• Annual Conference of KIPS
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• 2009.04a
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• pp.924-927
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• 2009

P2P 시스템은 피어들간의 자발적인 협력에 의해 구성되고 동작한다. 피어들이 파일 공유 시스템에 활발하게 참여하면 공유 파일 수의 증가로 서비스 향상을 가져올 수 있다. 그러나 일부 피어는 자신의 파일을 전혀 공유하지 않고 필요한 파일의 다운로드만 수행한다. 피어의 이와 같은 '무임승차(free riding)'은 다른 피어의 활발한 참여를 감소시키고 P2P 시스템의 서비스를 저하시킨다. 이에 본 논문에서는 파일 공유 시스템에서 피어의 행동을 참조하여 기여도를 계산하고 인센티브를 할당하는 인센티브 메커니즘을 제안하였다. 제안 메커니즘은 피어의 기여도에 따라 대역폭을 인센티브로 할당하여 차별화된 서비스를 제공한다. 본 논문에서는 실험을 통해 인센티브 메커니즘에서 신뢰 피어의 필요성과 피어의 기여도에 따라 서비스가 차별화되는 것을 확인하였다.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.16 no.7
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• pp.137-148
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• 2011

Different from the traditional client-server model, it is possible for participants in a cooperative distributed system to get quality services regardless of the number of participants in the system since they voluntarily pool or share their resources in order to achieve their common goal. However, some selfish participants try to avoid providing their resources while still enjoying the benefits offered by the system, which is termed free-riding. The results of free-riding in cooperative distributed systems lead to system collapse because the system capacity (per participant) decreases as the number of free-riders increases, widely known as the tragedy of commons. As a consequence, designing an efficient incentive mechanism to prevent free-riding is mandatory for a successful cooperative distributed system. Because of the importance of incentive mechanisms in cooperative distributed system, a myriad of incentives mechanisms have been proposed without a standard for performance evaluation. This paper draws general incentive design considerations which can be used as performance metrics through an extensive survey on this literature, providing future researchers with guidelines for the effective incentive design in cooperative distributed systems.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.12 no.5
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• pp.717-727
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• 2009

P2P (Peer-to-Peer) network depends on cooperation of peers considerably. However, some peers do not share files at all and only download files. Peers also share low quality files or unpopular files. These selfish behavior of peers is referred to 'free riding'. The free riding of peer may decrease participation of other peers or the system performance. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism, called IcMFS (Incentive Mechanism for File Sharing System), which provides the correct use of incentive mechanism using trust peer, computes contribution values referring behavior of peers and rewards peers. The proposed mechanism assigns bandwidth and TTL(Time-To-Live) to a peer and differentiates the use of service. A case study on simulations shows the service differentiation according to the contribution value of peer, the correct use of incentive mechanism using trust peer and the advantage by use of trust peer. To prove the stability of proposed mechanism, we also show the disadvantage that a peer receives from the incorrect use of incentive mechanism.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.31 no.5
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• pp.889-899
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• 2021

This paper proposes a reliable data sharing scheme on the internet of vehicles (IoV) by utilizing blockchain technology for constructing a decentralized system approach. In our model, to maintain the credibility of the information messages sent by the vehicles to the system, we propose a reputation rating mechanism, in which neighboring vehicles validate every received information message. Furthermore, we incorporate an incentive mechanism based on smart contracts, so that vehicles will get certain rewards from the system when they share correct traffic information messages. We simulated the IoV network using a discrete event simulator to analyze network performance, whereas the incentive model is designed by leveraging the smart contract available in the Ethereum platform.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.9 no.12
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• pp.321-332
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• 2020

Decentralized approaches are extensively researched by academia and industry in order to cover up the flaws of existing systems in terms of data privacy. Blockchain and decentralized learning are prominent representatives of a deconcentrated approach. Blockchain is secure by design since the data record is irrevocable, tamper-resistant, consensus-based decision making, and inexpensive of overall transactions. On the other hand, decentralized learning empowers a number of devices collectively in improving a deep learning model without exposing the dataset publicly. To motivate participants to use their resources in building models, a decent and proportional incentive system is a necessity. A centralized incentive mechanism is likely inconvenient to be adopted in decentralized learning since it relies on the middleman that still suffers from bottleneck issues. Therefore, we design an incentive model for decentralized learning applications by leveraging the Ethereum smart contract. The simulation results satisfy the design goals. We also outline the concerns in implementing the presented scheme for sensitive data regarding privacy and data leakage.

• 한국사회정책
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.69-96
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• 2013

This paper is to critically review the economic reasoning of non-sustainability of welfare state due to its intrinsic incentive problems and to see how the nordic welfare state responds to them. The welfare state as a political design of state to pursue equality has social insurance as its main economic function. It survives market failure of private insurance to contribute to human capital investment and industrial restructuring. The universal tax-financed welfare state, however, has the problem of tragedy of commons such as reduced work incentive and work ethics. But, the existing nordic welfare state overcomes it through employment-focused policy arrangements, maintenance of work ethics and benefits moral, incentive mechanism of wage-compression, public educational investment and its complementation with social security. The Nordic model shows that problems of incentive and moral are not about those of theory and reasoning, but about their reality which policies and institutions could respond to.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.10 no.6
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• pp.173-180
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• 2021

Non Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) is a technology to guarantee the explosively increased Quality of Service(QoS) of users in 5G networks. NOMA can remove the frequent orthogonality in Orthogonal Multiple Access (OMA) while allocating the power differentially to classify user signals. NOMA can guarantee higher communication speed than OMA. However, the NOMA has one disadvantage; it consumes a more energy power when the distance increases. To solve this problem, relay nodes are employed to implement the cooperative NOMA control idea. In a cooperative NOMA network, relay node participations for cooperative communications are essential. In this paper, a new bandwidth allocation scheme is proposed for cooperative NOMA platform. By employing the idea of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, the proposed scheme can effectively prevent selfishly actions of relay nodes in the cooperative NOMA network. Especially, base stations can pay incentives to relay nodes as much as the contributes of relay nodes. Therefore, the proposed scheme can control the selfish behavior of relay nodes to improve the overall system performance.

• Defense and Technology
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• no.3 s.169
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• pp.22-27
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• 1993

국방부문에서 창출된 기술지식이 민간부문으로 이전되어 경졔적인 효과를 창출하기 위해서는 다음의 조건이 필요합니다. 첫째, 국방 관련 부문에서 창출된 기술지식이 원활이 이전될수 있는 다양한 이전 메커니즘이 구비되어야 합니다. 둘째, 민간부문이 그러한 지식을 탐색, 소화, 흡수 할수 있는 능력을 지니고 있어야 할 뿐만 아니라, 스스로가 그것을 상업화하기 위한 노력과 자원을 투자해야 합니다. 셋째, 민간기업이 국방기술을 상업화하는 것에 대한 인센티브가 제공되어야 합니다

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.43-52
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• 2010

The Kad network is a peer-to-peer (P2P) network which implements the Kademlia P2P overlay protocol. Nowadays, the Kad network has attracted wide concern as a popular architecture for file sharing systems. Meanwhile, many problems have been coming out in these file sharing systems such as freeriding of users, uploading fake files, spreading viruses, and so on. In order to overcome these problems, we propose an incentive mechanism based on game theory, it establishes a more stable and efficient network environment for Kad users. Users who share valuable resources receive rewards by increasing their credits, while others who supply useless or harmful files are punished. This incentive mechanism in Kad network can be used to detect and prevent malicious behaviors of users and encourage honest interaction among users.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics and Information Engineers
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• v.50 no.6
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• pp.33-42
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• 2013

In the early stage of P2P, the technology was limited to narrow usage of file sharing, but currently, P2P technology has become essential to maximize the efficiency between associated technologies without additional deployment of high costly infrastructure and also the burden of the server. Especially, P2P media streaming service is a highly attractive service to mobile users. which requires a higher quality in the mobile environment in accordance with the development of technology of wired network as well as better mobile terminals. However, P2P technology should consider the trade-off between 'peer selfishness' and QoE for providing fairness. The P2P system also try to maximize the resource utilization through an incentive mechanism for service differentiation and encourage peers to contribute continuously for improving the overall system performance. In this paper, we propose an point-based incentive mechanism based on peer's contribution level and energy availability for service differentiation. We also introduce that the proposed mechanism efficiently enhances the system performance as the peer with incentive using contribution and energy obtains more effective resource distribution.