Abstract
This research is a case study that focuses on how conglomerate illegality and corresponding penalty affects corporate performance and strategy. The research aims to provide base information for policy-makers as well as the general public about the corporate environment. The analysis results can be summarized as follows. First, profitability is represented as an M-curve. Profitability falls from indictment to the final pronouncement of the corporate head and increases upon his or her return. The result suggests that the absence of a corporate head could result in low profitability as the firm is exposed to owner risk. Secondly, significant effects on investment were not found. Investment showed a continuous increase from indictment to final judgment. This could have resulted from investment decisions made prior to the indictment, which are generally long-term. Meanwhile, the rate at which investments rose for core subsidiaries were lower, which makes it reasonable to suspect dwindling executive capacity due to the absence of a corporate head. Thirdly, employment showed a slight increase, but the rate was found to be greater during the periods following the final judgment. From a political perspective, this increase can be inferred from a give-and-take tradeoff between corporate employment and the pardon of the corporate head.