The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A (대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A)

The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers (대한전기학회)
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Analysis on Incomplete Information in an Electricity Market using Game Theory

게임이론을 이용한 전력시장 정보의 불완비성 해석

  • Published : 2006.05.01
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Abstract

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.

Keywords

References

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