• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.42
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• pp.133-160
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• 2009

In International trade the buyer and seller are normally separated from on another not only by distance but also by differences in language and culture. It is rarely possible for the performance of obligations to be simultaneous and the performance of contracts therefore calls for trust in a situation in which the parties are unlikely to feel able to trust each other unless they have a longstanding and successful relationship. Thus the seller under an international contract of sale will not wish to surrender documents of title to goods to the buyer until he has at least an assurance of payment, and no buyer will wish to pay for goods until he has received them. A gap of distrust thus exists which is often bridged by the undertaking of an intermediary known and trusted by both parties who will undertake on his own liability to pay the seller the contract price in return for the documents of title and then pass the documents to the buyer in return for the reimbursement. This is a common explanation of the theory behind the documentary letter of credit in which the undertaking of a bank of international repute serves as a "guarantee" to each party that the other will perform his obligations. The independence principle, also referred to as the "autonomy principle", is at the core of letter of credit or bank guarantee law. This principle provides that the letter of credit or bank guarantee is independent of the underlying contractual commitment - that is, the transaction that the credit is intented to secure - between the applicant and the beneficiary ; the credit is also independent of the relationship between the bank and its customer, the applicant. The most important exception to the independence principle is the doctrine of fraud in the transaction. A strict interpretation of the rule that the guarantee is independent of the underlying transaction would lead to the conclusion that neither fraud nor manifest abuse of rights by the beneficiary would constitute an objection to payment. There is one major problem related to "Independent guarantees", namely abusive or unfair callings. The beneficiary may make an unfair calling under the guarantee. The countermeasure of beneficiary's unfair calling divided three cases. First, advance countermeasure namely by contract. In other words, when the formation of the contract, the parties must insert the Force Majeure Clause, Arbitration Clause to Contract, and clear statement to the condition for demand calling. Second, post countermeasure namely by court. Many countries, including the United States, authorize the courts to grant an order enjoining the issuer from paying or enjoining the beneficiary from receiving payment under the guaranty letter. Third, Export Insurance. For example, the Export Credit Guarantees Department is prepared, subject to certain conditions, to cover the risk of unfair calling. Of course, KEIC in Korea is cover the risk of the all things for guarantees. On international projects, contractor performance is usually guaranteed by either a standby letters of credit or Independent guarantee. These instruments will be care the parties.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.42
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• pp.163-186
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• 2009

On April 11, 1980, the "United Nations on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" ("CISG") was prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and approved by a diplomatic conference in Vienna providing uniform law for international sales of goods. It took effect as of March 1, 2005, in Korea. It is set forth on the seller's remedies for breach by the buyer Section III (Art. 61 - 65) under the CISG. In this study, the focus is only on the seller's notice fixing additional final period for performance (Art. 63) and the right to avoid the contract (Art. 64), with examination on some relevant foreign arbitral awards rendered by the ICC and the CIETAC together. Article 63 provides that the seller may fix an additional period of time for reasonable length for performance by the buyer of his obligation. It was found from the above arbitral awards that the concept of 'reasonable length' should be decided on a case-by-case basis, given the specific circumstances in the case [Art. 63(1)]. It is provided that unless the seller has received a notice that he will not perform within the period so fixed, the seller may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of contract in accordance with Article 63(2). Article 64(1) provides the means and grounds for avoidance of the contract, which can be avoided 1) when the breach of the buyer amounts to a fundamental breach of contract, or 2) when the additional period of time is fixed by the seller, unless the buyer declares that he will not perform so within the period of fixed time. As we examined in the above arbitral awards, it was held that the contract is avoided when the seller sends the final notice stating that he will avoid the contract, after the expiration of the additional period of time fixed by the seller in the ICC award. On the contrary, it was held that the contract should be deemed to be avoided exactly when the expiration of additional period noted in the avoidance notice is elapsed in the CIETAC award. Article 64(2) sets time limits for avoidance.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.19
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• pp.224-242
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• 2003

The author believes that the main task of study in international trade usage and practice is the management of transactional risks involved in international sale of goods. They are foreign exchange risks, transportation risks, credit risk, risk of miscommunication, etc. In most cases, these risks are more serious and enormous than those involved in domestic sales. Historically, the merchant adventurers organized the voyage abroad, secured trade finance, and went around the ocean with their own or consigned cargo until around the $mid-19^{th}$ century. They did business faceto-face at the trade fair or the open port where they maintained the local offices, so-called "Trading House"(商館). Thererfore, the transactional risks might have been one-sided either with the seller or the buyer. The bottomry seemed a typical arrangement for risk sharing among the interested parties to the adventure. In this way, such organizational arrangements coped with or bore the transactional risks. With the advent of ocean liner services and wireless communication across the national border in the $19^{th}$ century, the business of merchant adventurers developed toward the clear division of labor; sales by mercantile agents, and ocean transportation by the steam ship companies. The international banking helped the process to be accelerated. Then, bills of lading backed up by the statute made it possible to conduct documentary sales with a foreign partner in different country. Thus, FOB terms including ocean freight and CIF terms emerged gradually as standard trade terms in which transactional risks were allocated through negotiation between the seller and the buyer located in different countries. Both of them did not have to go abroad with their cargo. Instead, documentation in compliance with the terms of the contract(plus an L/C in some cases) must by 'strictly' fulfilled. In other words, the set of contractual documents must be tendered in advance of the arrival of the goods at port of discharge. Trust or reliance is placed on such contractual paper documents. However, the container transport services introduced as international intermodal transport since the late 1960s frequently caused the earlier arrival of the goods at the destination before the presentation of the set of paper documents, which may take 5 to 10% of the amount of transaction. In addition, the size of the container vessel required the speedy transport documentation before sailing from the port of loading. In these circumstances, computerized processing of transport related documents became essential for inexpensive transaction cost and uninterrupted distribution of the goods. Such computerization does not stop at the phase of transportation but extends to cover the whole process of international trade, transforming the documentary sales into less-paper trade and further into paperless trade, i.e., EDI or E-Commerce. Now we face the other side of the coin, which is data security and paperless transfer of legal rights and obligations. Unfortunately, these issues are not effectively covered by a set of contracts only. Obviously, EDI or E-Commerce is based on the common business process and harmonized system of various data codes as well as the standard message formats. This essential feature of E-Commerce needs effective coordination of different divisions of business and tight control over credit arrangements in addition to the standard contract of sales. In a few word, information does not alway invite "trust". Credit flows from people, or close organizational tie-ups. It is our common understanding that, without well-orchestrated organizational arrangements made by leading companies, E-Commerce does not work well for paperless trade. With such arrangements well in place, participating E-business members do not need to seriously care for credit risk. Finally, it is also clear that E-International Commerce must be linked up with a set of government EDIs such as NACCS, Port EDI, JETRAS, etc, in Japan. Therefore, there is still a long way before us to go for E-Commerce in practice, not on the top of information manager's desk.