• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.181-189
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• 2001

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies and applications has led to a new form of market place known as the electronic store. In this paper, we study competition between two shopping channels, an electronic store and traditional retailers. Based on the circular spatial market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the efficiency of the electronic store. The result shows that the Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium for both channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the electronic store has incentive to decrease its efficiency to gain more profit.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.147-164
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• 2008

When measuring the value of environmental attributes of housing, the conventional Hedonic Pricing Method assumes market equilibrium. Thus each attribute is believed to be implicitly valued based on the market price. The revealed preference is the basic logic in this approach. However, if the participants in the housing market are not perfectly informed or feel vagueness regarding the attributes of the housing, the conventional Hedonic Pricing Approach could not provide relevant value of the attribute in question. A Fuzzy Regression Method is suggested to handle with the lack of information or preference uncertainty problem m the Hedonic Pricing Approach. In this paper, our main concern IS given to the fuzziness effect on the airport noise in the metropolitan areas of South Korea.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.277-288
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• 2005

The proliferation of the internet technologies and applications has intensified business activities on the Internet. This study considered the price competition between two shopping channels, one on-line seller and the other traditional off-line retailer. Based on the Hotelling's linear market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the cost parameters which represent the characteristics of the online and off-line channels. By analyzing the equilibrium solutions, the following significant findings were obtained. First, pricing by Stackelberg equilibrium always outperformed that of Nash equilibrium. However the value of the cost parameters played a crucial role in determining both channels' preferred position (price leader or follower). Second, the online seller could benefit more in terms of profit by lowering its efficiency when its efficiency belongs to a certain interval. Third, when the online seller's efficiency is low, lowering its delivery cost has no contribution to its profit. To benefit more from lowering its delivery cost, increasing its channel efficiency to a certain level should be preceded.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.74-85
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• 2013

We analyze the efficiency of congestion pricings and transit subsidies in the spatial micro-economic model based on a general equilibrium environment. In this setting, we decompose the total welfare change into component factors and identify the reason of the change in the efficiency caused by policy instruments; these component factors are divided into indirect factors and direct factors including of origin-destination and mode choices. We set up the model as adding mode choice to the standard format in the fashion of Anas and Kim (1996) and extend the methodology proposed by Yu and Rhee (2011) and Rhee (2012) for deriving theoretical and analytical solution. Most of welfare gain comes from the modal shift from car to bus. The relative efficiency of subsidies in relation to the first-best pricing is lower than it of congestion pricings although the change in bus share by subsidies is similar to it by congestion pricing. Subsidies give rise to more modal shift from a car to a bus for long-distance commuting than it caused by congestion pricings. As the increase of bus share for long-distance commuting leads to the increase of cross-commuters passing through CBD, the welfare gain by subsidies is lower than it by congestion pricings.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.165-208
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• 1991

This paper develops an intertemporal general equilibrium model of asset pricing with taxes under the noisy and the incomplete information structure and examines theoretically the stochastic behavior of general equilibrium asset prices in a one-good, production, and exchange economy in continuous time markets. The important features of the model are its integration of real and financial markets and the analysis of the effects of differential tax rates between ordinary income and capital gains. The model developed here can provide answers to a wide variety of questions about stochastic structure of asset prices and the effect of tax on them.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.34 no.6
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• pp.510-522
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• 2016

In studies involving public transport, social welfare improvement is simply explained by the increase in public transport demand. However, the increase in the demand for public transport is mostly observed by the change in the frequency of public transport service, and in-vehicle crowding in public transport has not been an object of concern. This study examines and tries to reveal the cause of the changes of the social welfare and in-vehicle crowding of the changing public transport from imposing congestion pricing. We observe that congestion pricing increases in-vehicle crowding in public transport. This predictable phenomenon is more exacerbated in case of not operating bus-only lane. It should be noted that in-vehicle crowding is more increased in suburban, but in First-best toll system it tends to get worse less than it in other congestion pricing systems. We identify that the change of in-vehicle crowding is affected by the change of proximity of the housing to workplace, the number of commuting trips, and unpredictable distortion effect of the congestion charge.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.9
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• pp.4166-4182
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• 2018

We consider the Device-to-Device (D2D) communications in cellular networks where each cellular user (CU) shares the same resource with multiple D2D users (DUs). In this paper, we aim to maximize the energy efficiency (EE) of the D2D networks, subject to an interference constraint required by the CU. Since the cellular and D2D communications belong to different networks, we consider to incentivize base station (BS) while assisting the DUs. To this end, we propose a Stackelberg game based interference pricing framework for the considered D2D communications in cellular networks. Unlike most of the existing methods, we use interference pricing framework to jointly address the EE resource allocation problem and the interference management in our networks rather than only improve the EE of the DUs or protect cellular networks. In particular, BS and all the users do not need all channel state information, which is more realistic in practice. In addition, two different pricing strategies are also proposed. Based on the two strategies, we analyze the equilibrium of the game. Moreover, in the first strategy, the upper and lower boundaries of the interference price are obtained. The closed-form expression is gained with a backward induction for the second strategy. Both offer valuable insights to the considered scenarios. Finally, compared with the existing work, the EE of the D2D communications is significantly improved. The advantageous performance of our scheme are demonstrated by the simulation results.

• Journal of Korean Society of Water and Wastewater
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.100-114
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• 1996

Besides insufficient water, water contamination confronts us with 'water crises' of both quantity and quality. However, the daily water consumption per capita of Korea is greater than that of other developed countries. Because of the current low water price, which is lower than a half of production cost, not only does it become difficult to cope promptly with rapidly increasing water demand and water contamination, but it also causes waste of water. We should, therefore, switch over from supply side management-oriented policy to demand side management-oriented policy through a raise of the water rate. This study carries out a cost analysis based on fair return method which is the principle of water pricing in Korea, and it estimates, through equilibrium analysis, long run marginal cost(LRMC), which satisfies allocative efficiency and reflects true social cost to additional one-unit water supply. Based on the results, this study proposes that the estimated LRMC is the optimal price level in water pricing, which is the most important of the demand side management policies. In the end, water conservation effect, price pervasive effect, and social welfare effect are analyzed.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.207-223
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• 2013

Revenue management (RM) has been widely used to model products characterized as perishable. Classical RM model assumed that price is the sole factor in the model. Thus price adjustment becomes a crucial and costly factor in business. In this paper, an optimal pricing model is developed based on minimization of soft customer cost, one kind of price adjustment cost and is solved by Lagrange multiplier method. It is formed by expected discounted revenue/bid price integrating quantity-based RM and pricing-based RM. Quantity-based RM consists of two capacity models, namely, booking limit and overbooking. Booking limit, built by assuming uncertain customer arrival, decides the optimal capacity allocation for two market segments. Overbooking determines the level of accepted order exceeding capacity to anticipate probability of cancellation. Furthermore, pricing-based RM models occupancy/demand rate influenced by internal and competitor price changes. In this paper, a mathematical model based on game theoretic approach is developed for two conditions of deterministic and stochastic demand. Based on the equilibrium point, the best strategy for both hotels can be determined.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.183-192
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• 2014

This paper proposes a payment-based power control scheme using non-cooperative game with a novel pricing function in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). The proposed algorithm considers the fairness of power control among second users (SUs) where the value of per SU' signal to noise ratio (SINR) or distance between SU and SU station is used as reference for punishment price setting. Due to the effect of uncertainty fading environment, the system is unable to get the link gain coefficient to control SUs' transmission power accurately, so the quality of service (QoS) requirements of SUs may not be guaranteed, and the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) is not ensured. Therefore, an alternative iterative scheme with sliding model is presented for the non-cooperative power control game algorithm. Simulation results show that the pricing policy using SUs' SINR as price punishment reference can improve total throughput, ensure fairness and reduce total transmission power in CRNs.