• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.409-417
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• 2017

The study is concerned with doing research on the plan to prevent the dispute occurring between contract parties regarding the additional cost generated when the construction period is shortened during construction work. After the review of the claim cases and the judgment cases of the court regarding the additional cost caused by the shortened construction period, the representative problem is the incomplete regulations on calculating the additional cost. In the 1st stage of the results of the research on the problem, the procedure handling the additional cost is presented, and the process of planning and approving the shortening of the construction period is gone through in the stage of the procedure to prevent the dispute on the additional cost between contract parties. In the 2nd stage, the plan on enacting and revising the regulations on removing the incomplete problems of the current regulations relating to the calculation of the additional cost. The basis for the advanced contract management is provided by resolving the incomplete problems of the current regulations relating to the shortening of the construction period with the prevention of a dispute and the resultant loss.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.334-337
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• 2003

In this paper we presents a centralized model for a long-term replenishment contract model in the supply chain system. We assume ARIMA demand process for reflecting more realistic demand data and present a solution which minimizes total system cost of the contract model between single supplier and buyer under centralized system. From the result of experiments we can observe that the proposed model generate better result than the decentralized model.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.167-197
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• 2017

I build a small open economy (SOE) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to investigate the effect of a heterogeneous wage contract between regular and temporary workers on a macroeconomic volatility in a financially fragile economy. The imperfect financial market condition is captured by a quadratic financial adjustment cost for borrowing foreign assets, and the labor market friction is captured by a Nash bargaining process which is only available to the regular workers when they negotiate their wages with the firms while the temporary workers are given their wage which simply equals the marginal cost. As a result of impulse responsesto a domestic productivity shock, the higher elasticity of substitution between two types of workers and the lower weight on the regular workers in the firm's production process induce the higher volatilities in most variables. This is reasoned that the higher substitutability creates more volatile wage determination process while the lower share of the regular workers weakens their Nash bargaining power in the contract process.

• Journal of the East Asian Society of Dietary Life
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.727-737
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• 2007

The aims of this study was to suggest a new efficiency measurement indicator for evaluating the management efficiency of decision making units(DMUs) in the contract foodservice industry. The data envelopment analysis(DEA) model which considers multiple inputs and outputs and looking for benchmarks, was used to compare the productivity of DMUs. We considered sales, profits, and customer satisfaction as output variables and it adopted food cost, labor cost and administrative expense as input variables. The results of applying DEA revealed relatively efficient types of business and service types. The efficiency of school units was highest and the mired service type was the most efficient one. In this study the CCR model efficiency was analysed with profit and the customer satisfaction index by the matrix method. DEA efficiency was correlated with profit but there was no correlation between DEA efficiency and the customer satisfaction index.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.19-32
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• 2002

This paper examines the effect of the producer-supplier quality contract parameters and the magnitude of the quality related variables on the quality of the final products. Our analysis focuses on the parties' equilibrium behavior In a quality game environment where the supplier should choose among the two production technologies, one requiring high cost but producing high quality Parts and the other requiring low cost but producing low quality parts and where the producer should decide whether to do the inspection of the parts. The game framework is employed to depict the potential conflicts existing between the Producer and the supplier because the Producer can not observe the supplier's choice and each party wants the other to bear the cost of producing high quality products. In our model, we specifically consider the competitive situation where the producer competes with a firm producing the same product. We employ the market share attraction model to Incorporate the competitive situation and completely characterize the equilibrium by using the Nash equilibrium concept for the game solution. Our results show that the equilibrium depends on the contract terms and the magnitude of the quality related variables. Compared to the non-competitive situation, the probability of producer's Inspection and the probability of supplier's choosing the high quality technology increases in a competitive situation. This is true even when the competitor's quality is lower than the producer's lowest. As a result, the quality of the final product increases In a competitive situation. And as the failure cost borne by the supplier increases, the probability of choosing the high quality technology Increases and the probability of inspection decreases. The net effect of this results in the decrease of the final product quality.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.96-107
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• 2004

This paper deals with $\ulcorner$Requirement Decision Model for Repair Parts supplied by the Government$\lrcorner$ which is to reduce Aircraft Contract Maintenance Cost. It aims to find solutions to the fundamental problems of the Aircraft Contract Maintenance System. Under the current Aircraft Contract Maintenance System, it is hard to forecast the exact demand of repair parts, so support rate of Repair Parts supplied by the Government is restricted under 50 percent. It is inevitable to purchase Repair Parts from the firm with much higher price than those of Government source. However, absence of fixed demand pattern makes it difficult to improve accuracy of demand forecast. As a solution to these problems, this model prevents a cost increase due to the unit price difference between Repair Parts supplied by the Government and Repair Parts purchased by the Firm. It also reflects demand characteristics of each repair part, and prevents continual stock increase by setting an upper limit on the amount of Repair Parts supplied by the Government. The effectiveness of this model is verified by empirical analysis using the latest raw data. By applying this model to real situation, we expect to reduce about 4 billion won every year.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.175-201
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• 2007

Licensing contracts between partners in International Joint Ventures(IJV) have not only aspects of relation contract, which is interdependent and long-term cooperative relationships in interpartner but also aspects of discrete contract which is exposed to opportunistic risk caused by IJV partners who maximize individual profit instead of joint payoff maximization. In this circumstance, appropriate compensation structures such as lump-sum and royalty can reduce conflicts and spur interpartner cooperation. In addition, compensation structures that stipulate each party's rights, duties, and responsibilities under various sets of environmental conditions have strong implications for transaction cost minimization and joint payoff maximization. On the other hands, compensation structures such as lump-sum and royalty in IJV licensing contract have benefits and costs depending on IJV partners uncertainty, partner dependency, and environment uncertainty. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to empirically show how partner uncertainty, partner dependence and environment uncertainty influence compensation structure chosen by licensor in IJV.

• Ocean Systems Engineering
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.79-95
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• 2019

The material analysis of an offshore structure is generally conducted in the contract design phase for the price quotation of a new offshore project. This analysis is conducted manually by an engineer, which is time-consuming and can lead to inaccurate results, because the data size from previous projects is too large, and there are so many materials to consider. In this study, the piping materials in an offshore structure are analyzed for contract design using a big data framework. The big data technologies used include HDFS (Hadoop Distributed File System) for data saving, Hive and HBase for the database to handle the saved data, Spark and Kylin for data processing, and Zeppelin for user interface and visualization. The analyzed results show that the proposed big data framework can reduce the efforts put toward contract design in the estimation of the piping material cost.

• Plant Journal
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.51-59
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• 2009

The global plant construction market has grown dramatically since 2000. As the market grows, domestic EPC contractors are expanding to meet its needs and have made great strides in terms of economic indicators from a decade ago. Larger projects involve a number of risk factors, such as volatile oil prices, however, and thus require quantitative and elaborate project management techniques for the ultimate success of a project's profitability. In addition, many Korean companies face difficulties in predicting potential risks and problems due to a lack of experience in dealing with the global market trend toward projects based on the Cost-re(Cost Reimbursable) contract as opposed to those based on the LSTK(Lumpsum Turnkey) contract. This study will examine methods and types of man-hour management according to plant project contract types. Further, it will explore the man-hour management system for successful completion of projects by satisfying the client's needs and enhancing the convenience in engineers' using the system. Additionally, this study will analyze the current system and identify its problems to address potential problems.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.1-9
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• 2018

This study is intended to look into the effect of construction safety supervision system on risk control and reduction. To achieve this, a survey was carried out to 114 companies in construction, ordering, contract and management. The overall findings were as follows. The effect of construction safety supervision system on risk control and reduction showed that factors of supervision system, supervision cost and supervision method had a positive effect on risk control and reduction. And their perception of the introduction of safety supervision system in construction sites according to process showed that there was a difference between them according to the field of ordering, contract and supervision. There was the biggest difference between owner and contractor in double supervision system, but no difference between them in the perception of risk reduction. These results show that all ordering, contract and supervision are positively needed for the introduction of construction safety supervision. This means that there is a difference between owner and contractor in the perception of process according to system operation. All companies agree to system improvement by the settlement of safety supervision system for the prevention of safety accidents and safe construction, but the systematic complement of safety supervision is the burden of contractor. And there is a big difference between owner and contractor in the perception of responsibility and concern for cost burden.