, subjective mental work load. Application: The result of this study may help to improve navy ship navigation radar display currently in use.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.294-332
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• 2017

The aim of this study is to find ways to apply the strategic communications to the Republic of Korea Navy. It may be a little bit late for the ROK Navy to accommodate the SC in these days because the adoption and implementation of the SC by the Combined Forces Command has already been begun. It was in 2007 when the SC was in place in the CFC. ROK's Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff have also mulled over the SC and begun to apply it in part in the annual exercises such as Key Resolve command post drills and Foal Eagle field training exercise, etc. For the ROK Navy, in addition to those exercises, it is faced with further areas like North Korean maritime provocations and other maritime incidents where its version of SC is needed. As noted, the SC is not intended to deter or defend directly those provocations and incidents, but aims to create conditions favorable to the achievement of the navy's strategic objectives. The ROK Navy has to establish a SC planning center and implementing organizations within the Headquarters to be consistent with its above organizations such as MND, JCS, and CFC that have already applied the SC in part or in entirety. SC center and other related organizations need to be under the control of VCNO and the center needs to be located and administered by the policy division in N-5 at the HQs. The vision of the navy's SC is the winning without combats and the least damages in time of war. In other for the navy to reach the vision, the strategies to be executed are early establishment of SC implementing organizations, forming consensus over the need for the SC within the navy, strengthening core competencies to apply the SC, acquiring the SC experts and making doctrines on the SC. The SC, in addition, in the navy has to be planned and implemented in not only peace time and crisis time but also war time.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.85-119
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• 2013

This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.