• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.179-196
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• 2013

This paper examines the difference in compensation structure between family firms and non-family firms in Korea. A manager's compensation is an important means of motivating a manager to make decisions for shareholders by mitigating conflicts of interest between them. However, the role of a manager's compensation can be weakened in family firms for the following reasons. First, a family member manager has fewer conflicts of interest, compared to a non-family member manager. Second, a family member manager has an intrinsic incentive to increase a firm's value (i.e., family wealth). Finally, a family member manager can monitor non-family member managers more effectively. For the reasons, the agency problem will be less severe in family firms and subsequently the role of compensation will be reduced. The empirical results show that pay-performance sensitivity is smaller in family firms than in non-family firms. The main result is robust to variations such as changes in family ownership, the definition of a family firm, and control variables. Furthermore, this paper compares the pay-performance sensitivity of Chaebol family firms with that of other firms. The result shows that the sensitivity is higher for Chaebol family firms, compared to that in other family firms and non-family firms.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.9-16
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• 2023

This study analyzed the effect of manager's ability on compensation policy (compensation level and performance-reward sensitivity). To this end, the final 14,150 company-year data were used for KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed companies excluding the financial industry from 2012 to 2019. As a result of the empirical analysis, the higher the manager's ability, the higher the next reward level (the manager's ability hypothesis), but the performance-reward sensitivity decreased. This confirms the manager ability hypothesis through a positive (+) relationship between manager ability and compensation, and means that high compensation for manager ability may be additional compensation for manager ability other than performance, rather than due to performance. This study differs from previous studies and has contributions in that it examines the more complex effects of managerial ability and compensation system.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.16 no.10
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• pp.125-132
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of managerial predictive accuracy on managerial performance-compensation. In this study, we compared managerial performance with managerial performance, And to analyze the relationship between manager compensation and manager compensation using managerial profit prediction accuracy. As a result of this study, there is a significant positive relationship between profit prediction accuracy and manager compensation, which can be interpreted as a result of manager's ability to compensate manager's ability to predict the future well. In this paper, we propose a new methodology that can be used to analyze the effects of managerial compensation on managerial compensation. This is because there is a difference in that it is proved to be a factor. Therefore, it is important to note that the prediction of the future of the company also identifies the additional determinants that affect manager compensation contracts with the key managerial capabilities.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.12
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• pp.321-329
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• 2021

A measure of managerial ability was derived using DEA, a measure of management efficiency, and the correlation coefficient between discretionary accrual and non-discretionary accrual, net income and operating cash flow standard deviation was used as a proxy for income smoothing. verified. In addition, the manager's compensation was used by taking the natural logarithm of the cash compensation per manager. The analysis results are summarized as follows. The analysis period for hypothesis testing is from 2004 to 2017, as a result of the hypothesis analysis of the correlation with the level of manager's compensation, it was suggested that the income smoothing behavior decreased the performance-based compensation and increased the performance-controlled compensation. This can be said to be the result of indirectly confirming that additional compensation is differentially paid for income smoothing. This study has a contribution to the study by empirically analyzing whether income smoothing affects the relationship between managerial ability and managerial compensation. However, although a number of previous studies empirically analyzed that there are upper and lower bounds for manager compensation, there is limitations that could not be analyzed for asymmetric compensation due to income smoothing is expected to expand.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.107-114
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• 2019

This study analyzes the effect of the accuracy of future management performance, which managers voluntarily announce in the previous year's disclosure, on managers compensation. In the case of a company that disclosed the bad news in the previous year, the ability to predict uncertain future will be more important, and expects executives with better predictability to receive more compensation. The results of this study show that there is a significant negative(-) relationship between the accuracy of the manager's earnings forecast and the performance - compensation of the firms that disclosed the bad news in the previous year. The accuracy of the manager's disclosure is important, and it is confirmed that the manager's compensation increases as the incentive of the manager's effort to reduce future uncertainty. The results of this study are as follows: there is a positive relationship between the managerial performance and the managerial competence of managers. It is important to note that there is a difference and that we have identified additional determinants of the manager compensation contract.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.20 no.11
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• pp.105-112
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• 2022

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of the reporting earnings strategy on the relationship between managerial ability and manager performance-reward sensitivity. Both upward and downward adjustments can occur in the direction of management performance adjustment according to the manager's reporting earnings strategy. was found to decrease performance-based performance-reward sensitivity. The underreporting strategy is hypothesized that, although additional compensation is paid for the performance of the reporting strategy according to the manager's ability, the level of compensation increases, but this type of compensation will decrease the performance-reward sensitivity because this type of compensation is irrelevant to the actual performance of the manager. This is the result of indirectly confirming that discriminatory compensation is provided for upward and downward adjustment of business performance according to the reporting earnings strategy.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.5
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• pp.393-400
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• 2022

In a situation where the company handles accounting conservatively, the management's earnings forecasting information will be more conservative, and the conservativeness of this earnings forecasting information will have a differential effect in evaluating the performance of managers and paying compensation. This study aims to examine how the level of corporate accounting conservatism affects the forecast information of managers and how this affects the compensation of managers. This study establishes a hypothesis on the effect of the level of accounting conservatism on the earnings forecasting information and compensation of managers, and examines the relationship between managerial profit forecasting information & manager compensation according of conservatism in corporate accounting that can vary depending on the manager's disposition. As a result of the analysis, conservative managers are also conservative in earnings forecasting disclosure, and when corporate managers are highly conservative, they show their ability by making earnings forecasts disclosures more frequently and more accurately than corporate managers with low conservatism. It will help reduce the forecasting errors of stakeholders. Therefore, it is expected that this will play an important role in judging the manager's ability and determining compensation. Therefore, when a company handles accounting conservatively, management's earnings forecasts are also measured conservatively, which is expected to provide useful information on the basis and form of management's compensation to stakeholders.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.187-207
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• 2018

This study examines the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation and examines whether their relationship increases as managerial incentive compensation intensity increases. For this purpose, a total of 2,755 company-years were selected for the analysis of the companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from December 2012 to 2016 as the final sample. The results of this study are as follows. First, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between accounting conservatism and manager overpayment. This implies that managers' incentives to distort future cash flow estimates by over booking assets or accounting profits in order to maximize their compensation when manager compensation is linked to firm performance. In this sense, accounting conservatism can reduce opportunistic behavior by restricting managerial accounting choices, which can be interpreted as a reduction in overpayment to managers. Second, we found that the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation increases with the incentive compensation for accounting performance. The higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity of accounting performance is, the more likely it is that the manager has the incentive to make earnings adjustments. Therefore, the high level of incentive compensation for accounting performance means that the ex post settling up problem due to over-compensation can become serious. In this case, the higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity for accounting performance, the greater the role and utility of conservatism in manager compensation contracts. This study is based on the fact that it presents empirical evidence on the usefulness of accounting conservatism in managerial compensation contracts theoretically presented by Watts (2003) and the additional basis that conservatism can be used as a useful tool for investment decision.

• Journal of Korean Society of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.64-77
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• 2022

Objectives: The purpose of this study is to objectify the level of case management performance and the factors influencing performance, to improve the case management performance at the Korea Worker's Compensation & Welfare Service (KWCWS) on the basis of the recognition of the objective realities of case management by job coordinators at the KWCWS, to develop a model of case management fit for the KWCWS, and to provide a basis for establishing guidelines for standardized case management. Methods: A total of 156 questionnaires were distributed to job coordinators at the KWCWS's headquarters, six regional headquarters, and 55 branches. One hundred forty-one questionnaires were collected and 126 were analyzed statistically using SPSS 21.0. Factor analysis and reliability analysis were conducted to verify the validity and reliability of the main measurement items in the research model. Frequency analysis was conducted for general characteristics of survey subjects. Frequency analysis or descriptive statistics were conducted to identify the level of independent variables (case manager's individual variables, job variables, institutional and organizational variables). Dependent variables (case management performance) and the degree of correlation were analyzed through correlation analysis between research variables. Multiple regression analysis and hierarchical regression analysis were conducted to examine the effect of independent variables on case management performance. Results: The results of the study showed that the level of overall performance in the five stages of case management was ordinary, with an average level of 3.45 on a 5-point scale. Levels of performance by step were institutional approach and intake (3.69), assessment (3.63), goal setting and intervention planning (3.46), implementation of intervention plan (3.32), and evaluation and termination (3.20), in that order. The explanatory power of case management performance (overall) by case managers with the KWCWS was case manager's institutional and organizational variables, job variables, and individual variables, in that order. At each stage of case management, the explanatory power of a case manager's institutional and organizational variables was found to be the greatest. The model changes at each stage of case management assume similar aspects statistically. In hierarchical regression analysis, it was institutional support that had a significant effect on case management performance (overall), and institutional support had the greatest effect. The results of multiple regression analysis in which all variables are input simultaneously showed that institutional support and expertise as well as self-efficacy had a positive effect. However, case management work experience, expertise (technology), and autonomy were found to have a negative effect during the stage of case management performance. Conclusions: As a result of the study, it was confirmed that raising the case manager's expertise and support from the institution and organization are important factors to improve the level of case management performance. The research also derived practical ways of reinforcement of case manager capacity, institutional and organizational support, operation of rehabilitation-case management teams, and occupational health-related aspects.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.102-111
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• 2013

During the administration of a construction project, various types of participants are engaged in the project. From the design phase to the maintenance phase, these participants may confront many risks. To avoid these risks, participants should utilize an insurance company or a bond company. The types of risks and liability that a construction manager may face are listed in the construction law or contract. But there are some arguments related to risk transferring and the content of risks. For this reason, construction managers must carefully consider any possible risks in the contract and the construction law. Therefore, for construction managers to deal with risks appropriately, the introduction of a legal requirement to carry professional liability insurance, a defined compensation range for damages, a method of guarantee in the event of defects, a defined compensation claim period for damage, and a method of damage claim were suggested in this study.