• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.

• Journal of rehabilitation welfare engineering & assistive technology
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.147-153
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• 2016

The aims of this study were to evaluate the joint coordination between hip and knee joints in the transfemoral amputees, and its symmetry between sound and prosthetic limbs. Seven transfemoral amputees ($46.4{\pm}10.7-year-old$, $174.8{\pm}3.5cm$, $78.3{\pm}9.7kg$) and 7 able bodies ($24.0{\pm}4.5-year-old$, $174.5{\pm}5.9cm$, $66.9{\pm}9.4Kg$) participated in this study. They walked at a self-selected walking speed across a 10m level ground. Simultaneously angle and angular velocity in the hip and knee joint were measured by motion analysis system. Then continuos relative phase(CRP), standard deviations of CRP (CRP_SD) and symmetry index(SI) were calculated. In able bodies, there were no differences of the parameters between left and right limb(all p>0.05). However, significant differences between sound and prosthetic limb in most of the parameters, except for CRP for stance phase were shown (all p<0.05). There were differences in all SI between transfemoral amputees and able bodies (p<0.05). In conclusion, joint coordination was altered in transfemoral amputee during level walking and shown in interlimb asymmetry.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.91-113
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• 2002

We report and analyze the Korean physicians' recent general strike over the implementation of the Separation of Prescribing and Dispensing Practice (SPDP) in which more than 18,000 private clinics and 280 hospitals participated. Utilizing game-theoretic models of bargaining we explain why the Korean physicians were so successful in organizing intense collective action against the government and securing very favorable policy outcomes. In particular, we highlight the role of distributional conflict among social actors in shaping the details of institutional reform. The introduction of the SPDP was a necessary first step in the overall reform of health care system in Korea. However, the SPDP was perceived to be a serious threat to the economic viability of their profession by the vast majority of Korean physicians who had long been relied on the profits from selling medicines to compensate for the loss of income due to the low service fee under the previous health care system. The strong political coalition among heterogeneous physicians enabled them to organize an intense form of collective action, the general strike. Thus, physicians were successful not only in dragging the government to a bargaining table, but also winning in the bargaining and securing an outcome vastly favorable to them. On the other hand, the lack of an overall reform plan in the health care policy area, especially the finance of the National Health Insurance and the need for maintaining an image as a successful reform initiator, motivated the government to reach a quick resolution with the striking physicians.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.153-172
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• 1990

The present paper investigates the potential value of strategic antitrust policy in an oligopolistic international market. The market is characterized by a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium and by asymmetry in costs among firms in the world market. The model is useful for two reasons. First, it is important in the context of policy-making to examine the conditions under which it may be beneficial to relax antitrust law to enhance competitiveness. Second, the explicit derivation of the level of cost-saving required for a gain in total domestic surplus provides an empirical rule for excluding industries that do not satisfy the requirements for a socially beneficial antitrust exemption. Results of the analysis include a criterion that tells how the cost-saving and concentration effects of a merger offset each other. The criterion is derived from fairly general assumptions on demand functions and is simple enough to be applied as a part of the merger guidelines. Another interesting policy implication of our analysis is that promoting mergers would not be a beneficial strategy in a net importing industry where cost-saving opportunities are thin. Cost-saving domestic mergers are more likely to increase national welfare in exporting industries. The best candidate industries for application of strategic antitrust policy are those with the following characteristics: (i) a large potential for efficiency enhancement; (ii) high market concentration at the world but not the domestic level; (iii) a high ratio of exports to imports. Recently, many policymakers and economists in Korea have also come to believe that the appropriate antitrust policy in an era of increased foreign competition may actually be to encourage rather than to prohibit domestic mergers. The Industry Development Act of 1986 and the proposed bill for Mergers and Conversions in the Financial Industry of 1990 reflect this changing perspective on antitrust policy. Antitrust laws may burden domestic firms in the sense that they have a more constrained strategy set. Expenditures to avoid antitrust attacks could also increase costs for domestic firms. But there is no clear evidence that the impact of antitrust policy is significant enough to harm the competitiveness of domestic firms. As a matter of fact, it is necessary for domestic financial institutions to become large in scale in this era of globalization. However, the absence of empirical evidence for efficiency enhancement from mergers suggests caution in the relaxation of antitrust standards.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.177-219
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• 2016

A commercial advertisement is not only a way of competition but also a medium of communication. Thus, it is under the constitutional protection of the freedom of business (article 15 of the Constitution) as well as the freedom of press [article 21 (1) of the Constitution]. In terms of the freedom of business or competition, it should be noted that an unfair advertising (false or misleading advertisement) can be regulated as an unfair competition, while any restraint on advertising other than unfair one might be doubted as an unjustifiable restraint of trade. In terms of the freedom of press or communication, it is important that article 21 (2) of the Constitution forbids any kind of (prior) censorship, and the Constitutional Court applies this restriction even to commercial advertising. In this article, the applicability of these schemes to advertising of the so-called learned professions, especially physician, are to be examined, and some proposals for the reformation of the current regulatory regime are to be made. Main arguments of this article can be summarized as follows: First, the current regime which requires advance review of physician advertising as prescribed in article 56 (2) no. 9 of Medical Act should be reformed. It does not mean that the current interpretation of article 21 of the Constitution is agreeable. Though a commercial advertising is a way of communication and can be protected by article 21 (1) of the Constitution, it should not be under the prohibition of censorship prescribed by article 21 (2) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court adopts the opposite view, however. It is doubtful that physician advertising needs some prior restraint, also. Of course, there exists severe informational asymmetry between physicians and patients and medical treatment might harm the life and health of patients irrevocably, so that medical treatment can be discerned from other services. It is civil and criminal liability for medical malpractice and duty to inform and not regulation on physician advertising, to address these differences or problems. Advance review should be abandoned and repelled, or substituted by more unproblematic way of regulation such as an accreditation of reviewed advertising or a self-regulation preformed by physician association independently from the Ministry of Health and Welfare or any other governmental agencies. Second, the substantive criteria for unfair physician advertising also should correspond that of unfair advertising in general. Some might argue that a learned profession, especially medical practice, is totally different from other businesses. It is performed under the professional ethics and should not persue commercial interest; medical practice in Korea is governed by the National Health Insurance system, the stability of which might be endangered when commercial competition in medical practice be allowed. Medical Act as well as the condition of medical practice market do not exclude competition between physicians. The fact is quite the opposite. Physicians are competing even though under the professional ethics and obligations and all the restrictions provided by the National Health Insurance system. In this situation, regulation on physician advertising might constitute unjustifiable restraint of competition, especially a kind of entry barrier for 'new physicians.'