• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.81-96
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• 2007

In this study, we conduct an empirical study to investigate the impact of the interdependence and trust between supplier and buyer on both their collaboration and supplier performance in automobile industry supply chain. The result shows that there is a positive relationship between the supplier's dependence and trust on the buyer and their collaboration. Moreover, it shows that supplier's dependence and trust on the buyer affects supplier performance through collaboration as a mediating effect. Therefore it is very important to notice that supplier and buyer in automobile industry should try to have a good collaborative relationship together in order to improve supplier performance.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.17-27
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• 2002

Buyer-carts to support the purchasing process in the B2B EC platform, can be categorized as s-cart, i-cart, and b-cart depending upon its residing sites : seller, intermediary, and buyer sites. In this paper, after proposing the desired features of buyer-carts in B2B EC as identification, collection, trashing, ordering, payment, tracking, recording, purchasing decision support, and transmission of records to e-procurement systems, we try to analyze each buyer-cart qualitatively from such viewpoints. Moreover, we propose an efficiency evaluation model for quantitative analysis. By setting variables from interview of employees in 30 listed companies In Korea, we try to evaluate the efficiency of buyer-carts in B2B EC. From this paper, we show that the b-cart platform is more efficient than other buyer-carts especially in B2B EC.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.61
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• pp.3-28
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• 2014

This study describes the buyer's remedies regarding defects in title under CISG. Although CISG stipulates the seller's liability for the delivery of conforming goods physically at Art. 35 and legally at Art. 41 and Art. 42 respectively, the buyer's remedies are not distinguished between non-conformity governed by Art. 35 and defects in title governed by Art. 41 and Art. 42. If the seller does not fulfill his obligation under Art. 41 and Art. 42 to deliver goods which are free from third party claims, the buyer should pay attention to which remedies are available under CISG. Under CISG, for defects in title in the delivered goods, the buyer is entitled to require performance in Art. 46 (1) unless he has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement, to declare the contract avoided by strictly limiting the situation in which the failure by the seller to perform his obligation amounts to a fundamental breach of contract in Art. 49, to claim damages in Art. 74, and to suspend the performance of his obligation where it becomes apparent that the seller will not perform a substantial part of his obligation in Art. 71 (1). Unlike Art. 35 non-conformity, the buyer may not require delivery of substitute goods under Art. 46 (2), claim repair under Art. 46 (3), and declare price reduction for title defects under Art. 50.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.8
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• pp.113-121
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• 2016

Purpose - This paper aims to examine the impact of buyer-supplier cooperation on suppliers' trust on buyers and the moderating role of buyers' governance mechanism between the sharing activities and trust. Research design, data, and methodology - An integrated research model is designed to materialize the research hypotheses. First, the impact of buyer-supplier cooperation is empirically analyzed by looking into how the sharing activities, in the field of information, resource, and knowledge, of buyer with supplier will affect the trust of supplier on buyer. Second, the moderating effect of contract-based governance mechanism of buyer is empirically analyzed. Third, the influence of trust on innovation performance of suppler is empirically analyzed. Results - Our findings provide supporting evidence for some of our hypotheses. First, all of the sharing activities are significantly influential, but in different degree, to trust of supplier. Second, contract-based governance mechanism of buyer have a moderating effect on the relationship between sharing activities and trust, positively in resource-sharing activities, negatively in information-sharing activities, not significant in knowledge-sharing activities. Third, supplier's trust on buyer positively affects supplier's own innovation performance. Conclusions - The strategies applied in supply chain management have become important as the competition among firms has shifted from competition between individual firms to competition between supply chains. A customer's sharing activities with its supplier may contribute to an increase in innovation performance. The supplier's information-sharing activity with its customer could affect its information-sharing activities with its main supplier. Cooperative activity with a partner in the supply chain is cultivated and amassed into relationship knowledge, and this study shows that the cooperative relational knowledge related to information-sharing activities enables firms to participate in sharing activities with their main suppliers. Increasing evidence shows that sharing various activities between buyer and supplier improves trust and performance outcomes, and enables firms to maintain competitive advantage. From the perspective of knowledge theory, external knowledge is becoming more important in firms' innovation activities, because innovative knowledge is acquired primarily through interaction with another organization. In addition, relationship learning could be an important tool in absorbing the supplier's core technology, information, expertise, and core competencies, increasing relational value.

• Journal of the Korean Data Analysis Society
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.2967-2980
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• 2018

In this study, we intended to find out how to improve the relationship performance between a hospital who is a buyer and its suppliers in the medical supply chain. For specific, in control of the transaction period and the number of bed, we investigated the effect of information sharing between a buyer and its suppliers along with the trust for the suppliers' capabilities perceived by the buyer on the buyer's relationship performance. In addition, in control of the transaction period and the number of bed, we also examined the influences of moderating effect of the interactional justice on the relations between information sharing and relationship performance, and between capability-trust and relationship performance. For this, we conducted reliability analysis, exploratory/confirmatory factor analyses, discriminant validity analysis, and moderated multiple regression analysis including control variables. Our results showed that there are positive effects of information sharing between a buyer and suppliers, and the buyer's perceived trust for the suppliers' capability on the relationship performance while controlling the transaction period and the number of bed. Besides, we empirically confirmed that there was the moderating effect of the interactional justice on the relations between capability-trust and relationship performance, whereas we could not find that statistically significant moderating effect of the interactional justice on the relations between information sharing and relationship performance.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.26
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• pp.87-111
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• 2005

The buyer must pay the price under the contract and must take delivery of the goods of contract. The buyer's obligation to pay the price includes taking such steps and such formalities under the contract. The remedial system of the rights of the seller is easier than that of the buyer, for the obligations of the former are less complicated. The seller has the right to avoid a contract provided two conditions are fulfilled : (a) the buyer must have committed a fundamental breach of contract, or (b) the additional period for performance set by the seller in the case of non-performance must have expired. A decision is more difficult to take in the case of a delay where there is no fixed-term contract, to clarify the situation the seller may set a Nachfrist. It is essential that the contracting parties in Korea should understand the provisions of CISG.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.42 no.1
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• pp.1-17
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• 2017

This study investigates a buyer-supplier supply chain, in which a buyer delegates the production process to a supplier as in many practices. The consumer's buying intention and overall supply chain performance are affected not only by the buyer's decision on sales price but also by the supplier's decision on product quality. Therefore, the buyer has a motivation to control the supplier's quality investment. Among various incentive schemes that the buyer can adopt in practice, we consider a revenue-sharing contract and investigate its unique characteristics. By comparison with a typical wholesale price contract, we reveal that the revenue-sharing contract can enhance supply chain's overall performance, including quality, demand, and profits of not only overall supply chain but also each player. We contribute to the academia and the supply chain practice by providing important guidelines in adopting incentive schemes and effectively managing product quality in a supply chain.

• 한국무역상무학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2004.12a
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• pp.79-104
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• 2004

The buyer must pay the price under the contract and must take delivery of the goods of contract. The buyer's obligation to pay the price includes taking such steps and such formalities under the contract. The remedial system of the rights of the seller is easier than that of the buyer, for the obligations of the former are less complicated. The seller has the right to avoid a contract provided two conditions are fulfilled : (a) the buyer must have committed a fundamental breach of contract, or (b) the additional period for performance set by the seller in the case of non-performance must have expired. A decision is more difficult to take in the case of a delay where there is no fixed-term contract, to clarify the situation the seller may set a Nachfrist. It is essential that the contracting parties in Korea should understand the provisions of CISG.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.21-47
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• 2010

Quantity discounts provide a practical foundation for supply chain inventory policies, improving the supplier's profit and reducing the buyer's inventory cost simultaneously. Traditional quantity-discount research, which deals with inventory coordination between a buyer and a supplier, is extended to a stationary stochastic environment. This research shows that the magnitude of the optimal discounts scheduled by the deterministic quantity discount models may not be large enough to cover the buyer's additional inventory stocking risks under uncertain conditions. As a result, the buyer's total inventory cost may often increase rather than decrease. In contrast, the proposed model allows the supplier to identify the discount level, which shares the buyer's amplified risk associated with temporary overstocking and ensures that both buyer and supplier benefit economically. The performance of the proposed model was tested in the continuous review environments via numerical experiments. The experimental results support the proposed method as a feasible alternative in coordinating inventory decisions under stochastic demand.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.12
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• pp.253-276
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• 1999

CISG articles 34 and 37 clearly allow the seller to cure any nonconformity in documents of sale or performance prior to the date for delivery if it does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense. CISG article 48 allows a seller to cure the performance even after the date for delivery if it does not cause the buyer unreasonable delay, unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. The wording any failure to perform is broad enough to include a delay. The seller's right to cure relates to all his obligations. The seller may remedy 'any failure to perform his obligations'. This language is broad enough to include a defect in documents. In some cases the fact that the seller is able and willing to remedy the non-conformity of the goods without inconvenience to the buyer, may mean that there would be no fundamental breach unless the seller failed to remedy the non-conformity within an appropriate time. It cannot generally be said what unreasonable inconvenience means. This can only be decided on a case-by-case basis. The seller must bear the costs involved in remedying a failure to perform. The curing of a failure to perform may have influence on the amount of the damage claimed. Insofar as the seller has the right to cure, the buyer is in that case obliged to accept the cure. If he refuses to do so, he can neither avoid the contract nor declare a reduction in price. This rule clearly shows the underlying concept of the CISG, to keep to the contract, if possible. Should the buyer requires delivery of substitute goods and the seller offers repair, it depends on the expense each case. The buyer must receive the request or notice by the seller. The relationship between the seller's right to cure and the buyer's right to avoid the contract is unclear. The buyer's right to avoid the contract should not nullify the seller's right to cure if the offer is reasonable. In addition, whether a breach is fundamental should be decided in the right of the seller's offer to cure.