Journal of Digital Convergence (디지털융복합연구)

The Society of Digital Policy and Management (한국디지털정책학회)
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Moderating effects of Income Smoothing on the relationship between managerial ability and manager compensation

경영자 능력과 경영자 보상의 관련성에 이익유연화가 미치는 조절효과

  • Lee, Eun-Ju (Department of Financial & Tax Accounting, Busan University of Foreign Studies) ;
  • Hwang, Sung-Jun (Business School, Pusan National University)
  • 이은주 (부산외국어대학교 세무회계학과) ;
  • 황성준 (부산대학교 경영학)
  • Received : 2021.11.19
  • Accepted : 2021.12.20
  • Published : 2021.12.28
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Abstract

A measure of managerial ability was derived using DEA, a measure of management efficiency, and the correlation coefficient between discretionary accrual and non-discretionary accrual, net income and operating cash flow standard deviation was used as a proxy for income smoothing. verified. In addition, the manager's compensation was used by taking the natural logarithm of the cash compensation per manager. The analysis results are summarized as follows. The analysis period for hypothesis testing is from 2004 to 2017, as a result of the hypothesis analysis of the correlation with the level of manager's compensation, it was suggested that the income smoothing behavior decreased the performance-based compensation and increased the performance-controlled compensation. This can be said to be the result of indirectly confirming that additional compensation is differentially paid for income smoothing. This study has a contribution to the study by empirically analyzing whether income smoothing affects the relationship between managerial ability and managerial compensation. However, although a number of previous studies empirically analyzed that there are upper and lower bounds for manager compensation, there is limitations that could not be analyzed for asymmetric compensation due to income smoothing is expected to expand.

본 연구의 목적은 경영자 능력과 경영자 보상 사이의 관련성에 이익유연화가 미치는 효과에 초점을 두고 분석해 보고자 하였다. 경영효율성의 측정치인 DEA를 사용하여 경영자 능력에 대한 측정치를 도출하였으며, 이익유연화를 측정의 대리변수로 재량적 발생액과 비재량적발생액의 상관계수, 당기순이익 및 영업현금흐름의 표준편차를 사용하여 검증하였다. 또한 경영자 보상은 경영자 1인당 현금보상에 자연로그를 취하여 사용하였다. 가설검증을 위한 분석 기간은 2004년부터 2017년으로 실증분석결과 이익유연화 행위가 성과를 기반으로 한 보상은 감소시키며 성과를 통제한 경영자 보상은 증가시킨다는 결과를 제시하여 본 연구의 가설을 지지하는 결과로 나타났다. 이는 이익유연화에 대해서 차별적으로 추가적인 보상이 지급됨을 간접적으로 확인한 결과라고 할 수 있다. 본 연구는 경영자 능력과 경영자 보상간의 관련성에 이익유연화가 영향을 미치는 지를 실증적으로 분석하였다는데 연구의 공헌도가 있다. 그러나 다수의 선행연구에서 경영자 보상에는 상한과 하한 구간이 존재함을 실증 분석하였으나, 이익유연화로 인한 비대칭적 보상에 대하여 분석하지 못한 한계점이 존재하므로, 향후 연구에서 풍부한 실증결과를 바탕으로 연구가 확장되길 기대한다.

Keywords

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