• 전기학회논문지
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• 제59권12호
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• pp.2150-2156
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• 2010

In this paper, we investigate how an electricity capacity market design may encourage generators to exaggerate their available capacity. In order for an analytical approach, a two player game model is introduced. We focus on two pure strategy Nash equilibria: an equilibrium at which generators offer their true capacities, and an equilibrium at which generators offer exaggerated capacities. The latter case is caused by asymmetries of information between players and so called 'moral hazard' in terms of the economics literature. This paper shows that, considering practical electricity markets, the moral hazard case is highly probable. Moreover, it is shown that, with the considered capacity market design in the real world, the better the electricity energy market performs, the higher the risk of moral hazard becomes.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.1-19
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• 1995

In this paper, we analyze an M / M / 1 queueing system where there are incentive conflicts among customers. Self-interested customers' decisions whether to join the system or not may not necessarily induce a socially optimal congestion level. As a way to alleviate the over-congestion, toll imposition was used in Naor's paper [3]. Instead of using a toll mechanism, we study the usefulness of imperfect information on system state (queue size, for example) as a way to reduce the over-congestion by self-interested customers. The main conclusion of this paper is that by purposefully giving fuzzy or imperfect information on the current queue size we can improve the congestion in the system. This result might look contradictory to rough intuition since perfect information should give better performance than imperfect information. We show how this idea is verified. In deriving this result, we use the concept of Nash equilibrium (pure and mixed strategy) as introduced in game theory. In some real situations, using imperfect information is easier to apply than imposing a toll, and thus the result of this paper has practical implications.

• Journal of Astronomy and Space Sciences
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.107-122
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• 2002

Multi-body spacecraft attitude and configuration control formulations based on the use of collaborative control theory are considered. The control formulations are based on two-player, nonzero-sum, differential game theory applied using a Nash strategy. It is desired that the control laws allow different components of the multi-body system to perform different tasks. For example, it may be desired that one body points toward a fixed star while another body in the system slews to track another satellite. Although similar to the linear quadratic regulator formulation, the collaborative control formulation contains a number of additional design parameters because the problem is formulated as two control problems coupled together. The use of the freedom of the partitioning of the total problem into two coupled control problems and the selection of the elements of the cross-coupling matrices are specific problems ad-dressed in this paper. Examples are used to show that significant improvement in performance, as measured by realistic criteria, of collaborative control over conventional linear quadratic regulator control can be achieved by using proposed design guidelines.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권4호
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2006년도 제37회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.384-385
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• 2006

현재와 같은 경쟁적 전력수급 시장에서 경쟁력을 확보하기 위해서는 모든 발전사업자는 이득 극대화를 위한 전략이 필요할 것이다. 이에 여러 발전 방식 중에서도 타 에너지원의 발전설비보다 에너지원의 생산, 저장, 소비 등 다양한 전략이 가능한 양수발전을 선택하여 효과적인 대응 방안을 찾아보고자 한다. 본 논문에서는 발전 경쟁 시장 체제하에서 동적 게임이론을 적용하여, 양수발전을 소유한 발전 사업자의 최적 입찰 전략 알고리즘을 제시한다.

• 한국국방경영분석학회지
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• 제31권1호
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• pp.107-121
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• 2005

In this study, a new fictitious play (FP) procedure is presented to solve two-person zero-sum (TPZS) Blotto games. The FP solution procedure solves TPZS games by assuming that the two players take turns selecting optimal responses to the opponent's strategy observed so far. It is known that FP converges to an optimal solution, and it may be the only realistic approach to solve large games. The algorithm uses dynamic programming (DP) to solve FP subproblems. Efficiency is obtained by limiting the growth of the DP state space. Blotto games are frequently used to solve simple missile defense problems. While it may be unlikely that the models presented in this paper can be used directly to solve realistic offense and defense problems, it is hoped that they will provide insight into the basic structure of optimal and near-optimal solutions to these important, large games, and provide a foundation for solution of more realistic, and more complex, problem

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2004년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.701-703
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• 2004

Although the electricity market structure worldwide may be different in kinds, there generally exists long-term forward market and short-term spot market. Particularly, the bilateral contract in long-term forward market fixes the price between a genco and a customer so that the customer can avoid risks due to price-spike in spot market. The genco also can make an efficient risk-hedge strategy through this bilateral contract. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for evaluating the optimal bilateral contract price using game theory. This mechanism makes a customer reveal his/her own willingness to purchase electricity so that a fair bilateral contract price can be derived.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• 한국데이타베이스학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국데이타베이스학회 2010년도 춘계국제학술대회
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• pp.223-234
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• 2010

This study is aimed at proposing a new research model in which application store intention to acceptance influence factors (i.e.. facilitating condition, mobile computing self-efficacy, service compatibility, and system quality) affect TAM (i.e., perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use) positively, leading to application store intention to acceptance eventually. This study developed a research model to explain the use of Apple's App Store, and collected 228 survey responses from the undergraduate students who had experiences with such application store services as game and personal information management application download. To prove the validity of the proposed research model, PLS analysis is applied with valid 228 questionnaires. By employing PLS technique, the measurement reliability and validity of research variables are tested and the path analysis is conducted to do the hypothesis testing. In brief, the finding of this study suggests that application store intention to acceptance influence factors affect TAM positively, and application store intention to acceptance as well.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• 제27권2호
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• pp.37-50
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• 2020

This paper is very exploratory and addresses the issue 'Is a general quality model of software possible?'. If possible, how specific can/should it be?' ISO 25000 Series SQuaRE is generally regarded as a general quality model which can be applied to most kinds of software. Usability is one of the 8 characteristics of SQuaRE's Product Quality Model. It is the main issue associated with SQuaRE's Quality in Use Model too. it is the most important concept associated software quality since using is the only ultimate goal of software products. Playability, however, is generally regarded as a special type of usability, which can be applied to game software. This common idea contradicts with the idea that SQuaRE is valid for most kinds, at least many kinds, of software. The empirical evidences of this paper show that SQuaRE is too specific to be a general quality model of software.