• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.5
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• pp.214-219
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• 2006

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.25-35
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• 2005

This paper describes the mechanism for new investment to appear in waves of boom and bust causing alternative periods of over and under supply of electricity in Korean market. A system dynamics model was developed to describe the dynamic behavior of new investment in Korean market. The simulation results show the boom and bust cycle in the new investments. When the market price is high, investors decide to build new power plants. However, it takes some delay time to complete new power plants. When the new power plants are being added into the grid, the supply increases and the wholesale price begins to decrease. This causes the cancellation of new power plant or delay the construction. This mechanism causes the boom and bust cycle in new investment.

• 한국신재생에너지학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2008.05a
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• pp.87-90
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• 2008

Levelized generation cost(LGC) has been widely used in assessing feed-in tariffs(FiT) for electricity generating from new and renewable energies. Current FiTs for renewable electricity in Korea have been fixed and applied with realistic economic data by the efforts of KERI(Korea Electrotechnology Research Institute) since October 2006. Some critical issues on the estimation of LGC are, however, found in KERI's report. Major issues are the estimation of capital cost, the consideration of corporate tax, and the application of economic life cycle in the formulae for LGC. These critical issues are examined and interpreted in a correct way in this paper.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.12
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• pp.2143-2149
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• 2010

Market price and curtailment amounts of the Demand Resource Market(DRM) are determined by competition between electricity consumers. An important aspect of the DRM involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. This paper presents economic equilibrium models for simulating imperfect competition among electricity consumers in the DRM and analyzes the models at Nash Equilibrium of Game Theory. The proposed demand functions and supply functions of DRM are based on the Demand Resource Market Rules in Korean electricity market. Simulation results show that the models are adequate for obtaining Nash Equilibrium of consumers' competitive curtailment.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.64 no.7
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• pp.1125-1129
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• 2015

Increasing peak load is one of the major concerns about operation of urban railroad systems. Since ESSs (Energy Storage Systems) have a great potential for shaving the peak load, there has been a growing interest in the use of ESS for peak load reduction. Also, ESS can be optimally scheduled to minimize the electricity purchasing cost under a given ToU (Time-of-Use) tariff by taking advantage of electricity price difference between peak and off-peak time. This paper presents a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP)-based ESS scheduling method to minimize the electricity purchasing cost under a ToU tariff for an urban railroad system.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.10
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• pp.616-623
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry, The trading system in an electricity market has been one of the most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper deals with comparisons of the major two types of the trading system: compulsory pool market and bilateral contract market. The two trading systems are compared quantitatively from the viewpoint of consumer's surplus and social welfare, This paper, also, proposes a unified model of Cournot and Bertrand for analyzing the mixed trading system of pool market and bilateral contract market. Nash equilibrium of the unified model is derived by criteria for participating in bilateral contract market. Numerical results from a sample case show that a mixed trading system of pool market and price-competitive bilateral market is beneficial to consumer from the view points of consumer's surplus.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.59-66
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• 2002

The vertically integrated power industry was divided into six generation companies and one market operator, where electricity trading was launched at power exchange. In this environment, the profits of each generation companies are guaranteed according to utilizing strategies of their own generation equipments. This paper presents on generator maintenance scheduling and efficient bidding strategies for generation equipments through the calculation of the contract and the application of each generator cost function based on the past demand forecasting error and market operating data.

• Nuclear industry
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• v.5 no.11 s.33
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• pp.39-45
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• 1985

In some parts of Canada, such as Ontario, the choice between nuclear and coal is clear : the economics, environmental, and public health effects all favour nuclear. It is recognized that the economics of coal depend largely on the price of coal, which in

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.47-52
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• 2003

This paper presents a schematic process based on the method of eliminating dominated strategies to obtain the optimal bidding strategy Pursuing the Nash equilibrium Point. The Proposed approach is demonstrated for a bidding game in a generation competitive market with 2-dimensional bidding strategy vectors constituting a price-quantity strategy curve.