• Korea Trade Review
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• v.45 no.2
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• pp.177-189
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• 2020

The dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is in great peril. The Appellate Body has ceased to function last December as the United States has blocked the appointment of new Appellate Body members since 2017. The focus of this study is on the examination of US's discontent on the Appellate Body and various efforts to reform the Appellate Body. In a recent report, the US Trade Representative raises its concerns on the Appellate Body including 90 days mandatory deadline, transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members, scope of appeal, advisory opinions, precedent, recommendation, and overreach without offering any viable solutions. Some of WTO members and experts proposed several Appellate Body reform measures but agreement between WTO members is unlikely in a foreseeable future. Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms should be seriously considered such as interim appeal arbitration arrangements, separate dispute settlement mechanisms for trade remedies, unilateral retaliatory measures without WTO authorization. Rules-based multilateral dispute settlement system is imperative to small open economies like Korea. The Korean government should actively participate in Appellate Body reform discussions with other WTO members to keep the WTO dispute settlement system from collapsing.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.13
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• pp.699-733
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• 2000

This article analyzes the state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement for first four and a half years. Remarkable points found on this analysis are as follows: First, the Quad consisting of the United States, the European Community (EC), Canada and Japan has participated in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism more frequently than any other WTO member. Second, among developing country members some leading countries such as Korea, Brazil and India have relied actively upon the mechanism to claim and defend their rights and obligations under the WTO rules. Third, bilateral dispute settlements generally have been preferred to multilateral dispute settlements by the panel or Appellate Body. Fourth, observation of the Appellate Body proceedings well shows WTO members' strategy to use every process available to them. Fifth, the provisions of GATT 1994 have been most frequently invoked by the members. GATS and TRIPS Agreement disputes are mainly involved in developed countries, in particular the U.S. and the EC. Sixth, very high winning ratio in the panel and Appellate Body process indicates that complaining parties review the possibility to get favorable rulings even before referring to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and prepare for the case very thoroughly. Seventh, roughly speaking, disputes were settled within two or three years. Therefore, seeking bilateral dispute settlement can be more advantageous to a complaining party than referring to a panel or an arbitrator because of low costs and short time period in dispute settlement. Finally, the DSB approved retaliatory actions for winning complaining parties against the defending parties who had rejected implementation of its rulings and recommendations. In conclusion, it can be said that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been operated very successfully for the first four and a half years. It is hoped that continued study on state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement mechanism will be contributory to improved national interest of Korea.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.3-29
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• 2020

The WTO's dispute settlement system has played a significant role in settling trade disputes between countries, and its function and role have been expanded by handling about 596 disputes since its establishment in 1995. This shows that the WTO's dispute settlement system is gaining enormous trust among member countries that it recognizes as a fair, effective, and efficient system for resolving trade disputes. The U.S. remains uncooperative in the WTO dispute settlement system, citing disregard for the 90-day deadline for appeals, continued service by persons who are no longer A.B. members, issuing advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute, A.B. review of facts, and review of a member's domestic law de novo. The A.B. claims its reports are entitled to be treated as a precedent. These problems should be gradually improved through various discussions and agreements by establishing a multilateral forum for resolving disputes and gradually ending the problems through reform of the DSU.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.157-177
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• 2017

World Trade Organization(WTO) has 164 members since it has established on 1995. It plays a significant role in solving the world trade disputes. The process of the dispute settlement mechanism includes five steps: Negotiation, Establishment of experts group, Deliberation of appellate body, Execution and Supervision of Verdict and the Sanctions for Default. It suggested that the higher rate of developed countries using mechanism to solving the disputes than developing countries solving disputes by mechanism through the analysis of dispute of WTO members. Meanwhile, the more powerful economic entity is, the more trade dispute will be. There are several problems of mechanism by analysis the recently famous cases of trade disputes: Overburden of experts panel, Low utilization rate of the mechanism of developing countries, Lack of economic competition policy and labor standard terms and Unfulfillment of retaliatory measures of developing countries towards developed countries. This paper propose proper solutions and advises to improve mechanism of WTO dispute settlement.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.81-113
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• 2013

The World Trade Organization (WTO) offers remedies for non-compliance by the introduction of compensation or retaliation in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). There are no the provisions under the WTO DSU and it seems unclear what retaliation is attempting to achieve. Therefore, it is unclear whether the goal of WTO retaliation is to induce compliance or to restore the balance between the rights and the obligations of WTO members. It has been claimed the WTO has a strong dispute settlement system by providing retaliation when the recommendations and rulings of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are not complied with. But this seems to be inadequate to bring about effective and timely compliance. Especially there is a problem with free riding by a violating member because the level of retaliation is determined from the expiration of a reasonable period of time, providing an incentive to delay compliance. Also the level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, according to DSU Article 22.4. However, if the member concerned objections to the level of the suspension proposed, the matter shall be referred to arbitration. The arbitrator shall not examine the nature of the suspension of concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the nullification or impairment. The arbitrator makes an assessment standard of equivalence by comparing the suspension of concessions or other obligations and the nullification or impairment calculated in terms of the amount of trade. But it is necessary that other standards replace the quantitative standards when the level of the nullification or impairment cannot be quantified by concrete damages.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.155-187
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• 2017

In the US, the Sections 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 are still being used to resolve disputes. The U.S' such unilateral retaliations grounded on the Sections 301 of the Trade Act, in fact, violate the WTO agreements and hinder the development of international trade as the trade partner may assume it as a reprisal move impeding the fair settlement of disputes. Here, this study is going to examine the characteristics and functions of the WTO dispute settlement system briefly and compare the countermeasures recognized to be legitimate by the WTO with the U.S' unilateral retaliation. Also, this author will analyse the US-Japan Automobiles (DS6) and EC-Bananas III (DS27) as one of the typical cases resulted from the unilateral retaliation. According to the result, these cases do not conform to WTO-consistency, and it implies that it is absurd to accept the US' unilateral retaliation internationally. In conclusion, presently, it is a global trend to solidify protectionism, and to vitalize trade and resolve trade disputes efficiently, it is needed to prohibit the recourse to unilateral retaliations and also positively apply the WTO dispute settlement system(DSU) defining rules about how to strengthen the multilateral system.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.307-325
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• 2007

Examining the standards of review adopted by the dispute settlement body of the WTO in its decision on safeguard measures, the Appellate Body offers no coherent guidance or theory as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures adopted by the domestic authorities. It faults the lack of reasoned and adequate explanation in the national authorities' decision to impose safeguard measures, yet its own explanation of the permissible role for safeguard measure could hardly be less instructive. The Appellate Body has consistently emphasized fidelity to text in its decision but that approach can not work properly when the text is fundamentally deficient from the viewpoints that neither Article XIX nor the safeguard Agreement establish a coherent foundation for safeguard measures due to their vague and abstract provision. Without any coherent theory on guidance as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures, it would be absurd to expect WTO members to produce a reasoned and adequate explanation as to how their safeguard measures are in compliance with the WTO roles. In the absence of a thorough renegotiation for the proper operation of the WTO safeguard system, which seems quite unlikely for the foreseeable future, perhaps the unique method out of the current predicament is for the Appellate Body to lead a movement in establishing a sensible common law of safeguards, drawing on extra-textual guidance including the standards of review about their proper role in the WTO safeguard mechanism.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.187-210
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• 2019

This article examines the necessity for the introduction of an ICSID Appellate System. In comparison with the WTO appellate system, the ICSID ad hoc Committee has a very limited mandate. An annulment inquiry under the ICSID arbitration system barely focuses on whether the arbitral decision resulted from a justifiable process. As long as there is procedural legitimacy, the resulting awards remain unaffected under the annulment procedure, irrespective of mistakes of fact or law. In contrast, in the WTO DSS the AB substantively reviews panel rulings and suggestions that are founded on any deficiency of objectivity or error in the interpretation of a particular WTO provision. This defect intrinsic in the annulment procedure could cause injustice to a party earnestly interested in correcting recognized misapplication of law by ICSID tribunals. Accordingly, the establishment of an appellate system would result in a more substantive and procedural review of awards. The creation of such an ICSID appellate system would ensure thorough scrutiny of the decisions of the tribunal of first instance, leading to better reasoned outcomes. This could lead to a crystallization of predictability in investment relations. The end result would be that fairness, clarity, reliability, and legality in the ICSID adjudicative process would be unassailable, to the advantage of all the contracting parties.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.113-130
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• 2021

This study aims to analyze the WTO-inconsistent aspects of the single rate presumption of the United States in establishing and imposing anti-dumping duties for non-market economy exporters. By examining the drafting history in the GATT/WTO negotiations and the practice of the single rate presumption for non-market economies by the United States from a comparative perspective, it critically addresses the inherent lack of pertinent disciplines under the framework of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement in establishing dumping margins for exporters of non-market economies. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body leaves open the possibility of allowing the investigating authority to consider multiple exporters and the exporting country as a single entity. However, the study argues that it is difficult in practice for the investigating authority to make a single-entity decision in a WTO-consistent manner. The study also finds an incompatibility in the notion between establishing dumping margins for 'individual' exporters and 'non-market economies.' A proper discipline for non-market economies under the multilateral anti-dumping norm needs to be reconsidered in the era of persistent trade conflicts between the United States and China.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.1
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• pp.177-191
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• 2019

Global trade protectionism has increased further and U.S. priorities and protectionism have strengthened since Trump took office in 2017. Trump administration is actively implementing tariff measures based on U.S. domestic trade laws rather than the WTO rules and regulations. In particular, the American government has recently been imposing high tariffs due to national security and imposing economic sanctions on other countries' imports. According to the U.S. Trade Expansion Act Section 232, the American government imposed additional tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to WTO member countries such as China, India, and EU etc. on march 15, 2018. Thus, this study aims to investigate whether the U.S. Trade Expansion Act Section 232 is consistent with GATT/WTO rules by comparing the legal basis of US / China / WTO regulations related to Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act, and gives some suggestions for responding to the Section 232 measure. As the Section 232 measure exceeded the scope of GATT's Security Exceptions regulation and is very likely to be understood as a safeguard measure. If so, the American government is deemed to be in breach of WTO's regulations, such as the most-favored-nation treatment obligations and the duty reduction obligations. In addition, American government is deemed to be failed to meet the conditions of initiation of safeguard measure and violated the procedural requirements such as notification and consultation. In order to respond to these U.S. protection trade measures, all affected countries should actively use the WTO multilateral system to prevent unfair measures. Also, it is necessary to revise the standard jurisdiction of the dispute settlement body and to explore the balance of the WTO Exception clause so that it can be applied strictly. Finally, it would be necessary for Chinese exporters to take a counter-strategy under such trade pressure.