• 중국학논총
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• no.64
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• pp.141-156
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• 2019

After coming to power, Xi Jinping has continuously announced his political conviction, novel view of values, new thoughts and theories through the various kinds of mass media. A comprehensive understanding of these contents allows us to examine Xi Jinping's intention of building Chinese national ideology, and the process of change and settlement of his ideas. This paper aims to explore the following issues based on the Xi Jinping's statements. Chapter 2 examines the process and time-background where the ideas of Marx·Mao Zedong, and China specific ideology of Socialism become the sources of Xi Jinping's Ideology formation. Chapter 3 deals with the contents and function of the China dream which is the fundamental aim of Xi Jinping's Ideology formation. Chapter 4 focuses on the historical value of Xi Jinping's Ideology formation.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.61-84
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• 2023

In this paper, I tried to clarify the background of the strengthening of centralization in the central-local relations during the Xi Jinping period in terms of the institutional structure of elite politics through a comparative study of the composition of the provincial sector of the Politburo, the highest power body, during the time of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Compared to the Hu Jintao period, it is judged that the strengthening of centralization in the Xi Jinping era is being implemented not through the neutralization of institutionalized formal construction norms, but through the expansion of control within the norms. In other words, the institutionalized frame itself was not broken in the composition of the provincial sector of the Politburo, and local compliance with the central government centered on the general secretary was increased by exercising the right to control personnel more strongly.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.5-36
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• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.129-148
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• 2017

The political system of Xi Jinping which was launched in 2013, faced many difficulties both domestically and internationally. Xi Jinping must integrate and stabilize society through political reforms, such as sustained economic growth and Resolved corruption. In addition, he should seek new relations with the United States on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, this study analyzed political leadership of Chinese political leaders including Xi Jinping using Max Weber 's political domination type. From the first generation political leaders to the fourth generation political leaders in China, the types of political domination of the first and second generation political leaders tend to be charismatic rather than legitimate domination. But the third generation political leaders tend to have a tendency of traditional domination rather than legitimate domination, and the fourth generation political leaders have a tendency to dominate more than traditional domination. On the other hand, the type of political domination of Xi Jinping shows traditional domination and legitimate domination tendency in the process of political growth and emergence, but shows tendency of charismatic domination after domination of political power.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.61-92
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• 2020

This paper attempts to examine the changes in China's naval strategy and to analyze the goal, range, and method of each strategy during the Xi Jinping's era. Since the founding of New China, the People's Liberation of Army Navy(PLAN) has made four changes in the naval strategy. Under Xi Jinping's administration, China's naval strategy is far seas operation combined with near seas active defense. Now, China's naval strateg y is shifting from a defensive to an aggressive one, increasing the proportion of offensive weapon systems and the number of state-of-the-art warships, and the scope of the naval strategy has been specified in the second island chain including the Indian Ocean. With the changes of naval strategy, the PLAN will set a new strategic goal to secure maritime dominance and implement an assertive strategy to actively respond to the intervention and intrusion of external forces. Moreover, the PLAN will also improve its sea-based deterrence force and the maneuver force to block other countries in the long-distance maritime conflict zones. The operation method of China's future naval strateg y will gradually shift from 'interdiction' to 'rapid-response.'

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.5-25
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• 2014

On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.

• 중국학논총
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• no.65
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• pp.215-234
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• 2020

This paper aims to analyze the recent consolidation of Xi Jinping's power in the context of political reform of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and reason out its implications. After Reform and Opening Up, the CCP needed to adapt to the changing society, secure its legitimacy and reinforce its ruling power. Therefore, the CCP has practiced political reform focused on intra-democracy since 16th Party Congress in 2002. Intra-democracy in the CCP's collective leadership consists of two parts: a stable power succession, based on term limits and age limits, and a democratic management system, based on checks and compromises between political factions. Those mechanisms of intra-democracy are still functioning in the Xi Jinping era, which explains that the consolidation of Xi's power is the result of the agreement in the CCP. In other words, it is a short-term change to efficiently deal with challenges the CCP is facing.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.39-76
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• 2019

This paper is to analyze the trend and implications of the publication of China's defense and security white papers. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled instruction; publication details and composition of China's defense and security white paper; the gist of the white paper on national defense and security during the Chinese president Xi Jinping era; the implications of Chinese white paper on national defense and security during the Chinese president Xi Jinping era; and conclusion. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense had published seven books every two years since 1998 to 2010. In 1995, the ministry published a white paper titled 'China's arms control and disarmament' for the first time. In 2013, it published a white paper titled 'The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces' and 'China's Military Strategy' in 2015. All have the common characteristic of being a propaganda policy reflecting China's strategic calculations. It seems that China has began to publish defense white papers in a proactive manner, due to the following factors: (1)pressure on China to demand military transparency from neighboring countries such as the United States; (2)the erosion of the 'China threat.' and (3)confidence in the achievement of China's military modernization. The 'active defensive strategy' and the 'strong defense strategy' of Si Jinping are implied in the words "China's dream is a dream of a powerful country and dream of a strong nation is essential to construct a strong nation." His these strategies have raised security concerns for neighboring countries. We need to maintain and reinforce strong ROK-US security cooperation, and hedging strategies to harmoniously promote ROK-China economic cooperation.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.161-168
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• 2023

Recently, China-Taiwan relations are facing a crisis, and at the same time, the U.S.-China relationship and the structure of Northeast Asia are greatly shaken, so we should pay attention to changes in cross-strait relations. This study aims to predict how cross-strait relations will change after the party convention by analyzing Xi Jinping's Taiwan policy, focusing on the "Political Report" of the 20th party convention and the content analysis of leadership personnel. The results of the study are as follows. First, as the amendment to the party constitution announced after the closing of the party convention stipulates the possibility of armed invasion, Xi Jinping will implement a tough Taiwan policy emphasizing unification. Second, strategic competition with the United States will continue to intensify in the future when analyzing the contents of Chapters 2, 11, 13, and 14 of the "Political Reporting" and the personnel management of diplomatic and security leadership. As a result, cross-strait relations are expected to show instability for a considerable period of time. Third, at a time when Taiwan rejects the unification plan of "one country, two systems" and the tendency to de-Chineseize is strengthening, there is a possibility that legislation or specific enforcement ordinances will be enacted to strengthen the existing "Anti-Secession Law." Fourth, it is expected that strong and warm two-sided strategies will be used together, such as taking a strong response to external forces interfering with the Taiwan issue and Taiwan independence forces, and using incentives for the Kuomintang(KMT) and Taiwanese who are friendly to unification.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.115-145
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• 2023

The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter referred to as "the 20th National Congress") was under the global spotlight long before it was held for seven days from 16 to 22 October 2022. People wondered whether Xi Jinping would secure a third term as China's leader or whether he would lay the foundations to be in power forever during the third term. In Korea, the press and media questioned whether the event would become the "crowning of Emperor Xi (Xi Huangdi)," whose power rivaled that of the first emperor in China, Shi Hunagdi, and featured the scene where Hu Jintao was forced to leave the venue during the Congress. On the other hand, many Korean academics focused more on how Xi would organize the Politburo and its Standing Committee and whether the outline of his heirs would appear during the event. This tendency in academia in turn worsened the media's concerns. This paper presents a quantitative analysis of the 20th National Congress Report, as opposed to an analysis of Xi's political intentions at the event. The National Congress Report outlines the Party's visions, goals, and strategies for the next five years in politics, economy, society, culture, foreign affairs, and relationship with Taiwan. The authoritative document is rich in narrative and logic and deserves academic study. This research analyzes the 18th, 19th, and 20th Reports by identifying their keywords and regular expressions and checking their frequency and percentage through text-mining methods. This approach enables the quantification and visualization of the significant changes in the Party's sovereign vision over the fifteen years of Xi's rule from 2013 to 2027.