In order to achieve full-scale economic cooperation between North Korea and South Korea, the Gaesong Industrial Complex should reopen first. In this case, the Inter-Korean commercial arbitration system should be clearly established to effectively resolve the disputes arising in the special economic zones of the Gaesong Industrial Complex. Even though the Inter-Korean Investment Security Agreement, the Agreement on the Resolution of Commercial Disputes between North Korea and South Korea, the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the Inter-Korean Commercial Arbitration Committee, and the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the Inter-Korean Commercial Arbitration Committee in the Gaesong Industrial District are in place, specific arbitration procedure is not concretely agreed upon and realized between the two Koreas. Therefore, the realization of commercial arbitration between them led by the Ministry of Unification or the government should be accomplished. In addition, it is necessary to consider the administrative trial or administrative litigation system in order to deal with administrative disputes that are not subject to commercial arbitration. Lastly, discussions on legal integration between the two Koreas should continue, focusing on the special economic zone of the Gaesong Industrial Complex, in order to prevent integration from being hindered by a different culture for a long time.

This study is aimed at drawing up improvement measures in connection with the resolution of claims, one of the major constraints in revitalizing South-North Korean economic cooperation. To that end, we first looked at the structure of South-North Korean economic cooperation and the institutional status related to resolving the claims. Also we analyzed the current status of the claims in the process of promoting South-North Korean economic cooperation by companies and the provisions of the claims between the parties in order to derive any problems. Through these research results, we were able to identify directions and implications for efficient improvement of the causes of several South-North Korean economic cooperation claims. First, at the corporate level, there is a need to create specific details of a contract for resolving disputes and to add additional third-party coordination functions in the relevant clause of the contract in preparation for the occurrence of a dispute. In addition, it is necessary to seek ways to advance jointly with corporations in China and other third countries in order to secure stability. Second, the government should continue to discuss ways of promoting South-North Korean commercial arbitration with North Korea so that follow-up measures can be completed as soon as possible. In addition, a two-track strategy is suggested to provide a practical negotiation channel at the private level. Also it is necessary to be active in persuading North Korea to join the international arbitration treaty in preparation for the activation of full-fledged economic exchanges.

In investigating how set-off defenses matter in arbitration, one should take into account that it is not permitted against the parties' will for arbitrators to rule on the disputes that are not the subject of an arbitration agreement, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties involved, because it is considered that the parties intend to solve only the disputes which are the subject of the agreement by arbitration. Also, one should keep in mind that the parties must settle the disputes that are the subject of an arbitration agreement by arbitration when they conclude the agreement, and it is not allowed against the parties' will to resolve the disputes in other ways. The parties may agree whether the respondent can request for arbitration on the counterclaim, which is his/her claim against the claimant, and whether the respondent can raise a plea for a set-off that his/her claim against the claimant is a counter obligation. Failing on such agreement, the respondent may submit a counterclaim when his/her claim and the claimant's claim are the subject of the same arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal may rule on the counter obligation when the arbitration agreement, which becomes the basis for the claimant' claim, has an effect on the counter obligation. Where the claimant fails to raise an objection even after he/she becomes aware that the respondent has requested for arbitration or has raised a plea for set-off by providing his/her claim which is not the subject of the arbitration agreement as a counterclaim or a counter obligation, the arbitral tribunal may rule on the respondent's claim against the claimant. On these occasions, the arbitral tribunal has to guarantee the parties an opportunity to defend themselves by pointing out those situations. It will meet the purposes of arbitration systems to rule out the jurisdiction of the courts when the plaintiff alleges the existence of the arbitration agreement, in case the respondent raises a plea for set-off based on his/her claim which is not the subject of the arbitration agreement in the litigation procedures. However, where the plaintiff fails to allege the existence and conducts pleading in the court with regard to the counter obligation, the court must not reject the respondent's set-off defense because of the existence of the agreement.

Third-party funding in international and domestic disputes is a fast-growing trend and it is increasingly used by large, solvent companies that simply wish to share risk in their finance. On January 10, 2017, the Civil Law Amendment Bill was passed in Singapore and on June 2017 an "Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) Bill" in Hong-Kong had a third-party funding to finance the international arbitration and other dispute resolutions expressly approved. This arbitral tribunal's expanding discretion over critical interim measure of security cost was in issue. In Essar v. Norscot (2016), the arbitrator found that the additional third-party funding costs were recoverable as "other costs of the parties." In here, the decision showed the issue of a tribunal's power over cost measures could spread out to be reviewed and broadened through the legislative process. A recent investor-state arbitration case of ICSID, RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, covered the express awarding of security for costs where a claimant was funded by a third-party funder. It seems inevitable that the volume of third-party funding industry will grow more as time goes on. The next step would be to formulate guidelines on how to determine criteria against which an application for security for costs is measured.

This study examines the development strategies of the arbitration industry in Singapore and Hong Kong, and its purpose is to provide implications for the development of the arbitration industry in South Korea. The main strategies implemented by Singapore and Hong Kong to develop the arbitration industry are as follows: first, improvement of the arbitration law system; second, active support of the government for promoting the arbitration industry; third, build up of an effective arbitration expert training system; and fourth, an arbitration-friendly attitude of the court. In order for South Korea to become an international arbitration hub in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to refer to the above-mentioned strategies. In addition, South Korea needs to develop marketing strategies that can differentiate itself from Singapore and Hong Kong, such as the development of an arbitration system in connection with the 4th Industrial Revolution, differentiation of the disputes sector, use of geographical advantages and a penetration pricing strategy, and support of the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board. In terms of marketing strategy, there are few studies on the development strategy of the arbitration industry in South Korea. In this respect, this study has academic value and differentiation.

China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan have a singular political relationship. This distinctive relationship creates a unique impact on the nationality of the arbitral awards among the said countries. Each of these regions does not adopt the arbitral award of the other party as either a foreign arbitration award or a domestic arbitration award, but separately adopts the arbitral award in different jurisdictions within the same country. Therefore, in order to approve and enforce their arbitral awards in other areas, they have no choice to apply special laws or the conventions concluded between them, neither the New York Convention nor the individual arbitration laws in those areas. Therefore, this paper reviewed the convention and self-established laws among China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan regarding the approval and execution of the other arbitral awards. In addition, the domestic laws in China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan are compared with the New York Convention to ascertain the criteria for distinguishing domestic and foreign arbitral awards. This study also compared and analyzed what criteria were established for the determination of the nationality of the arbitral awards in the domestic law or the convention concluded in pan China. Through the analysis of these contents, the characteristics and problems of criterion for the determination of nationality among China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan were identified. Based on the results, this study examined the precautions Korean companies entering these regions should use in the arbitration system in these areas.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the customs clearance and arbitration systems of Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand, from among ASEAN countries, and to present the practical implications. This paper analyzes the customs and arbitration systems through a literature review by collecting data from papers, research reports, and laws and regulations related to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand. There are significant differences between these countries in relation to customs and payment of customs duties. Also, they have different procedures for the appointment of arbitrators if there is no agreement by the parties as to the number of arbitrators. Therefore, a comparison of the arbitration system and customs clearance procedures in ASEAN countries is timely and necessary, and there is a need for more research to be conducted in the future.

The parties are jointly and severally liable to pay to the arbitrators such reasonable fees and expenses (if any) as are appropriate in the circumstances. Any party may apply to the court (upon notice to the other parties and to the arbitrators) which may order that the amount of the arbitrators' fees and expenses shall be considered and adjusted by such means and upon such terms as it may direct. Arbitrators' fees and expenses are calculated on the basis of informal time fees determined by the arbitrators themselves, and the fees and expenses also vary greatly depending on the nature of the case. Obviously, when appointing a member of the LMAA as an arbitrator, it is rare to negotiate the fees and expenses with the arbitrator and to make specific arrangements for the fees and expenses. And it is common for between an arbitrator and a party to have an arbitrator agreement only in accordance with LMAA Terms. And it is common for between an arbitrator and a party to have an arbitrator agreement only in accordance with LMAA Terms. The purpose of this study analyzes the structure of arbitrators' fees and expenses under the UK Arbitration Act and LMAA Terms 2017. The contents can be divided into the relationship between the arbitrator and the parties (the claim of fees, the type of fees) and the relationship between the parties(the burden rate of arbitrators' fees). In this regard, this study suggests the implications after comparatively analyzing the UK Arbitration Act and the LMAA Terms 2017.

This article examines the necessity for the introduction of an ICSID Appellate System. In comparison with the WTO appellate system, the ICSID ad hoc Committee has a very limited mandate. An annulment inquiry under the ICSID arbitration system barely focuses on whether the arbitral decision resulted from a justifiable process. As long as there is procedural legitimacy, the resulting awards remain unaffected under the annulment procedure, irrespective of mistakes of fact or law. In contrast, in the WTO DSS the AB substantively reviews panel rulings and suggestions that are founded on any deficiency of objectivity or error in the interpretation of a particular WTO provision. This defect intrinsic in the annulment procedure could cause injustice to a party earnestly interested in correcting recognized misapplication of law by ICSID tribunals. Accordingly, the establishment of an appellate system would result in a more substantive and procedural review of awards. The creation of such an ICSID appellate system would ensure thorough scrutiny of the decisions of the tribunal of first instance, leading to better reasoned outcomes. This could lead to a crystallization of predictability in investment relations. The end result would be that fairness, clarity, reliability, and legality in the ICSID adjudicative process would be unassailable, to the advantage of all the contracting parties.