• Journal of the Korean Association of Geographic Information Studies
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.63-75
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of CCTV installation empirically in the economic and spatial aspects(crime displacement and diffusion effects of crime control benefits), targeting S city in Korea. In terms of economic effects, caused by CCTV installation(2012 and 2013), cost benefit analysis was conducted by means of CCTV installation costs, crime cases, and crime costs per case. The result shows that there is positive effect of 1.34(34%) in 2012. This is slightly higher than the previous study results in Korea(cost effectiveness 1.32), but a little lower than the USA cases(cost effectiveness 1.49). In the case areas in S city, the result proves that the new CCTV has gained economic profit through the crime reduction, compared to the installation expences. However, the cases in 2013 shows no economic profit effect. Secondly, an analysis was conducted in the spatial aspect(crime displacement and diffusion effects of crime control benefits) by using the analysis tool of crime displacement value called WDQ. The results are summarized as follows: The total crimes in three regions had crime diffusion effect but it was less than the direct effect, while in one region, displacement effect was found, but they were less than direct effect. In the case of theft and violence, CCTV had a positive effect, except for one region. The results of the analysis were totally different. Judging from this difference, it may conclude that the effects of CCTV are different by the types of crimes and the places of crimes. The results of this study is meaningful in that it examined and evaluated the effects of the CCTV by scientific and rational measurement tools where previous studies are not many. In addition, it has policy implication for the validity of CCTV and making effective installation plan for crime reduction and prevention.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.60
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• pp.33-61
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• 2019

It is quite difficult to actually prove the effectiveness of so-called target-hardening, one of the various strategies used to reduce crime, one of the serious problems in society recently. In particular, three to five minutes is often used as golden time for intruders to give up or stop, which is based on foreign and some indirect research cases in Korea, but there were no studies that more directly identified the average break-in operation time or the abandonment time based on the elapsed time when the shield hardware resists intruders. This study was the first of its kind in Korea to investigate and verify samples of 90 inmates of break-in burglars who were imprisoned in August 2018 by profiling the average criminal experience, education level, age, height and weight of typical Korean professional break-in thieves, and specific criminal methods, average break-in operation time, and the criteria for giving up if not breached. According to the analysis results, in the survey on the number of pre-invasion theft crimes by intruders, many of the respondents who participated in the survey were criminals of professional invasions, and by their physical characteristics, there was not much difference from ordinary adult men. Residential facilities were the highest in the world, followed by commercial and educational facilities. According to the survey on the types of facilities that committed intrusion into residential facilities, it was not safe to say that single-family housing accounted for the largest portion of single-family housing, multi-family housing, apartment high-rise (more than three stories), and apartment low-rise (more than one to three stories) among residential facilities, and that the ratio of apartment high-rise was higher than expected. Based on the average time required to break into a place for an intrusion crime, it is assumed that the psychological time worked in a place where the break-in was difficult, since the break-in was not performed while measuring the time of the break-in operation. In the case of time to give up a crime, more than half of the respondents said they would give up the crime even in less than four minutes, suggesting that a significant number of intrusive crimes can be prevented even if the facility has four minutes of intrusion resistance. This proves that most intruders will give up the break-in if the break-in resistance performance of the security facility is exercised for more than five minutes.

• Journal of the Korean Association of Geographic Information Studies
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.64-80
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• 2018

In Korea, citizens can only know general information about crime. Thus it is difficult to know how much they are exposed to crime. If the police can predict the crime risky area, it will be possible to cope with the crime efficiently even though insufficient police and enforcement resources. However, there is no prediction system in Korea and the related researches are very much poor. From these backgrounds, the final goal of this study is to develop an automated crime prediction system. However, for the first step, we build a big data set which consists of local real crime information and urban physical or non-physical data. Then, we developed a crime prediction model through machine learning method. Finally, we assumed several possible scenarios and calculated the probability of crime and visualized the results in a map so as to increase the people's understanding. Among the factors affecting the crime occurrence revealed in previous and case studies, data was processed in the form of a big data for machine learning: real crime information, weather information (temperature, rainfall, wind speed, humidity, sunshine, insolation, snowfall, cloud cover) and local information (average building coverage, average floor area ratio, average building height, number of buildings, average appraised land value, average area of residential building, average number of ground floor). Among the supervised machine learning algorithms, the decision tree model, the random forest model, and the SVM model, which are known to be powerful and accurate in various fields were utilized to construct crime prevention model. As a result, decision tree model with the lowest RMSE was selected as an optimal prediction model. Based on this model, several scenarios were set for theft and violence cases which are the most frequent in the case city J, and the probability of crime was estimated by $250{\times}250m$ grid. As a result, we could find that the high crime risky area is occurring in three patterns in case city J. The probability of crime was divided into three classes and visualized in map by $250{\times}250m$ grid. Finally, we could develop a crime prediction model using machine learning algorithm and visualized the crime risky areas in a map which can recalculate the model and visualize the result simultaneously as time and urban conditions change.

• Journal of Ginseng Culture
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• v.5
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• pp.32-51
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• 2023

Because red ginseng was exported in large quantities to the Qing Dynasty in the 19th century, a large-scale ginseng cultivation complex was established in Kaesong. Sibyunje (時邊制), a privately led loan system unique to merchants in Kaesong, made it possible for them to raise the enormous capital required for ginseng cultivation. The imperial family of the Korean Empire promulgated the Posamgyuchik (包蔘規則) in 1895, and this signaled the start of the red ginseng monopoly system. In 1899, when the invasion of ginseng farms by the Japanese became severe, the imperial soldiers were sent to guard the ginseng farms to prevent the theft of ginseng by the Japanese. Furthermore, the stateled compensation mission, Baesanggeum Seongyojedo (賠償金 先交制度), provided 50%-90% of the payment for raw ginseng, which was paid in advance of harvest. In 1895, rising seed prices prompted some merchants to import and sell poor quality seeds from China and Japan. The red ginseng trade order was therefore promulgated in 1920 to prohibit the import of foreign seeds without the government's permission. In 1906-1910, namely, the early period of Japanese colonial rule, ginseng cultivation was halted, and the volume of fresh ginseng stocked as a raw material for red ginseng in 1910 was only 2,771 geun (斤). However, it increased significantly to 10,000 geun between 1915 and 1919 and to 150,000 geun between 1920 and 1934. These increases in the production of fresh ginseng as a raw material for red ginseng were the result of various policies implemented in 1908 with the aim of fostering the ginseng industry, such as prior disclosure of the compensation price for fresh ginseng, loans for cultivation expenditure in new areas, and the payment of incentives to excellent cultivators. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of Japanese imperialism at the time was not to foster the growth of Korean ginseng farming, but to finance the maintenance of its colonial management using profits from the red ginseng business.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.175-181
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• 2024

The U.N. Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee estimated that the amount of North Korea's cyberattacks on virtual asset-related companies from 2017 to 2023 was about 4 trillion won. North Korea's cyberattacks have secured funds through cryptocurrency hacking as it has been restricted from securing foreign currency due to economic sanctions by the international community, and it also shows the form of technology theft against defense companies, and illegal assets are being used to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and develop nuclear and missile development. When North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, and declared the completion of its national nuclear armament following the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on November 29 of the same year, the U.N. imposed sanctions on North Korea, which are considered the strongest economic sanctions in history. In these difficult economic situations, North Korea tried to overcome the crisis through cyberattacks, but as a result of analyzing the changes through the North's cyber attack cases, the strategic goal from the first period from 2009 to 2016 was to verify and show off North Korea's cyber capabilities through the neutralization of the national network and the takeover of information, and was seen as an intention to create social chaos in South Korea. When foreign currency earnings were limited due to sanctions against North Korea in 2016, the second stage seized virtual currency and secured funds to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and advance nuclear and missile development. The third stage is a technology hacking of domestic and foreign defense companies, focusing on taking over key technologies to achieve the five strategic weapons tasks proposed by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. At the national level, security measures for private companies as well as state agencies should be established against North Korea's cyberattacks, and measures for legal systems, technical problems, and budgets related to science are urgently needed. It is also necessary to establish a system and manpower to respond to the ever-developing cyberattacks by focusing on cultivating and securing professional manpower such as white hackers.