The increased number of organized employees and amount of collective bargaining in the public sector has caused many industrial relations students to pay attention to the compulsory arbitration mechanism. Some of these have criticized the compulsory arbitration on the grounds that it tends to replace collective bargain ing itself. They argue that each party lacks the incentive to concede and compromise that is so necessary in reaching agreements as long as the threat and/or use of strike is unavailable to them. On the other hand, the proponents of the compulsory arbitration maintain that compulsory arbitration carries out a strike like function by imposing the cost of disagreement. This paper is primarily concerned with these contradictory issues. More particularly, an attempt is made to analyze the impact of the compulsory arbitration mechanism upon the collective bargaining process by developing a bargaining model with explicit considerations of the determinants of the concession behavior of each party as a function of the cost of disagreement and the risk willingness relationship between the parties. The analysis in this paper leads to a synthesis of the above competing arguments, and shows that those contradictory views on the effect of the compulsory arbitration are mainly due to their failure to con sider the concession process.

Applicability of control theories to the efficient operation of accounting system is studied in this paper. Since managerial accounting has been developed along the progrees of control theory, management control theories are essential to explain important attributes of diverse accounting system. Basic concept of control is studied in depth and control systems are classified on the base of their special characteristics. And then the applicability of those control methods to accounting systems are discussed based on behavioral as well as management science approach. In the management science approach, accounting control models of production management, inventory management and R&D are designed with its unique quantitative characteristics. It, however, is very difficult to implement quantified control standards on the behavioral management side. Since most of variables considered on behavioral approach are non-quantitative, only discussion of the theoratical definition has been a main issue on previous studies. In this paper, practicability of the behavioral approach to the accounting control system is studied analyzing state variables and behavior variables of the control system. Theoratical base of the discussion are provided from control theories developed in organization theory and Economics. Basic objective of accounting control practice is to control qualitative human behavior represented by quantified figures while quantitative methods are prevailing over general accounting practice. Therefore, this paper tried to develope and integrate accounting control systems applicable to the behavioral management area as well as management science control side.