• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
• /
• v.19 no.3
• /
• pp.387-419
• /
• 2021

The challenges facing companies and institutions surrounding civil nuclear decommissioning are diverse and many, none more so than those faced in the United Kingdom. The UK's Generation I nuclear power plants and early research facilities have left a 'Nuclear Legacy' which is in urgent need of management and clean-up. Sellafield is quite possibly the most ill-famed nuclear site in the UK. This complex and challenging site houses much of what is left from the early days of nuclear research in the UK, including early nuclear reactors (Windscale Piles, Calder Hall, and the Windscale Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor) and the UK's early nuclear weapons programme. Such a legacy now requires careful management and planning to safely deal with it. This task falls on the shoulders of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Through a mix of prompt and delayed decommissioning strategies, key developments in R&D, and the implementation of site licenced companies to enact decommissioning activities, the NDA aims to safety, and in a timely manner, deal with the UK's nuclear legacy. Such approaches have the potential to influence and shape other such approaches to nuclear decommissioning activities globally, including in Korea.

• Convergence Security Journal
• /
• v.12 no.2
• /
• pp.99-106
• /
• 2012

March 11, 2010, in Japan located over East Sea of Korea, due to the strong earthquake tsunami, Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was ceased and exploded resulting in leaking radioactive substances. Even though it was an accident happened in a nation, leaked radioactive substances were spread across the world moving along ocean currents and air current. Our nation also had terror and confusion about radioactive rain after the accident, and even though a year has been passed by after the accident, the problem on the radioactive contamination isn't solved. So to speak, nuclear accident of neighboring country is a threat to our nation but not only Japan but also Chinese ocean across the West Sea has nuclear power plants. Beside threat of nuclear accident of neighboring countries, North Korea in military confrontation is the world 3rd country holding chemical and biological weapons and can spray the biological weapons to South Korea at any time like Yeonpyeong-do bombard provocation in November, 2010. The study is the strategy confronting such threats and grafted artificial rain technology which is weather control technology. Since radioactive substances on radioactive accidents and North Korean biological weapons can differ in the density by the weather condition, only artificial rain technology can remove the threat perfectly but it is worth to try as the method to reduce damage and in the aspect of psychology. To use the artificial rain technology in the aspect of national security to acquire the public safety, research institutes such ADD should fulfill active and symbolic technology research development.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.30 no.1
• /
• pp.273-302
• /
• 2015

The term "peaceful uses of outer space" in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty appears in official government statements and multilateral outer space related treaties. However, the examination of the state practice leads to the conclusion that this term is still without an authoritative definition. As far as the meaning of 'peaceful use' in international law is concerned the same phrases in the UN Charter, the 1963 Treaty of Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1956 Statute of IAEA, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 United Nations Conference of the Human Environment were analysed As far as the meaning of 'peaceful uses of outer space' is concerned the same phrases the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques(ENMOD) were studied. According to Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space treaty, states shall not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies repeats in Article III much of the Outer Space Treaty. This article prohibits the threat or use of force or any other hostile act on the moon and the use of the moon to commit such an act in relation to the earth or to space objects. This adds IN principle nothing to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty relating to military space activities. The 1977 ENMOD refers to peaceful purposes in the preamble and in Article III. As far as the UN Resolutions are concerned, the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exp1oration and Use of Outer Space, the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space(NPS) were studied. And as far the Soft Laws are concerned the 2008 Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT), the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Prolifiration(HCoC) and 2012 Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities(ICoC) were studied.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.26 no.2
• /
• pp.203-237
• /
• 2011

Since USSR successfully launched its satellite "Sputnik"in 1957, many countries including US and USSR began military use of space, and engaged in arms race in space, which is against spirit and ideals of peaceful use of space as common heritage of mankind stipulated in many treaties such as Outer Space Treaty. With worsening Cold War between East and Western Bloc, this military use of space and arms race in space has been intensifying. Regarding the ideals of peaceful use of space, it is interpreted that military use of space is possible unless it does not have the purpose of aggression. The military use of space may have diverse forms such as attacking satellites in space, or attacking from satellites, making use of present and future technologies available which should include the use of nuclear and kinetic/hyper-speed weapons, laser, particle beams, near explosion, disturbance weapons in different directions (i.e., surface to space, space to space, and space to surface). Arms control is being implemented by the efforts of many countries in different formalities including legislature of international treaties under the auspices of UNCOPUOS and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. Taking outstanding examples aiming at arms control by international community, there are confidence building measures (CBM), strengthening implementation of existing treaties, partial ban of nuclear tests, countryand regional approach, comprehensive approach and measures having legally binding force. While U.S. has surpassed other countries concerned in the area of military useof space, it withdrew from OST in early 2000s, thereby raising concern of international community. It requires concerted efforts of cooperationand implementation by international society to make sure peace of mankind and environmental conservation through arms control in space. Observing de facto possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea following series of nuclear tests and launching satellites, and efforts of launching rockets by South Korea, it is strongly needed for both countries to take part in arms control efforts by international community.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.34
• /
• pp.236-261
• /
• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
• /
• v.7 no.3
• /
• pp.143-151
• /
• 2009

Due to a more favorable climate in the recent relationship between U.S. and North Korea, North Korea nuclear issue is expected to enter the new phase of nuclear verification. From now on, our government should make preparation for taking the appropriate steps against the situation developed after the declaration by North Korea. Therefore, this paper is to identify the problems that may be occurred in the process of verifying and dismantling North Korea's nuclear program and to suggest the policy considerations that should be incorporated in establishing the action plan for verifying and dismantling her nuclear program, based on the analysis of experiences to verify and dismantle the WMDs in the former Soviet Union and in Iraq, respectively.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
• /
• v.21 no.3
• /
• pp.315-327
• /
• 2023

In South Korea, the exporters of items related to nuclear power generation are diversified. Consequently, there is a risk of illegitimate export by companies failing to recognize the export control system because the awareness about this system for the strategic items among the subcontractors of nuclear power facilities is limited. To prevent illegitimate export of the strategic items, it is necessary to conduct outreach activities regarding the export control system for the related companies. Additionally, the exporters and export license examiners should consider whether an export target is on the Denial List, who may divert the strategic items to weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control developed two systems for controlling illegitimate export of the Trigger List items. The first system, Nuclear Industry Information Collection and Analysis System, can gather information about the key nuclear industries in Korea and analyze the dealing of strategic items. The second system, Denied Persons Information Gathering System, can regularly gather information about the denied persons and provide the updated data to the exporters and regulatory examiners. These two systems can be used for outreach activities and export license examination to prevent illegitimate export of the strategic items.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.31
• /
• pp.57-84
• /
• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.41
• /
• pp.208-231
• /
• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
• /
• v.19 no.6
• /
• pp.120-125
• /
• 2018

Various security threats, such as North Korea's nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile developments, are becoming issues. Considering the current security situation in South Korea, proper selection of weapons and efficient defense acquisition systems are essential. In this paper, we conduct a survey and analysis of the defense core technology necessary for the development of weapons systems, and review whether current defense research and development is carried out efficiently. A theoretical study was conducted on ways to enhance the linkage between defense core technology and weapons systems development. As a result of the study, the necessity for development of weapons systems and the linking of defense core technology planning with the need for institutional improvement in enhanced utilization of defense core technology were derived. We propose a method for a long-term weapons systems concept plan that integrates defense core technology planning with forces planning and pre-project research programs to improve planning efficiency.