• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

South Korea should not be in subordinate position in international relationships like the past. As the status of middle power. South Korea achieves peaceful unification through overcoming North Korea's nuclear and conventional threats, and builds military power in Northeast Asia as a 'balancer'. This can firstly be achieved by constructing "attack systems triad". 'attack systems triad' can be established through integrating the C41SR as a common strategy for the purposes of preemptive deterrence and retaliatory deterrence against the dangers of the present and the future. Second, denial deterrence can be achieved by establishing "defense system triad" by combining common military power and defensive weapon system. Finally, development of independent advanced technological strategies can be achieved by building defense industry and combination of research and development through constructing "Infra triad". As for constructing and reinforcing the future of the ROK military, a unilateral principle and policy efforts to achieve the aforementioned force construction models are needed. This can only be achieved through the government's national vision to take on the role of mediator and a basis founded upon the consensus of the public.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.109-124
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• 2009

Background: This study aimed to examine whether cases of punishing false claimants threat general physicians to check their medical cost claims with care to avoid being suspected, and identify empirically general deterrence effects of the on-site investigation system in the Korean National Health Insurance. Methods: 800 clinics were selected among a total of 15,443 clinics that had no experience of on-site investigation until June 2007 using a stratified proportional systematic sampling method. We conducted logistic multiple regression to examine the association between factors related to provider's perception of on-site investigation and high level of perceived deterrence referring to fear of punishment after adjusting provider's service experiences and general characteristics. Results: The probability of high perceived deterrence was higher 1.7 times (CI: 1.13-2.56), 2.73 times (CI: 1.68-4.45) each among clinics exchanging the information once or more per year or once or more for 2-3 months than among clinics no exchanging the information about on-site investigation. Also, the probability of high perceived deterrence was higher 2.27 times (CI: 1.28-4.45) among clinics that knows more than 3 health care institutions having experienced an on-site investigation than among clinics knowing no case. Conclusion: A clinic knowing more punishment cases by onsite investigation and exchanging more frequently information about on-site investigation is likely to present high perceived deterrence. This result will provide important information to enlarge preventive effects of on-site investigation on fraud and abuse claims.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.411-416
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• 2023

From Cold War, Nuclear weapons have emerged military power into a very dangerous and important way of each national security. Throughout the era, the U.S. had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. But President George Bush initially started the withdrawal of nuclear tactical weapons deployed abroad in 1991. After that, under the protection of the nuclear umbrella, South Korea guarantees that the United States would operate its nuclear weapons to protect South Korea if it would be needed and the economy of South Korea has rapidly developed as more strong countries in the world. However, South Korea has seen and been realized the present state from the recent war between Russia and Ukraine. The protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea is unlikely to be permanently guaranteed. At the same time, South Korea should consider the security environment changes of surrounding nations such as China as military power acceleration and Russia as re-formation ambition. Because of these reasons, South Korea independently wants to protect itself and have the own nuclear weapons as a way to counter security threats. A majority of South Koreans also definitely believe that North Korea will not denuclearize or give up because North Korea has been having nuclear weapons as the final survival strategy of Kim Jong Un's regime. However, South Korea considers and makes new nuclear strategy through the role and effect of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to overcome the paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore, this research is to suggest the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea from new security threats of surrounding nations through dispute between India and Pakistan. The focus of this research is that what is the role and paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to find the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.31-35
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• 2024

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a large-scale surprise attack against Israel and war broke out. On this day, in addition to supplying rockets, they directly invaded Israeli territory in multiple areas using parariders and motorcycles. Considering the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, it is meaningful to consider why Israel allowed Hamas to attack and why it failed to deter the war in advance. Deterrence can only be successful if it is supported by capability, will, communication, and credibility. Although the capability and will were sufficient, and the communication through punitive deterrence had been sufficiently communicated, the failure to deter this war was problematic in terms of credibility. In order to increase deterrence against North Korea's threat, we need to improve customized extended deterrence, convey the will of both Korea and the United States to deter, and increase credibility in deterrence capabilities and execution ability.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.69-96
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• 2019

This paper is written to suggest several recommendations for South Korea to deter and defend North Korean nuclear threat, when North Korea does not seem to give up its nuclear weapons and the US's extended deterrence including the nuclear umbrella could remain uncertain. For this purpose, it explains key options regarding nuclear deterrence and defense by non-nuclear weapon state. It evaluates the current status of South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat and provides some recommendations to improve the preparedness. As a result, this paper concluded that South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat was not that reliable. The preparedness has weakened since the South Korean effort to denuclearize North Korea through negotiations in 2018. In this sense, South Korea could have serious problems in protecting its people from North Korean nuclear threat if the US promise of extended deterrence is not implemented. South Korea should focus on its decapitation operation to North Korean highest leaders in case of North Korean nuclear attack based on a minimal deterrence concept. It should be prepared to conduct preventive strikes instead of preemptive strikes due to North Korea's development of solid fuel ballistic missiles. It should integrate its Ballistic Missile Defense with that of the US forces in Korea. South Korea should make a sincere effort for nuclear civil defense including construction of nuclear shelters.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.81-88
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• 2019

Based on the theory of planned behavior and the theory of legal deterrence, this study takes consumers' willingness to pay for digital music as the research object, investigates the consumers who have digital music consumption channels and behaviors, and discusses the willingness of consumers to pay for digital music and its influencing factors. The study attempts to achieve the following research purposes: First, explore the influencing factors of willingness to pay for digital music using domestic and foreign literature research and related content analysis. Second, we want to examine the effect of Attitude, Collective Specifications, Quality Sensitivity and Music affinity on willingness to pay. Third, Legal deterrence and resource availability tries to verify whether there is a moderating effect between Attitude, Collective Specifications, Quality Sensitivity and Music affinity and willingness to pay. The research data was collected in 2019 between April 6th to May 8th. Questionnaires were randomly distributed in fixed places, mainly in Hubei Province, China. A total of 393 questionnaires were selected for data analysis. Based on the previous theoretical review and empirical analysis, the study draws the following conclusions: Firstly, attitude, collective specifications, quality sensitivity and music affinity have an impact on the willingness to pay. Second, Legal deterrence has a regulatory effect on the relationship among quality sensitivity, musical affinity and the willingness to pay. Last the resource availability has a significant impact on the willingness to pay. It also has a regulatory effect on the relationship among quality sensitivity, music affinity and the willingness to pay.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.13-22
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• 2015

This study used 286 men living without a spouse in the regions of Daejeon, Sejong, Chungnam and Chungbuk to review the effects that expressive sexual coping behavior have on the prostitution attitude. During this process, the moderating effect of the factor, 'perception of crime deterrence', was verified. The data were analyzed using PASW Statistics 18.0.Major findings are as follows; First, the attitude towards prostitution found in study subjects was higher than average, showing that they had a positive perception. Second, factors affecting the attitude towards prostitution were identified to be education level, health status, employment status, social participation, sexual coping behavior, official and unofficial deterrence as part of crime deterrence. Third, official deterrence as part of crime deterrents appeared to have a moderating effect in the relation between sexual coping behavior and prostitution attitude. Based on these findings, the study presents practical measures to deter prostitution of spouseless men.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.1-13
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• 2005

Due to the rapid developments in information and computer technology, the warfare paradigm is being transformed into information-centric and knowledge-based warfare. This atmosphere may have significant impact on the ROK armed forces' Force Improvement Plans (FIP) which is documented in 'Defense White Paper 2004'. We focus here on the relationship of information-centric force and deterrence of invasion. Particularly, we are interested in understanding the level of information superiority that might be required to deter the invasion. In order to solve this problem, we employed two-sided, zero-sum strategic game to simulate the outcome with six hypothetical cases devised by varying the level of information superiority.