• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.147-187
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• 2008

Online game researchers focus on the flow and factors influencing flow. Flow is conceptualized as an optimal experience state and useful explaining game experience in online. Many game studies focused on the customer loyalty and flow in playing online game, In showing specific game experience, however, it doesn't examine multidimensional experience process. Flow is not construct which show absorbing process, but construct which show absorbing result. Hence, Flow is not adequate to examine multidimensional experience of games. Online game is included in hedonic consumption. Hedonic consumption is a relatively new field of study in consumer research and it explores the consumption experience as a experiential view(Hirschman and Holbrook 1982). Hedonic consumption explores the consumption experience not as an information processing event but from a phenomenological of experiential view, which is a primarily subjective state. It includes various playful leisure activities, sensory pleasures, daydreams, esthetic enjoyment, and emotional responses. In online game experience, therefore, it is right to access through a experiential view of hedonic consumption. The objective of this paper was to make up for lacks in our understanding of online game experience by developing a framework for better insight into the hedonic experience of online game. We developed this framework by integrating and extending existing research in marketing, online game and hedonic responses. We then discussed several expectations for this framework. We concluded by discussing the results of this study, providing general recommendation and directions for future research. In hedonic response research, Lacher's research(1994)and Jongho lee and Yunhee Jung' research (2005;2006) has served as a fundamental starting point of our research. A common element in this extended research is the repeated identification of the four hedonic responses: sensory response, imaginal response, emotional response, analytic response. The validity of these four constructs finds in research of music(Lacher 1994) and movie(Jongho lee and Yunhee Jung' research 2005;2006). But, previous research on hedonic response didn't show that constructs of hedonic response have cause-effect relation. Also, although hedonic response enable to different by stimulus properties. effects of stimulus properties is not showed. To fill this gap, while largely based on Lacher(1994)' research and Jongho Lee and Yunhee Jung(2005, 2006)' research, we made several important adaptation with the primary goal of bringing the model into online game and compensating lacks of previous research. We maintained the same construct proposed by Lacher et al.(1994), with four constructs of hedonic response:sensory response, imaginal response, emotional response, analytical response. In this study, the sensory response is typified by some physical movement(Yingling 1962), the imaginal response is typified by images, memories, or situations that game evokes(Myers 1914), and the emotional response represents the feelings one experiences when playing game, such as pleasure, arousal, dominance, finally, the analytical response is that game player engaged in cognition seeking while playing game(Myers 1912). However, this paper has several important differences. We attempted to suggest multi-dimensional experience process in online game and cause-effect relation among hedonic responses. Also, We investigated moderate effects of perceived complexity. Previous studies about hedonic responses didn't show influences of stimulus properties. According to Berlyne's theory(1960, 1974) of aesthetic response, perceived complexity is a important construct because it effects pleasure. Pleasure in response to an object will increase with increased complexity, to an optimal level. After that, with increased complexity, pleasure begins with a linearly increasing line for complexity. Therefore, We expected this perceived complexity will influence hedonic response in game experience. We discussed the rationale for these suggested changes, the assumptions of the resulting framework, and developed some expectations based on its application in Online game context. In the first stage of methodology, questions were developed to measure the constructs. We constructed a survey measuring our theoretical constructs based on a combination of sources, including Yingling(1962), Hargreaves(1962), Lacher (1994), Jongho Lee and Yunhee Jung(2005, 2006), Mehrabian and Russell(1974), Pucely et al(1987). Based on comments received in the pretest, we made several revisions to arrive at our final survey. We investigated the proposed framework through a convenience sample, where participation in a self-report survey was solicited from various respondents having different knowledges. All respondents participated to different degrees, in these habitually practiced activities and received no compensation for their participation. Questionnaires were distributed to graduates and we used 381 completed questionnaires to analysis. The sample consisted of more men(n=225) than women(n=156). In measure, the study used multi-item scales based previous study. We analyze the data using structural equation modeling(LISREL-VIII; Joreskog and Sorbom 1993). First, we used the entire sample(n=381) to refine the measures and test their convergent and discriminant validity. The evidence from both the factor analysis and the analysis of reliability provides support that the scales exhibit internal consistency and construct validity. Second, we test the hypothesized structural model. And, we divided the sample into two different complexity group and analyze the hypothesized structural model of each group. The analysis suggest that hedonic response plays different roles from hypothesized in our study. The results indicate that hedonic response-sensory response, imaginal response, emotional response, analytical response- are related positively to respondents' level of game satisfaction. And game satisfaction is related to higher levels of game loyalty. Additionally, we found that perceived complexity is important to online game experience. Our results suggest that importance of each hedonic response different by perceived game complexity. Understanding the role of perceived complexity in hedonic response enables to have a better understanding of underlying mechanisms at game experience. If game has high complexity, analytical response become important response. So game producers or marketers have to consider more cognitive stimulus. Controversy, if game has low complexity, sensorial response respectively become important. Finally, we discussed several limitations of our study and suggested directions for future research. we concluded with a discussion of managerial implications. Our study provides managers with a basis for game strategies.

• Journal of Power Electronics
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.104-112
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• 2012

In this paper a new method for the design of a simple PI controller is presented and it has been applied in the control of a Boost based PFC rectifier. The Strength Pareto evolutionary algorithm, which is based on the Pareto Optimality concept, used in Game theory literature is implemented as a multi-objective optimization approach to gain a good transient response and a high quality input current. In the proposed method, the input current harmonics and the dynamic response have been assumed as objective functions, while the PI controller's gains of the PFC rectifier (Kpi, Tpi) are design variables. The proposed algorithm generates a set of optimal gains called a Pareto Set corresponding to a Pareto Front, which is a set of optimal results for the objective functions. All of the Pareto Front points are optimum, but according to the design priority objective function, each one can be selected. Simulation and experimental results are presented to prove the superiority of the proposed design methodology over other methods.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computational and Applied Mathematics Conference
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• 2003.09a
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• pp.15-15
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• 2003

We provide some recent results of approximation algorithms for solving Markov Games and discuss their applications to problems that arise in Computer Science. We consider a receding horizon approach as an approximate solution to two-person zero-sum Markov games with an infinite horizon discounted cost criterion. We present error bounds from the optimal equilibrium value of the game when both players take “correlated” receding horizon policies that are based on exact or approximate solutions of receding finite horizon subgames. Motivated by the worst-case optimal control of queueing systems by Altman, we then analyze error bounds when the minimizer plays the (approximate) receding horizon control and the maximizer plays the worst case policy. We give two heuristic examples of the approximate receding horizon control. We extend “parallel rollout” and “hindsight optimization” into the Markov game setting within the framework of the approximate receding horizon approach and analyze their performances. From the parallel rollout approach, the minimizing player seeks to combine dynamically multiple heuristic policies in a set to improve the performances of all of the heuristic policies simultaneously under the guess that the maximizing player has chosen a fixed worst-case policy. Given $\varepsilon$>0, we give the value of the receding horizon which guarantees that the parallel rollout policy with the horizon played by the minimizer “dominates” any heuristic policy in the set by $\varepsilon$, From the hindsight optimization approach, the minimizing player makes a decision based on his expected optimal hindsight performance over a finite horizon. We finally discuss practical implementations of the receding horizon approaches via simulation and applications.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.31-39
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• 2011

This paper attempts to extend such analysis to the rather more difficult problem of optimal management of transnational fish stocks jointly owned by two countries. Transboundary fish such as Mackerel creates an incentive to harvest fish before a competitor does and leads to over-exploitation. This tendency is especially poignant for transnational stocks since, in the absence of an enforceable, international agreement, there is little or no reason for either government or the fishing industry to promote resource conservation and economic efficiency. In the current paper I examine a game theoretic setting in which cooperative management can provide more benefits than noncooperative management. A dynamic model of Mackerel fishery is combined with Nash's theory of two countries cooperative games. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation and noncooperation. A bioeconomic model was used to compare the economic yield of the optimal strategies for two countries, under joint maximization of net benefits in joint ocean. The results suggest as follows. First, the threat points represent the net benefits for two countries in absence of cooperation. The net benefits to Korea and China in threat points are 2,000 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,130 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$). Total benefits are 3,130 billion won. Second, if two countries cooperate one with another, they reach the solution payoffs such as Pareto efficient. The net benefits to Korea and China in Pareto efficient are 2,785 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,605 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$) or total benefits of 4,390 billion won : a gain of 1,260 billion won. Third, the different price effects under the two scenarios show that total benefit rise as price increases.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.4
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• pp.185-204
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• 2009

The USIM(universal subscriber identity module)-unlock introducing in July 1, 2008 might be led to a significant change that mobile service provider's dominance is considerably dispersed to the handset manufacturer and distributor. Under USIM-unlock environment, mobile service provider, handset manufacturer, and distributor have to make their decisions on their handset distribution channel strategies: the closed distribution channel strategy or the open distribution channel strategy. The change of distribution channel strategy between members in distribution channel can be understood as a matter of strategy choice, and we have developed a theoretical model and analyzed how to make a decision for the member's optimal distribution strategy based on 3-person game model between members of mobile phone distribution channel, under both of '1 subscriber-1 handset' and '1 subscriber-multiple handset' assumptions. Under '1 subscriber-1 handset' assumption, the closed strategy controlled by mobile service provider is all players' optimal solution because the maximum size of the mobile phone market is limited by subscribers. But, as total expected profit by the handset and distribution subsides is a deficit, mobile service provider have to choose the open strategy and consider the conversion to MNO(mobile network operator). Under '1 subscriber-multiple handset' assumption, mobile service provider is trying to find the way how to lock-in its service and mobile phone and how to maximize ARPU(average revenue per unit), while handset manufacturer and distributor have to look for the way how to maximize the mobile phone market using their own marketing efforts, because it is expected that total mobile handset demand for the open market is bigger than demand for the closed market under '1 subscriber-multiple handset' assumption.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea CI
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.73-83
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• 2004

With increasing numbers of vehicles on restricted roads, It happens that we have much wasted time and decreased average car speed. This paper proposes a new concept of coordinating green time which controls 10 traffic intersection systems. For instance, if we have a baseball game at 8 pm today, traffic volume toward the baseball game at 8 pm today, franc volume toward the baseball game will be increased 1 hour or 1 hour and 30 minutes before the baseball game. At that time we can not predict optimal green time Even though there have smart electro-sensitive traffic light system. Therefore, in this paper to improve average vehicle speed and reduce average vehicle waiting time, we created optimal green time using fuzzy rules md neural network as a preprocessing. Also, we developed an Intelligent PLC(Programmable Logic Controller) for real time traffic forecasting as a postprocesing about unexpectable conditions. Computer simulation results proved reducing average vehicle waiting time which proposed coordinating green time better than electro-sensitive franc light system does not consider coordinating green time.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.67-86
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• 2013

This study first provides a stylized model that captures the essential features of the SC (Social Commerce) business and the competition process. The model focuses on the relationship between key decision issues such as marketing inputs and market value. As more SCs join the industry, they are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing and advertising expenditure. This type of competition may lead the industry away from its optimal development path, and at worst, toward a disruption of the entire industry ecosystem. Such being the case, another goal of this study is to examine the possibility that the ToC (Tragedy of the Commons) may occur in the SC industry. We build game models, each of which assumes homogeneity and heterogeneity of SC providers, respectively, and derive explicit equilibrium solutions from both models. Our basic analysis presents Nash equilibria in both models and shows that SC providers are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing expenses. We also compare the game outcomes with one with a hypothetical social planner who determines the total marketing level that optimizes the entire market value. Then, ToC can be defined to describe the situation where the total marketing efforts exceed the socially optimal level of marketing efforts. In both models, we examine the possibility of the ecosystem disruption and specify the conditions under which ToC may occur. However, the chance of avoiding ToC is higher with heterogeneous players than with homogeneous players. To supplement our analytical results, we develop a simulation model which incorporates a market dynamics based on the gap between actual marketing efforts and socially optimal marketing level. Simulation experiments present some lessons and insights which also confirm out findings from equilibrium analysis. For example, heterogeneity in SC providers alleviates the severity of ToC and makes it faster for survivors to escape from the ToC trap. As a result, the degree of industrial concentration tends to increase, which also explains the 'rich-get-richer' phenomenon observed in some empirical studies on the SC industry. Lastly, based on our analytical and experimental results, we come up with some measures to avoid ToC and overcome the shortcomings intrinsic to the current business model. And further discussions provide strategic implications and policy directions to overcome the possible trap of ToC in this ecosystem, and eventually help the industry to sustainably develop itself toward the next level. To name a few examples of policy measures, regulations on the marketing activities so that the overall marketing expenses cannot go beyond the socially optimal level; institutional guidelines and rules to straightening up the distortions in the way that SC providers view the marketing costs (the current marketing costs are underestimated, thereby encouraging SC providers to increase marketing expenditure); and so on.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.1-17
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• 2008

This article examines the establishment of the game theoretic model for the cleaner vehicles and analyzes the established model. We discuss the way to represent the players' preferences over the outcomes to make the model applicable in real practice. In this article we employ the real data to represent the preferences. In the analysis of the model we consider various scenarios and discuss how we can use GAMBIT, which is a game theory analysis software, to find solutions in each proposed scenario.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 2003.09a
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• pp.166-169
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• 2003

Reinforcement learning if a kind of machine learning. It aims to adapt an agent to a given environment with a clue to a reward and a penalty. Q-learning [8] that is a representative reinforcement learning system treats a reward and a penalty at the same time. There is a problem how to decide an appropriate reward and penalty values. We know the Penalty Avoiding Rational Policy Making algorithm (PARP) [4] and the Penalty Avoiding Profit Sharing (PAPS) [2] as reinforcement learning systems to treat a reward and a penalty independently. though PAPS is a descendant algorithm of PARP, both PARP and PAPS tend to learn a local optimal policy. To overcome it, ion this paper, we propose the Multi Best method (MB) that is PAPS with the multi-start method[5]. MB selects the best policy in several policies that are learned by PAPS agents. By applying PS, PAPS and MB to a soccer game environment based on the SoccerBots[9], we show that MB is the best solution for the soccer game environment.

• IEIE Transactions on Smart Processing and Computing
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.50-64
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• 2012

Quality of Service (QoS) and fairness considerations are undoubtedly essential parameters that need to be considered in the design of next generation scheduling algorithms. This work presents a novel game theoretic cross-layer design that offers optimal allocation of wireless resources to heterogeneous services in Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) networks. The method is based on the Axioms of the Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (S-NBS) concept used in cooperative game theory that provides Pareto optimality and symmetrically fair resource distribution. The proposed strategies are determined via convex optimization based on a new solution methodology and by the transformation of the subcarrier indexes by means of time-sharing. Simulation comparisons to relevant schemes in the literature show that the proposed design can be successfully employed to typify ideal resource allocation for next-generation broadband wireless systems by providing enhanced performance in terms of queuing delay, fairness provisions, QoS support, and power consumption, as well as a comparable total throughput.