• Journal of information and communication convergence engineering
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.38-42
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• 2018

In this paper, we consider measurement allocation problem in a spatially correlated sensor field. Our goal is to determine the probability of each sensor's being measured based on its contribution to the estimation reliability; it is desirable that a sensor improving the estimation reliability is measured more frequently. We consider a spatial correlation model of a sensor field reflecting transmission power limit, noise in measurement and transmission channel, and channel attenuation. Then the estimation reliability is defined distortion error between event source and its estimation at sink. Motivated by the correlation nature, we model the measurement allocation problem into a cooperative game, and then quantify each sensor's contribution using Shapley value. Against the intractability in the computation of exact Shapley value, we deploy a randomized method that enables to compute the approximate Shapley value within a reasonable time. Besides, we envisage a measurement scheduling achieving the balance between network lifetime and estimation reliability.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.8
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• pp.2854-2874
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• 2015

This paper presents a game theoretic approach to analyze the public goods (PGs) allocation in peer-to-peer (p2p) networks. In order to reduce the free-riders and promote the cooperation among peers, we propose an incentive mechanism with cooperation-based game theory. In this paper, we regarded the contributed resources by cooperators as public goods (PGs). We also build the PGs allocation in P2P networks to be the optimization problem, and the optimal solution of PGs allocation satisfies the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium. Firstly, based on the subscriber mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity, which can achieve Nash equilibrium. However, this strategy cannot meet to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium as the free-riders do not pay with their private goods for consuming the PGs. Secondly, based on the Walker mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity for the same allocation problem, which meets to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium and achieves Pareto efficiency within cooperative game. Simulations show that the proposed walker mechanism can significantly improve the network performance of throughout, and effectively alleviate free-riding problem in P2P networks.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.25 no.6
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• pp.1-19
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• 2021

Purpose - This paper aims at analyzing the functions and effectiveness of the cooperation agenda in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), focusing on the cases of Asian countries. This paper estimates the contribution of this agenda to the sustainable development in Asia by providing the 'side payment' of the economic integration that encourages foreign investment and change in global value chains (GVC). Design/methodology - This study analyzes the functions of the cooperation chapter in FTAs by applying the cooperative game theory and reviewing the structures of the related FTAs. Also, as an empirical study, the existing FTA provisions and related development assistant programs in Asia are reviewed in this paper, especially focusing on the FTAs signed by Korea. Findings - Our main findings can be summarized as follows: The drawback of the economic integration, which would be the imbalanced economic benefit, can be redressed by the cooperation chapter in FTAs functioning as a 'side payment'. Indeed, as the examples of Korean FTAs show, more foreign investment and the GVC expansion in Asian countries have been encouraged thanks to the implementation of the cooperation chapters. Originality/value - This paper attempts to find how a legally binding agreement would influence the cooperation agenda in Asia which has never been analyzed despite the increasing number of so-called 'cooperation' chapters in the FTAs.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.257-274
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• 2012

Since service competition among global supply chains became intensified, market-oriented system, instead of the existing cost-based system, for port service pricing has been strongly recommended in order to enhance their long-term viability and competitiveness. The Owen value of cooperative game frameworks allows us to apply a market-oriented pricing theory for the port pricing in the case of Gwangyang port to verify its usefulness. The analytical results of this paper suggested some solutions in the problem of berth-based cost allocation by a characteristic function and also showed the proper relative weights of factors to derive the quay use index by Budescu(1993). We also suggested a favorable port pricing system to major shipping firms as well as a discount port pricing system for their strategic alliance. To put it differently, the results of this study enable the port managers to make out some strategic port pricing system like the reasonable discount in port charge for the larger ship owners using the ports frequently.

• Journal of KIISE
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• v.42 no.5
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• pp.681-689
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• 2015

Personal information includes information about a living human individual. It is the information identifiable through name, resident registration number, and image, etc. Personal information which is collected by institutions can be wrongfully used, because it contains confidential information of an information object. In order to prevent this, a method is used to remove personal identification elements before distributing and sharing the data. However, even when the identifier such as the name and the resident registration number is removed or changed, personal information can be exposed in the case of a linking attack. This paper proposes a new anonymization technique to enhance data utility. To achieve this, attributes that are utilized in service tend to anonymize at a low level. In addition, the anonymization technique of the proposal can provide two or more anonymized data tables from one original data table without concern about a linking attack. We also verify our proposal by using the cooperative game theory.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.97 no.6
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• pp.669-679
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• 2008

Jirisan National Park was designated on December 29, 1967 as the first national park in Korea and that caused continuous conflicts between the violation of the right to hold property in this area due to several regulations following the designation and the nature preservation for the value of heritage for descendants. Thus, the objective of this study is to find a proposal for making decision based on the rationality that is able to solve these conflicts. To achieve the objective of this study, this study applies a game theory that supports a reasonable decision making process for solving these conflicts between interest groups around Jirisan National Park in which the component of this game consists of Jirisan National Park, residents, and interest groups. The Nash equilibrium obtained by the analysis of the strategy of interest groups for the use and preservation of forests and its rewards from the strategy as an nonecooperative game showed a behavior that chases their own benefits and causes lots of troubles. However, in the case of the results obtained from a cooperative game based on the strategy that includes some public interests accepted by interest groups and its rewards, it represented an aspect that solves conflicts through achieving a strategical set, which shows a win-win outcome even though the results of this cooperative game may present less rewards than that of the Nash equilibrium. Whereas, if there exists the public interests accepted by interest groups and truth for protecting such public interests, it is considered that it becomes a way that solves present structural troubles in the National Parks in Korea due to the fact that there exist uncertainties caused by the human rationality.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.11
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• pp.5253-5270
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• 2016

With device-to-device (D2D) communications, an inactive user terminal can be utilized as a relay node to support multi-hop communication so that connective experience of the cell-edge user as well as the capacity of the whole system can be significantly improved. In this paper, we investigate the spectrum sharing for a cooperative relay assisted D2D communication underlying a cellular network. We formulate a joint relay selection and channel assignment problem to maximize the throughput of the system while guaranteeing the quality of service (QoS) requirements of cellular users (CUs) and D2D users (DUs). By exploiting coalition formation game theory, we propose two algorithms to solve the problem. The first algorithm is designed based on merge and split rules while the second one is developed based on single user's movement. Both of them are proved to be stable and convergent. Simulation results are presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.40 no.1
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• pp.61-71
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• 2018

In this study, we developed hybrid control algorithms in smart base stations (SBSs) along with devised communication, caching, and computing techniques. In the proposed scheme, SBSs are equipped with computing power and data storage to collectively offload the computation from mobile user equipment and to cache the data from clouds. To combine in a refined manner the communication, caching, and computing algorithms, game theory is adopted to characterize competitive and cooperative interactions. The main contribution of our proposed scheme is to illuminate the ultimate synergy behind a fully integrated approach, while providing excellent adaptability and flexibility to satisfy the different performance requirements. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can outperform existing schemes by approximately 5% to 15% in terms of bandwidth utilization, access delay, and system throughput.

• IE interfaces
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.142-148
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• 2004

The objective of bridge construction cost allocation is to distribute in a fair and rational manner the bridge construction costs among those vehicles using the bridge. In most bridge construction cost allocation studies, bridge construction costs are mainly distributed according to traffic load(gross vehicle weight), without any consideration of bridge capacity requirements(the number of lanes). In this paper, a bridge cost allocation method for considering both traffic capacity and traffic loads is developed. The proposed method is based on cooperative game theory, particularly two concepts known as the Aumann-Shapley (A-S) value and Shapley value. This method can help to analyze the impact of traffic capacity costs. By applying the proposed method to an example, traffic capacity cost is found to be high so that traffic capacity should be considered to allocate the bridge construction costs to vehicle classes in a more equitable manner.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.1904-1921
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• 2019

In this paper, we investigate the problem of secure communications in multiple-input-multiple-output interference networks from the perspective of physical layer security. Specifically, the legitimate transmitter-receiver pairs are divided into different categories of active and inactive. To enhance the security performances of active pairs, inactive pairs serve as cooperative jammers and broadcast artificial noises to interfere with the eavesdropper. Besides, active pairs improve their own security by using joint transceivers. The encoding of active pairs and inactive pairs are designed by maximizing the difference of mean-squared errors between active pairs and the eavesdropper. In detail, the transmit precoder matrices of active pairs and inactive pairs are solved according to game theory and linear programming respectively. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm has fast convergence speed, and the security performances in different scenarios are effectively improved.