• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.129-153
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• 2015

Mandatory shutdown policy of the juvenile protection act was enforced in December 2011 to prevent game addiction of the youth. However, the size of game market in Korea seems to be reduced significantly after implementation of the shutdown policy. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of current government regulations on Korean online game market. Based on empirical evidences and results from the related literature, we developed several causal loop diagrams(CLD) and system dynamics models. The CLD include sub-diagrams of innovation processes, user commitments, and operational costs. We conducted simulation analyses under various policy scenarios, adopting Normalized Unit Modelling By Elementary Relationship(NUMBER). Our results show that first, the impact of time regulation on the number of users is greater than the impact of content regulation. Second, the quality of domestic online game appears more elastic to regulations than the quality of foreign online game. The results of this study suggest that the deregulation in Korean online game market can narrow the gap in market outcomes between domestic and foreign online games. Some recommendations for future study are suggested.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.27-38
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to analyze the game dynamics of 'Battle Royale' genre and how these dynamics create dramatic tension, focused on . Battle Royale games maintain the dramatic tension through the intersection of uncertainty and inevitability. Uncertainty is reinforced by randomness of the game world and hidden information of player statement. Inevitability is emerged from the level design with choke point, and restriction of playable field over time. From this mechanism, Battle Royale genre establishes the gameness which derives player's meaningful choice and maintains player's tension until the end of the game.

• The Research Journal of the Costume Culture
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.154-168
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• 2019

The present study investigated fashion Instagram marketing, applying the concept of gamification. It set out to examine the following specific issues: 1) perceptions of flow, pleasures, dimensions of game dynamics (challenge, competition, achievement, reward, relationships among participants, and relationships between brands and consumers), and consumer responses based on frequency and involvement in exercise; 2) the effects of game dynamics dimensions on flow and pleasure; and 3) the effects of flow and pleasure on consumer responses. An online survey was used to gather data and the study analyzed a total of 200 responses. The results of the study were as follows. Perception differences were found only in relation to exercise involvement. Competition, relationships among participants, and relationships between brands and customers positively predicted flow. Among the dimensions of game dynamics, challenge, competition, reward, relationships among participants, and relationships between brands and consumers positively influenced pleasure. In addition, the study also found that pleasure and flow had positive effects on intention to participate and brand loyalty. Meanwhile, only pleasure predicted word-of-mouth. These findings suggest that fashion brands implementing Instagram as a marketing channel should seek to stimulate pleasure and fun to provoke positive consumer responses. Furthermore, the findings of the study provide practical and useful insights for fashion brands implementing Instagram marketing.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.5-14
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• 2018

Nowadays, game development of new genres continues through convergence among existing genres, and the games of this hybrid-genre are gaining popularity around the world. Following this trend, it is meaningful to analyze the characteristic contents of the existing genre for more effective genre fusion. In this paper, in the genre of survival game, a genre of digital game, we would like to select a representative survival game for analysis of survival content, which is a key goal and core of the game, to identify common and differentiated features. For this purpose, we have studied game mechanics and game dynamic components around the contents of the survival game, based on the MDA framework.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.61-89
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• 2000

The purpose of this study is first, to find out what factors affect the cooperation and trust within the functions in the policy implementation network and in what mechanism these factors interact, second to investigate the whys to manage trust and cooperation successfully in the dynamic situation such as the network setting. For these purpose, this study reviews the concept and characteristics of policy implementation organizations, second, extracts the various factors affecting trust and cooperation in the network situation, third applies and analyzes the relationship among factors to system dynamics model based on the game theory. The results of this study could be summarized as follows: It was found that the utility change within the participants by persuasion ＆ mutual understanding and change of rule would be leading to success in policy implementation network. Also bureaucratic management such as power enforcement does not have any good impact in the managing network. In this study, system simulation method tried to analyze the hypothesis. Quantitative and case analyses were not accompanied and analysis was limited to two-person game theory. So there is some doubt this results could be generalized to actual situation which is N-person game.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.175-197
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• 2004

The research studies the classic beer game simulation model from a new perspective. It does so by providing each agent with two ordering policies, and creating a set of rules that allow an agent to change its policy. Such a change is triggered based on an agent's confidence in their own performance, and on the relative confidence of their nearest neighbour. The overall effect is that policy diffusion can occur, where, under certain circumstances, an agent will mimic the behaviour of its neighbour, if it believes that its neighbour is performing better. The motivation behind this research is to provide an experimental base upon which the decision making strategies of business agent can be studied.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.43-52
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• 2009

This paper analyzes the four game physics engines in terms of real time techniques. Real time physics is the technology that simplifies the physics-based simulation to apply for the real time applications such as game. Our study includes two commercial physics engines, Havok's Physics SDK and NVIDIA's PhysX SDK, and two open source projects, Open Dynamics Engine and Bullet physics engine. As a result, most of them covers rigid body dynamics and some include either deformable body simulation or fluids simulation, or both. For real time simulation, they adopt the simplified numerical methods, the effective in collision detection/response, and also use the parallel processing hardwares, i.e., multi core CPU, Physics processing unit(PPU), or graphics processing unit(GPU).

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.6 no.12
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• pp.3133-3151
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• 2012

The optimal price strategy selection of two bounded rational cognitive mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in a duopoly spectrum sharing market is investigated. The bounded rational operators dynamically compete to sell the leased spectrum to secondary users in order to maximize their profits. Meanwhile, the secondary users' heterogeneous preferences to rate and price are taken into consideration. The evolutionary game theory (EGT) is employed to model the dynamic price strategy selection of the MVNOs taking into account the response of the secondary users. The behavior dynamics and the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the operators are derived via replicated dynamics. Furthermore, a reward and punishment mechanism is developed to optimize the performance of the operators. Numerical results show that the proposed evolutionary algorithm is convergent to the ESS, and the incentive mechanism increases the profits of the operators. It may provide some insight about the optimal price strategy selection for MVNOs in the next generation cognitive wireless networks.